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ABSTRACT. 
This thesis addresses the question, "how can I talk 
about public service in terms which signify its distinctive 
character?" Part I notes that the practitioner is faced with a 
proliferation of academic approaches, analyses and statements of 
methodological objectives based on different social sciences 
attempting to solve different problems. It seems that he will 
look in vain for something distinctive in the literature of Public 
Administration. At the practical level in Queensland he is not 
encouraged to question his role in the government system. The 
developing "turbulent environment" is questioning established 
societal values and public administration is no exception. In 
this situation, the individual in the public service may be faced 
with an ethical crisis and it is this factor which is asserted to 
be of fundamental importance. 
The ideas presented here are directed towards the 
construction of a highest common denominator for the various 
academic approaches to the study of public administration. The 
exercise is confused by semantic difficulty and the multi-
dimensionality of political language. Scholars and practitioners 
inevitably bring evaluations to political discussion and whilst 
facts and values can be separated in logic, words are a form of 
political action and are therefore important not for themselves 
but as a convenience of understanding. It is understanding that 
the thesis is seeking. 
Part II describes the formal aspects of the position of 
Permanent Head in the Queensland Public Service and presents 
responses made at interviews. The role of a Head can be 
characterized as (a) technical expert, (b) manager and (c) policy 
adviser. Whilst the "political" component in his work is seen as 
important, the Head claims neutrality. 
i.t 
Part III traces the history of the British notion of 
ministerial responsibility and the American public administration 
"dichotomy". It is argued that both paradigms of understanding 
are intended to resolve the tensions inherent in the interface 
between partisan politics and what is variously called adminis-
tration, professionalism, expertise and management. The conclusion 
is drawn that this relationship is uniquely the centre of interest 
for those who are to study public service. In this perspective. 
Public Administration is not only the study of internal management, 
nor is it only the study of policy making. It is a study concerned 
with the interface between the two and the design of formal 
arrangements to achieve the values of the polity. 
In Part IV the notion of administrative responsibility 
is discussed in the context of a political-administrative system. 
The objective is not an understanding of the "how to" of public 
service, but an integrated set of concepts which can be used to 
describe the relationships within this system in Public Admin-
istration terms. The notion of individual responsibility and 
obligation are fundamental for an understanding of the practition-
erfe role. There are possible conflicts of obligation which may 
lead to an ethical crisis. This crisis may be resolved if public 
servants inform their actions with the democratic imperative of 
maintaining, improving or creating situations of individual 
responsibility. 
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I THE PROBLEM. 
The Evaporating Field of Public Administration. 
The following essay attempts to comprehend the work of 
senior public officials in Queensland. What makes the work of a 
senior public servant different from that of a senior executive 
in the private sector? Is there any difference? Should there 
be? Is one aspect of his work more definitive than the other? 
What is it that we expect from top officials? These are import-
ant questions and my objective is to offer some answers based on 
both theoretical literature and data from the real world. It 
will be apparent from the nature of the enquiry that conclusions 
reached will be largely evaluative. No excuse is necessary for 
this approach. Even the most "scientific" of social scientists 
would admit, I think, that in the selection of aspects of behaviour 
for description and explanation, evaluation is unavoidable, either 
(a) by a positive choice of a value, or (b) by keeping the analysis 
at such a level that values are assumed. The essay is intention-
ally normative and seeks a value framework to support a theory of 
public administration. 
How do we approach these questions? When we discuss 
the physical sciences there is a good chance that we will agree 
on the meanings of the words (or symbols) used. The social 
sciences exhibit an increasing tendency towards semantic and 
methodological difficulty. When we turn to the study of Public 
Administration the academic field is so broad that it is doubtful 
whether any discipline, so called, can be said to exist. One 
Australian scholar concluded that "... there is really no such 
subject as 'public administration'. No science or art can be 
identified by this title, least of all any single skill or coherent 
intellectual discipline. The term has no relation to the world of 
systematic thought." Whilst most writings today on public 
administration are distinctly American, their roots lie deeply 
in the European experience, and American thought owes a great 
2 
debt to European ideas. The "profession of government" has been 
securely established both on the Continent and in Britain and is 
the product of the historical traditions, institutions and 
cultures of the states concerned. The different histories are 
reflected in the study of public administration in the United 
States and Britain. The British, until Fulton, took their 
system somewhat for granted and concentrated on specific problems 
of administration, whilst the Americans sought general theories 
to ground a "new" public administration. British theorists in the 
post-Fulton era are now bringing organization theory critically 
to bear on their administrative problems and the contemporary 
1 Parker, R.S. "The End of Public Administration", Public Admin-
istration. (Sydney) . Vol.XXIV, No.2, June I965, p.99* 
2 Chapman, Brian. The Profession of Government, The Public 
Service in Europe, London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959* 
3 See Robson, William A, "The Present State of Teaching and 
Research in Public Administration". Public Administration 
(London). Vol.39, Autumn I96I, pp.217-222. 
k See Brown, R.G.S, The Administrative Process in Britain, 
London : Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1970 and Keeling, Desmond. 
Management in Government, London : George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1972. 
"identity crisis" of American Public Administration as an 
academic study reflects that tradition. Wettenhall has 
examined the various possibilities and problems in the teaching 
of Public Administration in Australia, which appears to be a 
mixture of both British and American thought. Textbook writers 
have brought various schools of thought together for students. 
In spite of all this (perhaps because of it) one feels that 
Parker was right. But if it is true that the term "public 
administration" has no relation to systematic thought, then what 
are these scholars talking about, and how are the questions asked 
in the first paragraph above to be discussed? 
An academic discipline can be defined in veurious ways. 
Its focus of interest may be located in either (l) a given method 
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of study or (2) a given set of phenomena as an object of study, 
and one approach usually predominates. These alternatives come 
5 See Charlesworth, James C.(ed.). Theory and Practice of Public 
Administration : Scope. Objectives and Methods. Philadelphia : 
The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1968. 
Marini, Frank (ed.). Toward a New Public Administration. The 
Minnowbrook Perspective. Scranton : Chandler Publishing 
Company, 1971. Waldo, Dwight (ed.). Public Administration in 
a Time of Turbulence. Scranton : Chandler Publishing Company, 
1971. 
6 Wettenhall, R.L. Whither Public Administration? Paper delivered 
at 11th Annual Conference, Australasian Political Studies 
Association held at University of Sydney, 28-30th August,I969. 
7 See Caiden, Gerald E. The Dynamics of Public Administration. 
Guidelines to Current Transformations in Theory and Practice. 
New York : Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1971. Dunsire, A. 
Administration. The Word and the Science. London J Martin 
Robertson, 1973. Self, Peter. Administrative Theories and 
Politics. London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972. 
8 Castles, Francis G. Politics and Social Insight. London : 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, p.l. 
under the head of "teaching about" public administration. The 
art and craft of public administration can also be studied and 
learned academically. Lyall called this "teaching for" public 
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administration. There is no inherent conflict between these 
two forms of study and those who suggest that public administration 
can be taught as a profession usually refer to its similarity to 
medicine where various subjects are brought together to make up 
the professional area of academic study. However, the contemporary 
academic proliferation of approaches, analyses and statements of 
methodological objectives based on different social sciences 
attempting to solve different problems leaves the practitioner 
somewhat at a loss. He looks to scholars for theory which will 
describe, explain or justify what he does during working hours. 
If he is a generalist administrator and has no recognized profess-
ional background his difficulties are compounded. Theories that 
are available derive from disciplines concerned with specific 
aspects of his work (e.g. law, economics, psychology) and it is 
clear that what we usually regard as public administration can be 
studied according to the rules applied by the different sciences 
and the conceptually defined typologies employed. There is no 
difficulty here as far as the specific disciplines are concerned, 
but as Meyer points out when discussing administrative science -
9 Lyall, E.A. "The Teaching and Practice of Public Administration-
Integration or Disintegration?'^ Public Administration (Sydney). 
Vol.XXXI, No.1, March 1972, pp.70-78. 
"Each of these studies has a value of its own, and each 
result attained by these studies may be fully correct, 
but even when added together they do not constitute a 
science on administration because they do not regard 
the administrative facts, which they examine, as links 
in the whole administrative chain, but as elements of 
an other entity, namely the entity determined by the 
particular field of study within the special branch of 
science."-Q 
Accepting for the moment the possibility of a science 
of administration, we may still ask whether there is something 
additional in the study and/or practice of public administration. 
Of course one can study human behaviour in all sorts of ways and 
a scholar may help others to study it from these differing view-
points. The problem is to choose the viewpoint appropriate to 
the problem under consideration. For example, in a decision 
situation, the economic criterion in efficient resource allocation 
may be impossible to achieve because of legal constraints which 
are not alterable because of societal pressures. Where does 
public administration fit into this web of economic, legal and 
sociological methodologies? Is there no way of analysing the 
decision problem from a "public administrative" viewpoint? This 
is the theoretical problem. A second problem is that of individual 
action or existential choice. What criteria does a senior official 
defer to? What is, what should be the criteria against which the 
individual practitioner measures his actions? 
10 Meyer, Poul. Administrative Organization. A Comparative Study 
of the Organization of Public Administration. London : 
Stevens and Sons, 1957» pp.15-16. 
When the practitioner asks himself the questions -
"What am I doing?", "Why am I doing it?", "Ought I do it another 
way?", his existential predicament may be confused without a 
professional ethic based on a substantive body of knowledge. ' Is 
there such a public administration ethic or body of knowledge? 
Of course, a practitioner's personal goals may clarify his needs 
for him. But the question then is whether they coincide with 
public administration values. 
Government service in Queensland contains the whole 
range of established professions. These look at problems from a 
great diversity of backgrounds which do not encourage the esprit 
de corps necessary to support a "profession of government", so 
called. The current attempts to professionally homogenize top 
public servants by management training is commendable (adminis-
trative science on the academic side fills the same role). But 
this leads to a sort of reductionism because the factor which 
legitimates the practitioners' actions in the first place is 
missing, namely politics. The tension between management values 
which are essentially instrumental and the requirements of polit-
ical responsibility and accountability has been described by Self 
as the "classic dilemma of public administration". This dilemma 
can be seen in the way the academic field tends to divide itself 
broadly into government and administrative science. Another British 
scholar (Dunsire) stated in regard to British universities -
11 Self, op.cit., p.277. 
"It may be that a searching examination of ourselves, our 
curricula and our function would result in the 'subject' 
of public administration disappearing - into management, 
science in one direction and politics in the other. So 
be it. We will command no respect from those responsible 
in the public authorities for relations with the univer-
sities until we have faced this issue and come to terms 
with it."3^ 2 
Significantly the dilemma that Self refers to and which 
is reflected in British university teaching, reflects the orthodox 
politics-administration distinction of American Public Administra-
tion. There is no reason to believe that the university teaching 
of public administration in Queensland has resolved this dilemma. 
Of course, one can simply study the work of public officials in 
a scholarly way - historically, philosophically, sociologically, 
legally - and all of these are valid contributions to our under-
standing. But these approaches to the subject matter are grounded 
in the relevant disciplines (the "teaching about" public adminis-
tration). If we are to "teach for" the practice of public adminis-
tration, that is, for a "profession of government", a body of 
knowledge regarding objectives, role requirements and ethics of 
a particular government service is necessary. If the practitioner 
is to see his role as a "professional" public administrator then 
these elements should be well known by him and able to be "professed". 
One aspect of this problem will be discussed in this essay. Cer-
tainly, if a public official is trained in management he ought 
12 Dunsire, Andrew. "The Future of the PAC", PAG Bulletin, No.4, 
p.8, quoted in Wettenhall, op.cit., p.10. 
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logically to be also trained in the theory and practice of 
government. 
The senior official at various times, is expected to 
be an expert in some particular area of government business, a 
policy adviser, a co-ordinator of interest demands, and a 
13 
manager of a large organization. How does he conceive his role? 
If scholars have such difficulty in describing the methods and 
subject matter of academic Public Administration, perhaps the 
practitioner may be in a better position to enlighten us. 
Unfortunately very few Australian public servants write about 
their jobs and only a few academic teachers of administration 
have had experience at a senior level in public service. 
Knowledge gained doing administration is therefore lost to 
students generally. 
The practitioner has his own ideas about the nature of 
public administration and there are as many versions as there 
are people who see themselves "administering" public matters. 
Social, constitutional, legal and professional rules, organizational 
factors and individual psychology shape the meaning the practitioner 
gives to what he does and what he ought to be going. The higher 
the practitioner is placed in the hierarchy the greater the 
13 The problem of defining the role of a senior official is at 
the root of much of the contemporary discussion on public 
services. See, for example, para.lS, Report of the 
Committee on the Civil Service I966-68 (Fulton), Cmnd. 
3638, 1968, and paras.9.50-9.7^, First Report of the Board 
of Inquiry into the Victorian Public Service (Bland), 
Melbourne t Government Printer, 6126/7A-. 
possibilities for action, but there is no direct and necessary 
relationship between hierarchical position and understanding. 
Work loads usually restrict his attention to the job in hand. 
To get things done without fuss, without drawing attention to 
oneself; a commonsense, plain, every day activity; unobtrusive 
and as natural as eating; these appear to be the desired char-
acteristics of administration. The practitioner does not like 
to have attention drawn to his assumptions, values and goals, 
and neutrality, for him, is a positive value. In general he has 
no use for theory if that theory tends to analyse and explain 
these assumptions and, being a busy man, he usually has neither 
the time nor inclination to stop and reflect. 
If he is able to stand back and consciously confront 
the meaning of what he does the practitioner is forced to come 
to terms with this problem of understanding. The public official 
qua individual seeks to achieve his meaningful objectives more 
effectively. These objectives may include the exercising of 
professional skill, self-aggrandizement, program success, promotion, 
power, status, social altruism and many more. If he is a student 
of public administration he seeks knowledge of the various meanings 
(purposes) given to their behaviour by practitioners in general, 
the institutional (organizational and legal) constraints involved, 
and an understanding of "good" administration within a theoretical 
framework. 
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Perhaps public administration ijs a practical every day 
exercise which neither requires nor allows conceptualizing at 
high levels of abstraction. Yet this view itself presupposes 
much that is unsaid and perhaps supports the status quo or 
individual self interest. If the practitioner does no more than 
perform the "practical" tasks put before him then others will 
undertake the necessary theorizing and he will remain (? become) 
the object of control when he should not be and be not in control 
when he should be. The responsibility of academic students is to 
make this clear to practitioners. 
Pointing to public service in Queensland, one can 
generalize and say that the public official is encouraged to pull 
back from moral or political issues which involve theorizing 
about the role of the service and public activities generally. 
The potential political implications of such theorizing result 
in training and education being sponsored primarily in the internal 
aspects of organization. The so-called "turbulent environment" 
will call this approach to account. If the public servant is to 
cope, a theoretical framework is required to place him in this 
environment, as an individual, as a citizen and as a professional. 
Management science (or administrative theory in Simon's 
terms) is instrumental and is concerned with "how an organization 
should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish its 
11 
Ik 
work efficiently". Scarcity of resources demands that, in the 
factual aspects of decision making, the administrator must be 
guided by the criterion of efficiency. If a science of adminis-
tration is possible it would provide the factual (that is, as 
defined by scientific method) premises regarding alternative 
behaviours which would maximise the achievement of given end 
values. The behavioural sciences eire concerned to provide the 
empirical bases for such premises, and the ability to understand 
these sciences, to apply their findings, and to add to the body 
of scientific knowledge would be desirable in any administrator. 
But such skills do not in themselves define the meaning of his 
work. Ultimately such skills are employed purposefully. That is, 
action is directed towards determined ends. Dahl's indictment of 
the efficiency criterion is apposite. 
"What is efficiency? Belsen and Dachau were 'efficient' by 
one scale of values. And in any case, why is efficiency 
the ultimate test? According to what and whose scale of 
values is efficiency placed on the highest pedestal? Is 
not the worship of efficiency itself a particular express-
ion of a special value judgment? Does it not stem from a 
mode of thinking and a special moral hypothesis resting on 
a sharp distinction between means and ends?"^_ 
It makes considerable difference whether the management 
techniques provided by the administrative scientists are used to 
run a holiday camp or a concentration camp. Wilson's example 
makes the point. 
1^ Simon, Herbert A, Administrative Behaviour, A Study of 
Decision-Making Processes in Administration Organization. 
New York : The Free Press, 1957, p.38.. 
15 Dahl, Robert A. "The Science of Public Administration", 
Public Administration Review. Vol.VII ( I 9 W , No.l, p.2, 
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"If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, 
I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without 
borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it."-/-
Skill in sharpening a knife is desirable if a sharp knife is 
required to be used. Efficient use of the knife makes sense if 
not many knives are available. But the job to be done, the 
purpose to be achieved gives meaning to both skill and efficiency. 
A surgeon may save a life, a butcher may slaughter cattle. All 
too often public servants are more concerned with the instrument 
than the purpose. Such considerations lead to the academic 
discussions about the distinction between politics (policy) and 
administration, facts and values in decisions, and political and 
administrative responsibility generally. These problems I under-
stand to be fundamental to the study of public administration 
and necessarily to be understood by practitioners if they are to 
be more than mere instruments. 
There still appears to be confusion regarding these 
matters. For example, officers of the Victorian Public Service 
apparently have the attitude that they do not make "policy" but 
merely carry it out. Yet Bland, whilst condemning this view that 
17 policy and administration are dichotomous, states that -
16 Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration", Political 
Science Quarterly. Vol.56, No.2 (June I887) reprinted in 
WoU, Peter (ed.). Public Administration and Policy. Selected 
Essays, New York : Harper and Row, I966. (Page references 
will be made to this reprint.) p»39. 
17 Bland Report, op.cit., para 9.64. 
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"Permanent Heads do not make policies. Policy determination 
is the affair of Ministers, Cabinets and the Parliament. 
Yet Permanent Heads are well placed to be and should be the 
initiators of, or the contributors to, policies ultimately 
determined and to influence their character and content.".o 
From an existential viewpoint there is a very fine line between 
"making" policy and "initiating" or "influencing" policy (apart 
from the well known semantic problems of knowing what we are 
talking about when we use the term "policy"). Bland then states 
categorically that the primary responsibility of a permanent head 
is managerial and only secondly to formulate new policy initiatives 
20 for consideration by him minister. Both analytically and in 
practice then, management and policy formulation are distinguish-
able. Yet Bland earlier stated that "Politics and administration 
are not severable. Politics seen solely as the affair of Ministers 
and administration as the affair of public servants makes no 
21 
sense." Does he mean "in practice"? Is there a difference 
between "politics" and "policies"; between "management" and 
"administration"; between politics (policies) and administration 
(management)? Perhaps we may deduce that Public Administration 
would be better titled Political Administration. This essay will 
attempt to sort out these conceptual difficulties. 
18 Ibid, para. 9.59. 
19 A good sTimmary of the problems involved in giving meaning to 
this term will be found in Dunsire, Administration, The 
Word and the Science. Chapter 9. 
20 Bland Report, op.cit., para. 9.51. 
21 Ibid, para. 6.^7. 
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It may reasonably be asked "Why bother?" Apart from 
satisfying the requirements of a Master's Degree, I am concerned 
that many public servants, including myself, spend all their 
working life engaged in administrative work (for my purposes 
here meant to refer to non-professional work), yet do not work 
through the implications of what they are doing. To what extent 
is an official, for example, responsible for the effects of 
policy with which he disagrees or thinks is morally wrong and to 
which he contributes some part in implementation? How can he 
conceptualize this question? To what extent is a public admin-
istrator who "formulates policy initiatives" (or alternatively, 
fails to do so), morally culpable for policy outcomes (even if 
not constitutionally, legally or organizationally)? How are 
these questions to be discussed? The practitioner does not 
usually enjoy the luxury of academic reflection. His problem is 
one of action, and, unless his work is routinized or pre-determined 
according to rules, his action involves choice. It will be argued 
that in the last resort every public official makes this choice 
for himself and must be held personally accountable for the outcome 
of his actions. This requires an ethical justification and in the 
same way that Aristotle required his Ethics to ground his Politics, 
any examination of public administration which excludes the ethical 
15 
22 factor is necessarily partial. Our "scientific" culture 
neglects this fact. For example, in a very recent bibliography 
of American Public Administration, the section on "Values and 
Ethics in Administration" takes up only one and one half out of 
23 
seventy-two pages. Consideration of administrative ethics 
must relate the individual interests and individual responsib-
ility of the administrator to the general interests expx'essed 
through the state. It will be argued that this is not a question 
that administrative science can answer, but one for political 
22 The only attempt in Australia that I know of to face this 
problem was made by the A.C.T. Group Council of the R.I.P.A. 
See Public Administration (Sydney). Vol.XXIV, No.3 (1965), 
pp.193-199. This was really a professional code which 
stated objective rules for public service. My concern is 
more with personal meaning which gives content to these 
rules in the selection of alternative behaviours. For 
Britain see "Professional Standards in the Public Service", 
Public Administration (London), V0I.5O, Summer 1972, pp. 
I67-I82. For New Zealand see Marshall, P.B. "The Profess-
ional Ethics of Administrative Discretion", in Milne, R.S. 
(ed.). Bureaucracy in New Zealand, Wellington : K.Z, 
Institute of Public Administration, 1957, pp.113-134. For 
Canada see Kernaghan, Kenneth. "Codes of Ethics and Admin-
istrative Responsibility", Canadian Public Administration, 
Vol.17, No.4, Winter 197^, pp.527-5^1. 
23 McCufdy, Howard E, Public Administration : A Bibliography. 
Washington D.C. : College of Public Affairs, The American 
University, 1972. This was not just an indexing oddity. 
The bibliography was compiled from student bibliographic 
essays, unpublished reading lists, text books, book 
reviews in journals and special collections. The books 
in McCurdy's bibliography are the most frequently cited by 
American scholars and the relative importance of Ethics in 
Public Administration study in that country would be 
reflected therein. I doubt that Australian scholars would 
differ significantly. The index to Spann, R.N, Public 
Administration in Australia, N.S.W, : Government Printer, 
1973, does not include "ethics". 
16 
theory and it is therefore important that the practitioner under-
stands the assumptions and values of the political system which 
legitimates his action choice. Man is responsible, can be seen 
to be responsible and no one is more responsible than he who 
makes decisions affecting the lives and well being of other 
people. The public official elected or appointed, whose power, 
position, status or expertise enables him to influence decisions 
which determine the nature of other people's lives therefore has 
a heavy responsibility. 
The study of government today, when administrators 
(both elected and appointed) control vast physical and knowledge 
resources, should concern itself with "the situation of respon-
2k 
sibility" in government as a whole and with locating individual 
responsibility for both management and policy decisions. It is 
difficult to understand public administration in any other way. 
For example if we look at the work of a permanent head in the 
Queensland system, it is clear that he has both management and 
policy functions. He is called to account for the management of 
his department by the Public Service Board, the Auditor-General 
and the Treasury. But his policy (i.e. value choice) contribution 
is lost behind the traditional shield of neutrality which Queens-
2k For the phrase "situation of responsibility", see Spiro, 
Herbert J. Responsibility in Government : Theory and Practice, 
New York : Van Noiltrand Reinhold Company, 1969. 
17 
25 
land inherited from the Westminster system. The more technol-
ogically complex society becomes, the greater the difficulty of 
advice given and decisions made being exposed to informed public 
discussion, and therefore, whilst those with causal responsibility 
for the consequences are not called to account, those who receive 
(suffer or benefit from) the consequences are called to account 
without being responsible. Public administration has always been 
concerned with responsibility and accotmtability. This is the 
nexus between administration and politics because the authority 
of administrators within public organizations is derived from and 
legitimated by the political process, i.e. administrators have no 
original political authority. 
The major political problem today in Australian society 
is that the scope of government is becoming so extensive and 
complex, with different "experts" seeking different values based 
on different sciences, that it is difficult to determine the locus 
25 Cf. the situation in the United States where specialist 
Committees of Congress, in one sense, perform the function 
of the Minister in our system as it relates to reporting to 
the legislature about departmental policy and management. 
This encourages more public discussion of policy making, as 
well as exposing the opinions and actions of civil servants 
to critical examination. The tradition of anonymity has 
been under challenge in Britain (Fulton Report, Chapter 8) 
and Australia (the Australian Government has repealed 
Public Service Regulation 34(b) regarding public comment.) 
The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Pro-
posed Freedom of Information Legislation (Canberra : 
Australian Government Publishing Service 1974) has 
recommended adoption of the principles of the United States 
Freedom of Information Act modified (l) to ensure 
confidentiality of Cabinet discussions and Ministerial 
discussions, and (2) to maintain authority of Ministers 
over departments. 
IS 
of responsibility. Decisions emerge from the system with their 
rationales on the one hand, and the locus of responsibility on 
the other, lost in the generalities of electioneering. If no 
one is responsible and everyone is accountable then the "system" 
itself is blamed and our society is out of control. Therefore a 
study of Public Administration centred around the concept of 
responsibility will be normative in that recommendations will 
inevitably be made for institutional arrangements to make visible 
administrative responsibility and accountability. This approach 
involves personal risks for senior officials and it is this group 
which this essay is mainly concerned to address. More often than 
not, academic recommendations from both management and politics 
scholars as to organizational change do not take into account the 
political risks involved when such recommendations are accepted. 
V It seems to me that what Public Administration as an 
academic discipline can do is to research "the situation of 
responsibility" in the various areas of government and offer 
descriptive theory based on this research. Secondly, normative 
recommendations can suggest ways and means to ensure a situation 
of responsibility within public organizations by the design of 
institutional ways and means to accord with the manifest political 
values of Australian society. The questions asked in the first 
paragraph of this section will be approached in this way. 
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Words and Things. 
The study of politics and public administration is 
confused by great semantic difficulty. Clearly, the mere making 
of definitions is not knowledge, but if research is to be useful, 
a minimal requirement is that the scholar should be clear and 
consistent with his meanings and use of words. Many words in 
26 the English language are "multi-dimensional" and the various 
words used in politics have many meanings to some people, one 
meaning to many people and no meaning at all to others. Political 
discourse can be characterized as a game in which the teams are 
27 
agreed upon but each player changes the rules as he goes along. 
Scholars themselves play the same sort of game and the 
study of government sometimes suffers from selective use of 
concepts. Thus an analyst will reserve concepts and models for 
one system and not another. For example, Alfred G. Meyer has 
pointed out that some scholars apply "ideology" and "politiciz-
ation" to the Soviet Union whilst using "belief system" and 
28 
"socialization" for the United States. Different disciplines 
deal differently with facts concentrating on those necessary 
conditions which lie within the field of skill. Stretton has 
pointed out -
26 Shively, W.Phillips. The Craft of Political Research, A Primer. 
Englewood Cliffs N.J. : Prentice Hall Inc., 1974, p.32. 
27 See Pocock, J.G.A. Politics. Language and Time. Essays on 
Political Thought and History, London : Methuen and Co, 
Ltd., 1972, partiiSularly pp.281-282. 
28 Meyer, Alfred G. "The Comparative Study of Communist Systems", 
Slavic Review, March, I967, p.11. 
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"Different disciplines may deal in different aspects or 
abstracts of the same facts, which may allow the discovery 
of different relations between the same facts. Even when 
different explanations seem merely to give different names 
and groupings to the same things, there may still be subtle 
differences of implication. 'Crime', 'delinquency' and 
'deviation' do not strike most people as calling for the 
same remedies. Its undoubted 'function for the integration 
and peirsistence of the system' may not commend to all alike 
what another discipline calls_'secure one-party monopoly of 
all means of production, indoctrination and violence'.",-, 
Orion White has argued that society itself can be posited as a 
system of symbolic exchanges and that -
"It is necessary to stress that symbolic exchange, by 
definition entails tension. That is, to exchange a symbol 
(for example, a word), none of the parties to the exchange 
must either hold or posit a complete definition of the 
symbol. In order for the symbol to possess a socially 
proper meaning, it must hold content that is tension-laden -
that is, that exists somewhere between the poles of complete 
ambiguity and complete perspicuity. This is only to say, of 
course, that the symbol must be interesting. If the symbol 
is interesting, it will hold something to receive and will 
allow for something (other words) to be given back. Hence, 
meaning derives from the tension between ambiguity and 
perspicuity in social symbols." (Emphasis in original.)^Q 
Finally it was Max Weber who emphasized that there can be no 
31 definitive vocabulary for the analysis of social phenomena. 
The choice of terms, the construction of a conceptual scheme 
and the phenomena to be studied are dependent on the scholar's 
29 Stretton, Hugh. The Political Sciences. London : Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1969, p.64. 
30 White, Jr., Orion. "The Concept of Administrative Praxis", 
Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol.5, No.l, May 
1973, pp.65-66. 
31 See discussion in Runciman, W.G, Social Science and Political 
Theory, Cambridge : University Press, 1969, pp.15-16. 
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point of view, his evaluations and the ideology of the time and 
32 
place. 
The above scholars have been quoted to stress the 
33 
obvious fact that words are not things, and that behind the words 
used in this essay are real people acting in the real world which 
is reconstructed here conceptually. "... reality, particularly 
social reality, is something we build rather than something we 
34 discover." It is because of this that the problem of putting 
himself outside his subject matter is very difficult for a student, 
because no matter what position he takes, if he is to do more than 
merely classify or describe empirical data, he inevitably devalues 
some held view and his own evaluations are then called to account. 
Values are therefore inherent in the problem of objectivity (inter-
subjectivity) which has been exhaustively examined by Arnold 
Brecht whose views I share (as far as I understand themX 
Scientific method by its own procedures is unable to prove that 
consubjectivity exists although common sense supposes that the 
32 A conception of language as an activity, and words as 
signals rather than labels for classes of objects, has 
been discussed in Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. Wittgenstein 
and Justice, on the significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
for social and political thought, Berkeley : University 
of California Press, 1972. 
33 The phrase "words and things" comes from Gellner, Ernest. 
Words and Things : A critical account of linguistic 
philosophy and a study in ideology, London : Gollancz, 1959* 
34 Press, Charles & Arian, Alan (eds.). Empathy and Ideology : 
Aspects of Administrative Innovation, Chicago : Rand 
McNally and Company, 1966, p.131. 
35 Brecht, Arnold. Political Theory, The Foundation of Twentieth 
Century Political Thought, Princeton N.J. : Princeton 
University Press, 1959. 
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same thing often causes parallel impressions in different human 
beings. However, given certain a priori assumptions, scientific 
method does offer a way of transmitting observational evidence 
from one observer to another allowing a check on these observations 
and the validity of the propositions derived therefrom. But 
there is no observational technique which will allow another to 
challenge the introspective truth of any statement (e.g. God 
exists). It may be true, but it is not a scientific statement 
simply because there is no way of transmitting the observational 
evidence from me to another. Explanation in science is concerned 
with existential fact or event, not norms, standards or rules, 
but with "is there" or what "has happened"; with evaluations 
rather than values. Given Brecht's interpretation of scientific 
procedure there is an unbridgeable logical gulf between "is" 
and "ought" statements. Brecht says -
"This 'Gulf Doctrine' as we shall call it ... has far reaching 
consequences because if logical derivations from facts are 
barred, no transmissable proof can be presented for non-
hypothetical propositions in the form of Ought beyond 
demonstration that human beings themselves insist or urge 
that something ought to be done."^„ 
This may seem perfectly obvious but even a cursory reading of the 
literature of public administration, and discussion with students 
and practitioners, shows that the "multiple realities" which are 
brought together in discourse are a major hurdle to overcome 
before intersubjectivity can begin. This being so, the initial 
36 Ibid, pp.28-29. 
37 Ibid, p.127. 
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choice of terms will inevitably be loaded with values because 
the conceptual framework devised reconstructs reality according 
to the student's meaning giving intention. This need not be of 
great concern when tradition, social values and our common 
environment bind us together reasonably well. It is when conflict 
of interests rationalized in ideologies, value systems, or 
conceptual paradigms occur that words become intellectual weapons. 
In a turbulent environment with an exponential rate of societal 
change, such conflicts will increase. Two approaches to the 
study of public administration are necessary. Scientific under-
standing of public organizations as far as possible to enable us 
to know what is impossible to achieve and clarity in the way we 
39 
conceptualize our values to enable us to "imagine effects" 
which our organizations can be constructed to achieve. But we 
must not confuse our science (how our State is governed) with 
our evaluations (how it should be governed). Science can explain 
and predict (but only on an "if - then" basis) and it is only 
our evaluations which will provide the creativity necessary to 
imagine our future and cause it to happen. Values and facts can 
be separated in logic, but in the real world, to stress one side 
without the other is like clapping with one hand. 
38 See Brecht, op.cit., pp.423-429. 
39 See Stretton, op.cit., Ch.9. 
40 Or more realistically in the social sciences, "if ... probably 
then". 
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It is the aim of this essay to offer a conceptual 
scheme drawn from the work of selected scholars in which both 
sorts of questions can be placed, remembering at all times that -
"Words are only tools for communication. Provided we under-
stand what other people mean when they use words, it is idle, 
unless we are writing a dictionary, to insist that one way of 
using words is alone correct. For students of society an 
interest in terminology should take the form of asking what 
theory about society the terms are being used to state." 
(Emphasis added. )r^ . 
In the contemporary study of politics and public admin-
istration, scientific facts and derived theories are usually in 
the form of (a) psychological or sociological explanations and 
(b) behavioural descriptions of political phenomena according to 
operationally defined rules. In many cases these theories appear 
contradictory from one discipline to another (Marx v Freud), and 
within the same discipline (Freud v Skinner). The point to be 
remembered is that scientific hypotheses are tentative, do not 
claim to be a final statement of the truth and are structured in 
such a way that other scientists can manipulate the phenomena, 
and rework the logic. Always there must be the possibility to 
falsify the theory. The paradoxical thing about the scientific 
study of politics (and public administration) is that explanatory 
structures (explanatory in the sense that something is the 
necessary outcome of something else), are destroying political 
studies. Minogue states this as follows -
41 Benn, S.I, and Peters, R.S, Social Principles and the 
Democratic State, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1959» 
p.l4. 
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"It is that for reasons of intellectual fashion and of 
political justification, those seeking to explain political 
events are led away from politics itself towards the various 
explanatory structures... If the structure in question is 
principles, they are led into philosophy. If it is rules, 
they are led into legal studies. If attitudes into social 
psychology, if policies into economics and logic, and if 
class into sociology. Epiphenomenalism is eroding political 
studies because it directs our attention away from political 
reality, some connection with which being the only thing 
that makes them political studies."^p 
There is no necessary connection between any explanatory 
structure (i.e. theory) and action. To assert otherwise is to 
argue from an "is" to an "ought", and a misunderstanding of 
science. To understand how a slice of reality fits together in 
a theory in no way demands that that theory be used to change 
reality unless the explanatory theory is held to be absolutely 
true, in terms of both facts and standards. If someone asserts 
this position nothing more can be said (? dogmatic Marxism). 
43 Popper calls this moral positivism and this view is essentially 
44 
opposed to both science and democracy. Political reality can 
be defined then as the "art of the possible" or knowing what you 
42 Minogue, K.R. "Epiphenomenalism in Politics, The Quest for 
Political Reality", Political Studies, Vol.XX, No.4, p.474. 
Minogue states that epiphenomenalism is the error of be-
lieving that structures determine political events and 
suggests that the externality of structures to political 
events represents not a contour of reality but a 
convenience of understanding. (p.47l) 
43 Popper, K.R. The Open Society and Its Enemies, London : 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, Vol.2, p.206. 
44 The relationship of scientific method and democracy has been 
explored in Thorson, Thomas Landon. The Logic of Democracy. 
New York : Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1962, and Biopolitics, 
New York : Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 
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can get away with and scientific theories are only politically 
4S 
relevant insofar as they are instrumental to that end. 
Political reality depends on what people believe about events 
and what they can do about them. Explanatory structures are but 
one sort of knowledge. There are also other sorts of knowledge 
(ethics, religion, aesthetics) which enter into what people 
believe and what they do. Therefore it is necessary to know what 
people believe, as well as what they do, to understand political 
reality of which public administration is a part. 
All this is a rather tedious way of saying that no 
definition of government, politics or administration involving 
explanatory hypotheses alone will settle once and for all the 
role of a public servant simply because any one definition will 
contain all the problems of policy involved in choice of terms. 
The questions, what is public administration? what is its true 
nature? its real meaning? are essentialist questions. What we 
should ask, for example, is - how can we talk about government 
meaningfully? How are the words "p^ ublic administration" used? 
What do public officials in this place and at this time do? How 
did this come about? Do we want them to do something else? Why? 
The answers will emerge from "historical episodes, traumas, 
failures and successes which have in turn created peculiar habits. 
45 Science has been called "the technical branch of politics", 
see Stretton, op.cit., p.38I. 
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mores, institutionalized patterns of behaviour. We11anschauungen 
and 'national psychologies'." 
I do not seek any "essence" of government, politics or 
administration. My aim is the more modest one of understanding 
some of the problems involved in the practice of public adminis-
tration generally and in Queensland in particular, and the 
development of a conceptual framework "to serve as a filing 
system for organizing empirical material and facilitating our 
understanding of it; and the criteria by which it is to be judged 
47 
are those appropriate to a filing system". 
It is not my purpose at this stage to offer definitions. 
What I propose is that we look at the ideas of some scholars in 
the field of Public Administration. We will look at the obvious 
examples which fit under the headings of the various concepts and 
leave borderline cases for those whose interest be in that 
direction. Whilst it makes little sense to ask questions about 
the nature of public administration in vacuo and my concern is 
with Queensland in particular, the aim of this essay is a level 
of generality in which Queensland public organizations can be 
understood as instances of a more general concept of public 
administration. 
The field which comes under the head of Public Admin-
46 iBahl, op.cit., p.8. 
47 Friedman, Milton. Quoted in Ralph Braibanti (ed.). Political 
and Administrative Development, Durham N.C. : Duke 
University Press, I969, pp.608-609. 
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48 istration is dominated by the Americans and there has been 
little systematic analysis of administrative issues in British 
literature, particularly the relating of political concepts to 
theories of organization and behaviour. This point is made by 
Self and his Administrative Theories and Politics is an attempt 
to join the specific and factual writing on modern government to 
the sometimes abstract theories of the Americans. He seeks "to 
extend the study of politics more effectively into the adminis-
trative field" which "could be viewed as a battleground between 
the contending perspectives of the political scientist and the 
organization or management theorists". It was Self's book which 
provided me with the problem which structures this investigation. 
Simply put, the question asked is, "How can we sensibly talk about 
politics and administration in referring to the work of public 
servants?" My interest is Queensland, but the literature of 
Public Administration is largely American and it is here that I 
sought an answer - I make no excuses for this. Obviously there 
are dangers in utilizing the work of scholars who are concerned 
with a polity based oh different political principles. In fact, 
Vincent Ostrom's The Intellectual CrisdiS in American Public 
48 Robson, William A, "The Present State of Teaching and Research 
in Public Administration", Public Administration (London). 
Vol.39, Autumn I96I. Ridley, F.F. "Public Administration : 
Cause for Discontent", Public Administration (Lctndon)« 
Vol.50, Spring 1972, pp.65-77. 
49 Op.cit., Introduction. 
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50 Administration attempts to explain the zig-zag path of American 
Scholarship in the field as the result of applying principles of 
design from one system (British parliamentary) to another system 
based on different principles (American separation of powers) 
where they do not fit. Of course, Ostrom is right insofar as the 
differing principles may be incompatible. But he is wrong to 
suggest that designs cannot be changed. The advantage of 
confronting one set of principles with another and working through 
the discrepancies would provide a greater understanding of both 
systems and the possibilities available to those who are 
concerned with design problems in our own system (for example, 
administrative reform). But when different sets of principles 
are placed in confrontation we are inevitably forced to look at 
fundamentals assiuned by both. My reading of American scholars' 
work in Public Administration convinces me that the fundamental 
logical and factual problem in joining political and administrative 
ideas as Self proposes can best be discussed in terms of what the 
Americans used to call the "politics-administration dichotomy". It 
is in this context that this essay will be developed. I know of 
only one work specifically concerned with the dichotomy as such. 
This is Gerald Caiden's Politics and Administration. A Short 
51 History of an Untenable Dichotomy and I am greatly indebted to 
50 University, Alabama : University of Alabama Press, 1975* 
51 Unpublished monograph. Department of Political Science, 
Haifa University, Haifa, Israel. 
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this for many of the ideas expressed herein. However, this essay 
will argue that the "dichotomy" (or more precisely, the analyticeJ. 
distinction) is not untenable and properly understood is an 
essential distinction for understanding public service. 
To this end Part II will discuss the work of Permanent 
Heads in the Queensland Public Service. The aim is to provide a 
description of a concrete institution so that the subsequent 
discussion can be related to the role requirements and individual 
expectations of real people in the real world. In Part III the 
British and American traditions of public administration will be 
briefly presented in order to highlight the different ways that 
the work of earlier public servants can be talked about. Finally, 
in Part IV an attempt will be made to bring together the notions 
of politics, administration and responsibility into a framework 
for understanding public service in our polity. 
Because of the semantic and methodological difficulties 
in the field there are very real problems of presentation. The 
words "public administration" can be understood in any or all of 
the following ways -
(1) the name of a "thing" - the words correspond to some real 
thing in the real world; 
(2) tjie concept standing for a class of "things" - the words are 
analytical tools to construct logical frameworks; and 
(3) the language usage - the social or political function that 
the words have in discourse, which changes over time, and 
which structures expectations (both our own and others'). 
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It is difficult to keep these notions of "public 
administration" separate in our minds and this difficulty may 
confuse us if one understanding of "public administration" is 
taken for another. We tend to hop across from one mode of under-
standing to another without being aware that we are doing so. 
This essay is not primarily concerned with philosophy in general, 
nor with logical analysis in particular. Nor am I competent to 
discuss the problems involved. I can only hope that the words are 
used in this essay in such a way that the meanings will be clear 
in context. A further confusion may occur because we tend to 
mistake the study of a subject matter and the subject matter 
52 
itself. To avoid this last named, I will follow Waldo and 
capitalize "Public Administration" when the study is referred to. 
52 Waldo, op.cit., p.VIII. 
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Background. 
As was stated in Part I, the main concern of this essay 
is to put together a conceptual framework within which public 
administration can be comprehended. However, abstractions alone 
are not knowledge and referents in the real world are necessary 
to give body to conceptual frameworks. Therefore, this section 
will discuss the work of Permanent Heads in the Queensland Public 
1 There is much writing on the work of Permanent Heads and the 
following sample may be consulted for comparative purposes. 
Brown, R.G.S, The Administrative Process in Britain. London : 
Methuen and Co., 1970, pp.30-37, 94-99 and passim. 
Bridges, Lord. "The Relationship between Ministers and the 
Permanent Departmental Head", Canadian Public Administration, 
Vol.VII, No.l, March 1964, pp.269-281. 
Crawford, Sir John. "The Role of the Permanent Head", Public 
Administration (Sydney). Vol.XIII, No.3, Sept.1954,pp.153-165. 
Crawford, Sir John. "Relations Between Civil Servants and 
Ministers in Policy Making", Public Administration (Sydney). 
Vol.XIX, No.2, June I96O, pp.99-112. 
Crisp, L,F. "Public Administration as a Profession : Some 
Australian Reflections on Fulton", Public Administration 
(Sydney). Vol.XXVIII, No.2/3, June-Sept.I969, pp.122-140. 
Cooley, A.S. "The Permanent Head", Public Administration 
(Sydney). Vol.XXXIII, No.3, Sept.1974, pp.193-205. 
Dunk, Sir William. "The Role of the Public Servant in Policy 
Formulation", Public Administration (Sydney), Vol.XX, No.2, 
June 1961, pp.99-113. 
Johnson, N. "Who Are the Policy Makers", Public Administration 
(London), Vol.43, Autumn I965, pp.281-287. 
Kingdom, T.D. "The Confidential Advisers of Ministers", Public 
Administration (London), Vol.44, Autumn I966, pp.267-274. 
Mackenzie, W,J.M. and Grove, J.W. Central Administration in 
Britain, London : Longmans, 1957, pp.63-73. 
Maud, Sir John. "Government in Theory and Practice", 
Political Studies. Vol.XIII, No.l, February I965, pp.15-21. 
Morrison, Herbert. Government and Parliament, A Survey from 
The Inside, London ; Oxford University Press, 1959, Ch.XIV. 
Playfair, Sir E. "Minister or Civil Servant", Public Admin-
istration (London), Vol.43, Autumn I965, pp.260-268. 
Spann, R.N. Public Administration in Australia, N.S.W, 
Government Printer, 1973, particularly Ch.l4. 
Wheeler, Sir Frederick. "The Responsibilities of Administra-
tors in the Public Service", Public Administration (Sydney), 
Vol.XXIII, No.4, December 1964, pp.289-298. 
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Service in an endeavour to give substance to what follows. These 
positions were chosen because of their comparative responsibil-
ities and the small number involved, and because the combination of 
political and administration values which come together in the job 
highlight the conceptual problems in the study of public adminis-
tration. 
A.A. Morrison suggested in I96O that, under the long 
lived Labor Government in Queensland, the administrative system 
developed two characteristics, (l) a heavy emphasis placed upon 
the administrative responsibilities of each Minister, and (2) the 
allocation of activities to make each Ministerial portfolio a 
2 
co-ordinated whole, as far as possible. This characterization 
of the Queensland system is still valid. 
When the Labor Government originally entered upon its 
reform program it considered it necessary that Ministers themselves 
take detailed control to ensure that the provisions of the legis-
lation were carried out. From 1915 to 1957 (with a break 1929-1932), 
this practice, which was intended as a political safeguard, became 
an administrative habit which set the scene for contemporary public 
service in this state. 
The abolition of the Legislative Council in 1921 and the 
continuing Labor majorities in the Parliament put more direct un-
challenged power into the hands of Ministers and it seemed to be 
2 Morrison, A.A. in Davis, S.R. (ed.). The Government of the 
Australian States, London : Longmans, I96O, p.313. 
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the obvious thing to deal directly with the Minister if a 
citizen or group had a problem. The unicameral system made the 
government more visibly accountable for things done or not done, 
apd the excuse that the Legislative Council was hindering the 
government's programmes was not available. Additional to this 
was the personal strength of Labor leaders, Ryan, Theodore, 
Forgan-Smith and Hanlon. Queensland therefore developed strong 
Executive government. The Ministry not the Parliament was (and 
is) the centre of the system. The involvement of the Minister 
in the day to day running of his department (i.e. approving 
relatively minor matters, dealing directly with groups and 
individuals), had the consequence that party considerations were 
always important in departmental operations and many Permanent 
Heads and senior officers became identified with the Parliamenteory 
party through their Minister. The bureaucracy was a servant of 
the Labor Party and this obviously had an effect on how public 
servants saw themselves, their work and their future. Until the 
intra-party fights of the 1950's which resulted in the split of 
1957, the public service had little expectation of an alternative 
government and the political leadership of Labor was taken for 
granted. Whether you liked it or not, from the viewpoint of 
someone working in the system, Queensland was a Labor state and 
its public service was a Labor bureaucracy (the Queensland State 
Service Union was even affiliated with the Party). The West-
minster system really pre-supposes regular changes of government 
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and a neutral public service (the British idea of giving the 
other political team a go at the wicket), but in Queensland it 
seemed impossible that Labor's forty year run would be broken. 
When the government changed in 1957 there were rumours 
flying all around the place as to what would happen and it was 
not surprising that incoming Ministers maintained a firm control 
over departmental detail. It has taken an increase in the scale 
of activities and an updating of organizational thinking about 
delegation (mainly at the suggestion of the Public Service Board) 
to question this way of doing things. But little has been really 
achieved to undermine the practice of detailed administration 
from the top which still characterizes the service. This is in 
spite of the fact that none of the 1957 Permanent Heads still 
hold that position. Contemporary Heads are still hesitant about 
delegating too much too far down the line. I think this is a 
cultural thing which flows from the pattern set by Labor. 
Further, because of the state government's continuing involvement 
in affairs which concern citizens at the local level, but which 
are controlled centrally in Brisbane (e.g. education, health, 
poliise), and because politics in Queensland are "the politics of 
development, concerned with things and places rather than people 
3 
and ideas", the main governmental problems concern questions of 
3 Hughes, Colin, in Rorke, John (ed.). Politics at State Level -
Australia, Sydney : Department of Adult •''•ducation. 
University of Sydney, 1970, p.44. 
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who gets what, of what material thing is to be provided, of 
getting things done, rather than problems of opposing values, 
ideologies, class warfare, redistribution of wealth, or con-
flicting values. Government of the state has been largely 
concerned with bread and butter issues which are understandable 
by the citizens, and with the administration of the material 
needs of an electorate which has never really been strongly 
represented in ppposition, either when Labor was in power or at 
the present. Politically the most interesting conflicts now 
occur between coalition Ministers themselves. 
The new Labor government in Canberra has had two 
effects on the system. In the main, Queensland Ministers and 
Permanent Heads are preoccupied with reacting to Commonwealth 
initiatives and planning within the state suffers as a result. 
This will probably be less important as time goes by. But more 
importantly in the long run, state public servants have seen 
what an influential role a highly qualified public service can 
play in government. There are rumblings of discontent at the 
middle levels of the service amongst those who feel they have 
something to offer but are stopped by strong control at the top and 
If 
a Public Service Act which prohibits public comment on administration. 
4 Public Service Regulation 36 states -
36. Officers not to publicly comment on administration. An 
officer shall not -
(a) Publicly comment upon the administration of euay department 
of the State; or 
(b) Use for any purpose other than for the discharge of 
official duties infonnation gained by or conveyed to him 
through his connection with the Public Service. 
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This is apparent in those technical areas which are quasi-
professional (e.g. social work, teaching, conservation). But 
the increased numbers of administrative officers who have studied 
at the tertiary level and who are aware of the values of partici-
pation are also making greater demands on the non-professional 
side. I suspect that all of this tends to tighten control at 
the top to maintain the existing tradition.^ 
Morrison's second point is still valid as the recent 
(25.3.75) reallocation of portfolios shows. Apart from the odd 
7 
placement of some areas, the machinery of government in Queens-
land is straight forward and the way activities are distributed 
in ministerial portfolios is a rational arrangement and easily 
understood. It is not my wish to go into the problems of adminis-
8 
trative reorganization but merely to assert that the arrangement 
of activities within portfolios generally follows the principle 
of allocation by objective or purpose with the rider that the 
5 This is intended only as a sketch in which to place the role 
of the Permanent Head. For those interested in available 
writing on the Queensland Government, see Knight, Kenneth W. 
and Adams, Jill. Politics and Administration in Queensland : 
A Select Bibliography, Brisbane I Department of Government, 
University of Queensland, 1974. . 
6 Appendix A, "Departmental Arrangements", shows the allocation 
of departments to Ministers and the areas for which Permanent 
Heads are responsible. 
7 Fisheries is in the Dept. of Aboriginal and Island Advancement 
and Tourism is with the Dept. of Harbours and Marine. 
8 For discussion, see Spann, Public Administration in Australia, 
Ch.4. Subramaniam, V. "Machinery of Government Investigations 
Fifty years after the Haldane Report", Public Administration 
(Sydney), Vol.XXVII, No.3, Sept.1968, pp.268-273.Clarke, 
Sir Richard. "The Number and Size of Government Departments", 
Political Quarterly, Vol.43, No.2, April-June 1972. 
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number of ministers is a consequence of coalition politics not 
scientific thought. And, although it is not possible to know 
for sure, the increase in Cabinet to eighteen members may also 
confirm that the government consciously desires to keep a tight 
ministerial control on departments. This follows the Menzies 
prescription. 
"... if we had fewer (Ministers) there would be one interesting 
consequence, because if you reduced the number of Ministers 
and you thereby increased the responsibilities coming to each 
Minister, you would make him more and more dependent on his 
departmental officers. You have only to reduce the number of 
Ministers far enough to create ultimately a complete 
bureaucracy."Q 
Formal Arrangements. 
In Queensland the basic instrument of government is the 
Depeurtment. The term Ministry is usually reserved for the 
9 Menzies, Sir Robert, quoted in Hawker, Geoffrey. "The Bureau-
cracy under the Whitlam Goverxunent", Politics, Vol.X, No.l, 
May 1975, p.l8. 
10 There are also over 300 commissions, committees, boards, etc. 
with staffs of various sizes, authorized to perform tasks on 
behalf of the government. Appendix B lists these alphabetic-
ally for the information of the reader. The list is correct 
as far as possible, but there may be others which have not 
been included. Public Corporations have not been generally 
used in Queensland in the sense of being autonomous. The 
S.E.A.Q. is the notable exception. There is a great range 
of bodies both inside the Public Service Act (e.g. the State 
Government Insurance Office) and outside it (e.g. Ambulance 
Boards) and variations in between (e.g. Hospital Boards) 
authorized by Statute. But the department of state is the 
typical form of executive government in Queensland. See 
Wettenhall, R.L. "The Ministerial Department : British Origins 
and Australian Adaptations", Public Administration (Sydney). 
Vol.XXXII, No.3, Sept.1973, PP.233-250.Using Wettenhall's 
typology it would be possible to classify Queensland Depart-
ments as (l) ministerial departments (on the British model), 
(2) departmental offices (where the Head has duties imposed by 
law and is highly visible as a "public officer"), and 13) 
hybrid departmental corporations (separate from the Crown in 
law). This is not necessary for my thesis. 
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11 Ministers of the Crown as a whole body and we refer to, for 
example, the Department of Works rather than the Ministry of 
Works. At the present time there are eighteen Ministers (all 
are members of Cabinet) who have responsibility for twenty six 
departments appointed under the Public Service Act. However, the 
Railways Department operates completely outside that Act and the 
Commissioner and his staff are appointed under the Railways Act, 
1914-1972. To confuse things further, the Commissioner of Police 
is Permanent Head of the Department of Police for officers in his 
Department under the Public Service Act, and is appointed 
Commissioner under the Police Act, 1937-1973, iu respect of 
police officers. Again the Under Secretary of Works, in addition 
to his duties under the Public Service Act, is responsible for 
wages employees who do not come under that Act. Other Permanent 
Heads' duties vary in the same way. I will limit the discussion 
to Permanent Heads appointed under the Public Service Act, 1922-
1973, for the sake of clarity and brevity. 
A general point which is very important, is that there 
is such a great variety of tasks carried out by government in 
11 For discussion of the semantic problems when using the term 
"ministry", see Wettenhall, R.L. "Cohcepts of Ministry", 
Public Administration (Sydney), Vol.XXIX, No.4, December 
1970, pp.319-329. The Queensland practice is additional to 
Wettenhall's three usages, (l) synonymous wit)it department, 
(2) total area of one minister's jurisdiction, and (3) 
Minister's co-ordinating policy secretariat (pp.328-329). 
Wettenhall dismisses the Queensland usage as being "not 
concerned with the specifics of administrative organization", 
and recommends No. 2 usage as the one appropriate. 
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Queensland that the difference between one department and another 
seems to outweigh the similarities. For example, there is a 
significant difference between the work of those Heads concerned 
with technological service activities which are almost entirely 
instrumental and those who are concerned with government "policies" 
on problematical matters which have not been resolved by the 
parties, the people or the academics. Comparisons are possible 
using quantitative measures such as (l) departmental expenditure, 
(2) personnel employed, both permanent and wages, (3) acts admin-
istered, (4) Parliamentary Questions, (5) Bills presented, (6) 
centralized and decentralized operations (departments operating 
in the capital city and others with large state wide organizations) 
and qualitative "measures" such as (l) professional complexity, 
(2) socio-political implication of actions taken where problemat-
ical social issues are involved, (3) value maintaining activities 
by oversighting departments such as the Treasury and the Public 
Service Board, (4) the level of innovative risk involved in 
decisions taken, (5) the party-political demands on the department 
arising from inter-party, inter-ministerial and Cabinet-Parliament 
conflicts. Comparison will not be attempted here, but the obvious 
problems involved emphasize the difficulty of defining one role 
for a Permanent Head. Perhaps the only common characteristic is 
that of being designated a Permanent Head under the Public Service 
Act. Any generalization reached must be tempered with the common-
sensical realization that it is only a "more or less" statement 
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and not a description of any one Permanent Head in Queensland nor 
a prescription for a common role for all Permanent Heads. 
The personal particulars of the present Permanent Heads 
in Queensland, as at June 1975, are set out in the following 
tables. 
Table 1. 
Table 2. 
Table 3. 
Age Groupings. 
45 to 50 years 
51 " 55 " 
^6 " 60 " 
6l years and over 
Departments Served. 
1 department 
2 " s 
3 
4 " 
5 and over 
Qualifications. 
Post Graduate Degrees or Diplomas 
Pass Degrees 
Non-tertiary professional 
qualifications 
No higher qualifications 
Table 4. Total Period of Service. 
To 5 years 
6 to 15 years 
16 " 25 " 
26 " 35 " 
36 " 45 " 
Over 45 years 
Niimber of Heads. 
4 
6 
8 
8 
9 
5 
7 
5 
2 
3 
7 
11 
5 
2 
1 
1 
6 
11 
5 
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Table 5. Service in Present Position. 
To 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
11 " 15 " 
Number of Heads. 
18 
3 
5 
Titles may be Under Secretary, Commissioner, Director 
General or Director, with the second in charge called Assistant, 
Deputy, etc. Organizational structures vary to accommodate 
specific needs of departments (technical leadership, etc.) but 
there are three basic arrangements which are varied as required. 
Figure I. 
(a) Minister 
-Ministerial Staff 
(b) Minister 
—Ministerial Staff 
Permanent Head 
Assistant Head 
Permanent Head 
(c) 
Technical and Clerical 
Sub-Departments 
Divisions,Branches,etc. 
Minister 
—Ministerial Staff 
Assistant Head Assistant Head 
Administration Technical 
r r^  
Technical and Clerical 
Sub-Departments 
Divisions,Branches,etc. 
T 
Permanent Head 
Assistant 
Technical Head 
Assistant/s 
Technical and Clerical 
Sub-Departments 
Divisions,Branches,etc. 
It is not my purpose to set out organization charts for 
each Department, but simply to point out that there is no rule as 
to the way senior positions are structured within these three 
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general types. In one depeirtment, for example, where highly 
specialized tasks are performed, the Director General of Primary 
Industries (the Permanent Head) is a Specialist (D.Sc.), whilst 
another equally specialized department, the Department of Health, 
has a generalist as Permanent Head with the specialist area of 
the Department controlled by the Director General of Health, who 
is senior to him. Again, the Department of Works, with a large 
professional staff, is headed by a generalist administrator with 
technical support from an Assistant Under Secretary who is a 
professional architect. The organization designer's desire for 
neatness in structures is always secondary to the political and 
social pxirpose of the department, its history and the nature and 
ability of the contemporary senior officers who lead it. This is 
as it should be. 
Duties at the level of Permanent Head and Assistant to 
the Permanent Head are not fixed. For exampSie, some Assistant 
Heads are responsible for set areas of administration, others are 
Assistants to the Permanent Head, and the Permanent Head and 
Assistant work as a team. This seems to depend on the structure 
of the department (e.g. whether there are sub-departments), the 
personality of those involved, their ability and the nature of the 
work. 
Whilst the role filled by an individual Head will be 
determined by many factors there are three main aspects of his 
work which can be classified, (l) his substantive responsibilities 
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in relation to Acts administered in his department, (2) his 
accountability to the Treasury, the Auditor-General and the 
Public Service Board for financial expenditure, personnel 
management, efficiency and general housekeeping matters, and (3) 
his relationship to the Minister and departmental suljordinates 
regarding policy making and implementation. None of these 
aspects is clear cut and simply discussed, all three are inter-
dependent, and all involve problematical questions of account-
ability. 
The first mentioned duty is not unique to Permanent 
Heads and is the usual statutory delegation to public servants 
to do certain things, to authorize licences, permits, etc., to 
approve, control or direct certain activities of the goveriunent 
subject to the appropriate Statute and public law generally. The 
significance of this particular duty from a public administration 
viewpoint is the amount of delegated power involved and the avenue 
of appeal available to the citizen. There has been muc|i debate 
over the question of misuse or non-use of this power and all the 
general arguments apply to the Queensland situation. I do not 
12 intend to go over them here. 
The Permanent Head may be given statutory power under 
the relevant Act. In that case the situation is reasonably clear 
12 See Schwarz, Bernard and Wade, H.W.R. Legal Control of 
Government, Administrative Law in Britain and the United 
States, London : Clarendon Press Oxford, 1972, for recent 
developments. 
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and his accountability for what is done or not done is settled 
13 by the legislation. In other cases the statute may give 
authority to a subordinate officer (e.g. to the Director of 
Children's Services not the Under Secretary, Department of 
Commuhity and Welfare Services and Sport, to the Public Curator 
and not to the Under Secretary, Department of Justice). I doubt 
that the Permanent Head would have any legal authority to direct 
the subordinate to do something under the appropriate statute 
with which he disagreed. However, the Head does have two strong 
weapons at his command - (a) he is close to the Minister, and (b) 
he has the personnel provisions of the Public Service Act which 
could be used to shift the "problem" sideways. However, this 
apparently does not occur to the extent that sucih action is taken 
and the Head exercises considerable authority over the work of 
subordinates in this regard. 
This is recognized explicitly in the new Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act 1974 (No. 19 of 1974). Section 13 (l) states -
13 Although I have no real evidence for this I suspect that some 
Heads would defer to their Minister even where statutory 
power has been given them personally. The potential role 
conflict for the Head as chief servant and adviser of his 
Minister on the one hand and as legal decision maker not 
subject to the directions of the Minister on the other, 
surfaced in the High Court, The Queen v. Anderson; Ex parte 
Ipec-Air Pty. Ltd., Commonwealth Law Reports, 113, 1965, 
pp.177-206. This is discussed in Wettenhall, "The 
Ministerial Department", pp.245-248. Particularly see 
judgment by Windeyer, J. which seems to support the 
Queensland practice. 
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"(l) Subject to this Act, the principal function of the 
Commissioner shall be to investigate any administrative 
action taken by, in or on behalf of any Government 
Department or Authority to which this Act applies." 
An "administrative action" means (Sect. 4) -
"... any action relating to a matter of administration, and 
includes -
(a) a decision and an act; 
(b) the failure or refusal to take a decision or to 
perform an act; 
(c) the formulation of a proposal or intention; and 
(d) the making of a recommendation (including a 
recommendation made to a Minister)." 
Sections 13 (3) and 13 (5) list matters which may not be 
investigated (those with rights of appeal to a tribunal or 
court and the actions of courts, tribunals, etc.). 
Jurisdiction extends to all Government Departments and 
Authorities, including members, officers and employees thereof 
(excepting members of the Police Force). 
Section 24 provides the grounds on which the Commissioner 
may consider that further consideration is necessary or action to 
rectify or alter or vary an administrative action is required, as 
follows -
(a) appears to have been taken contrary to law; 
(b) was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly 
discriminatory; 
(c) was in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of an 
enactment or a practice that is or may be unreasonable, 
unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory; 
(d) was taken in the exercise of a power or discretion, and was 
so taken for an improper purpose or on irrelevant grounds, 
or on the taking into account of irrelevant considerations; 
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(e) was a decision that was made in the exercise of a power or 
discretion and the reasons for the decision were not, but 
should have been, given; 
(f) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; or 
(g) was wrong. 
Following his decision that any of these grounds apply, the 
Commissioner shall recommend to the principal officer of the 
Department that action be taken accordingly (with a copy to the 
Minister) and request him to adi^se of the action taken. 
The principal officer under Section 4 means in relation 
to "a government department or similar organization, the permanent 
head or other principal officer thereof" and the permanent head 
"in relation to a Government Department, means the permanent head 
thereof for the purposes of the Public Service Act 1922-1973". 
Thus the Permanent Head is responsible under the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1974 for rectifying (or not 
rectifying) administrative actions as defined in that Act, and 
which the Commissioner considers unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, 
improperly discriminatory, wrong, etc. It appears then that 
whilst delegated statutory power may be given to subordinate 
officers within a Department, the Permanent Head, in the end, is 
accountable for accepting or otherwise the Commissioner's 
recommendations. In any case, two important points should be made. 
The decision as to the unreasonableness, etc. of a decision, an 
act, the formulation of a proposal or intention, the making of a 
recommendation, is transferred from one public servant to another, 
48 
from a servant of a Minister to a servant of Parliament and then 
back again to the Permanent Head who ends up as the "meat in the 
sandwich". His decision as to what will be done will be taken in 
consultation with his Minister, but there must be a strong 
pressure to follow the Commissioner's recommendation in spite of 
the vague grounds (unreasonable, irrelevant, unjust) which may be 
put forward. No doubt commonsense will pres^ ail and any confront-
ation will probably not be made public, but Ministerial responsib-
ility as a method of political control and hierarchy as a 
principle of organization have both been undermined by imposing 
a further level of "administrative action" on top of the existing 
departmental situation without the criteria provided by objective 
administrative law and rules. These issues are simply made more 
confused. But the Permanent Head certainly seems to be accountable 
for all "administrative action" within his department. 
Expertise in the substantive area of government being 
personally administered by the Permanent Head is assumed, and some 
Heads (e.g. Commissioner of Irrigation and Water Supply, 
Conservator of Forests) are required by law to be appropriately 
qualified to carry out the statutory tasks set for them. This 
does not apply in all cases. 
The second main group of duties formally given to a 
Permanent Head comes from the Public Service Act. A department 
in that act is defined (Section3), rather curiously, as -
"Any State department : the term where necessary includes 
any sub-department or branch or section of a department." 
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A Departmental Minister is (Section 3) -
"Departmental Minister : The Minister of the Grown for the 
time being administering a department concerned or in which 
an officer is employed." 
Public Service Regulation 8 states inter alia -
"8. Defining permanent heads. The person who for the time 
being holds any of the offices or positions named in the 
first column of the table hereunder shall be a permanent 
head and shall be the permanent head of such one or more 
departments, sub-departments, branches, and sections of the 
Public Service as are specified in the second column of 
such table opposite to the name of such office or position. 
•••14 
Individual Permanent Heads derive their authority under 
the Public Service Act from (a) their appointment by the Governor-
in-Council to their position (for example. Under Secretary, 
Director, etc.), and (b) this position being included in the 
table to Regulation 8. 
Public Service Regulation 22 states -
"22. Responsibility of permanent heads. The permanent head 
shall, subject to the departmental Minister, be responsible 
for the general working of the department and for all the 
business thereof." 
The following lists some duties which are included in 
the Permanent Head's responsibility for the "general working" of 
his department and "all the business thereof". 
.. Furnishing of returns to the Public Service Board as required. 
(Reg. 23). 
.. Reporting to the Board regarding proposals to create new 
offices, abolish any office, raise or lower the classification 
of any office. (Reg. 25) 
l4 Columns 2 and 3 correspond to new Regulation 8 made on 20.3.75' 
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.. Report as to surplus or inadequate staff. (Reg. 26) 
.. Responsibility for keeping work up to date. (Reg. 27) 
.. Training of officers for various positions in the department. 
(Seg. 28) 
.. Responsibility for enforcement of Public Service Act and 
Regulations. (Reg. 31) 
.. Report to Public Service Board any breach of the Act and 
Regulations. (Reg. 32) 
The Permanent Head has formal control by virtue of the 
Public Service Act over the personnel side of his department. 
The Public Service Board oversights the Heads' work in this 
regard and appoints Public Service Inspectors for this purpose. 
Inspectors are continually in contact with Permanent Heads and 
officers and it is the Inspector's responsibility to report 
regarding inefficiency, uneconomic activity or breaches of the 
Act and Regulations, accommodation, claims for additional staff 
and reclassifications. The present role of the Inspection Division 
of the Board vis-a-vis the departments is more of the management 
service type (organizational development, methods, training) 
rather than inspectorial in terms of the Act. The Division does 
not carry out regular inspections of departmental work, but enters 
departments on invitation of the Permanent Head and this occurs 
usually where new or increased classifications are requested. 
Great reliance is therefore placed on the diligence, and management 
capability of the head, in the day-to-day administration of his 
department as required by the Public Service Act. 
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Included in this class of duty is responsibility for 
accounts and the collection and disbursement of public moneys. 
In Queensland the Permanent Head is not designated accounting 
officer for his department under the Audit Acts I874-I967. ^ 
Each officer who handles moneys is personally made accountable 
under that Act. But Public Service Regulation 42 provides -
"42. Accounts and public moneys. In all matters relating to 
accounts and the collection and disbursement of public moneys, 
officers shall observe the provisions of 'The Audit Acts, 
1874 to 1967' or any Act amending or in substitution for 
such Acts, a&d the Regulations and instructions issued under 
the authority thereof." 
The Audit Act is greatly in need of overhaul and this 
is presently being done by officers of the Auditor-General's 
Department, but it will be seen that any difficulty of locating 
responsibility which may exist in that Act is taken care of by 
Public Service Regulation 42. The Permanent Head is for all 
sufficient purposes responsible for the accounting matters in 
his Department. 
Once the Minister determines policy goals for the 
forthcoming year, the Permanent Head through his officers, compiles 
the annual estimates and argues his Department's case with the 
Treasury and the Department of the Public Service Board. He also 
attends the Minister when estimates are debated in the Parliament. 
15 Cf. British practice where the Permanent Secretary is 
Accounting Officer for his Department and appears before 
the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. 
See Mackenzie and Grove, op.cit., p.185. 
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The third duty of the Permanent Head is the most 
problematical and revolves around the most elusive of all 
concepts in public administration, namely, policy, what it is, 
how and why it is made, and how it is implemented. Statutory 
responsibility and housekeeping matters are administratively 
interdependent with policy making and implementation, but, whilst 
the first two can be formally set out, "policy" creates the 
greatest problems in understanding because the formal statement 
of policy signifies the least interesting aspect of the topic. 
A Statute is a policy, a practice of ignoring the Statute can be 
a policy, a practice not to have a policy can be a policy, and 
there are an infinite variety of ways any policy can be applied. 
Given that the Permanent Head is accountable for the "adminis-
trative actions" of his department and is provided with the 
personnel and budgetry tools, and given that he has the expertise 
upon which policy deliberations can be based, then obviously he 
is in good shape to advise his Minister as to what should be, 
could be, or will be done in the Department. Whilst the first 
two categories of work undertaken by Permanent Heads can be found 
in the relevant acts (at least the formal requirements), the policy 
process within departments and the role of the Permanent Head is 
much more difficult to describe. In an attempt to understand this 
process, interviews were requested with Heads and following is an 
interpretation of talks held. 
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Politics and Policy. 
Not all Heads were approached to discuss the various 
topics of interest to this essay, but all those who were approached 
granted me an interview. The criteria used to request interviews 
was simply availability (some senior officers were overseas or 
interstate), immediate pressure of work in the department (some 
departments were in the middle of State/Commonwealth negotiations 
and it would have been most inappropriate to take the Head's time 
in these circumstances), and the type of activity or purpose of 
the department (it was essential that the various types of work 
undertaken by government in Queensland be covered). Interviews 
were granted me by thirteen Heads for periods ranging from 
approximately one to two hours. 
Almost without exception the Heads concerned seemed 
genuinely pleased to have someone with whom to discuss their work. 
This was indicated by such comments as -
"It's not often I get a chance to talk about these matters", 
"These questions are interesting to me because I discuss them 
so rarely", and 
"It's a pity these matters are not brought out more often, 
particularly between Permanent Heads themselves". 
One Head in particular criticised the Public Service Board for not 
encouraging greater interaction between Heads. As he stated it, 
"the only time I get to talk to other Under Secretaries on general 
matters is at the Premier's Christmas Party". Another complained 
that he did not even know some Heads personally and thought that 
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this was a bad thing. A third criticised his colleagues for their 
lack of interest in the Royal Institute of Public Administration 
which he considered should become their professional association. 
The feeling I got was that the Heads were so engrossed in the work 
of their own departments, and that there was so little effort made 
by the co-ordinating departments to bring them together that an 
esprit de corps or self-conscious Queensland "style" of department-
al leadership could not develop. In general the Permanent Head in 
Queensland sees himself as a departmental officer not a member of 
a class with interdepartmental professional characteristics. His 
orientation and job ability are specialized and not^  conducive 
towards a professional administrative role across departmental 
boundaries. But this is only partly his fault (it must be due to 
some extent to his lack of interest), because no real attempt is 
made to encourage discussions and interaction between the Heads 
regarding mutual problems and responsibilities. The impression 
that most Heads were pleased to discuss the matters raised by me 
would indicate that this lack of open discussion on such delicate 
matters was not a symptom of a closed system, but rather a part 
of the Public Service culture in this State which limits the 
professional perspective of the Permanent Head to his own 
department and its problems. 
No one "knows" what the Permanent Heads in this State 
are "really" seeking from their jobs. The data presented here by 
me are only a reflection of what I was told and what I interpret 
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to be their meaning. I assume a degree of honesty in the replies 
given me and will not attempt to "expose" hidden motivations. 
Apart from a commonality of attitude *hich their position seems 
to bring those who have succeeded in a bureaucratic organization, 
it is accepted that each Head is an individual with his own 
personality needs which are reflected in the way he sees to his 
work. The Minister to whom he answers also has personality 
requirements which interact with and make demands upon the 
Permanent Head. I have only looked at one side of this interaction. 
For any full examination of the role of the Permanent Head, his 
Minister's views would also be required. This is not possible for 
a variety of reasons and therefore any conclusions reached here 
must be seen as partial. The following should therefore be seen 
as a composite picture of a Queensland Permanent Head's perception 
of his role and should be applied to the individual positions only 
in a "more or less" fashion. It is intended as a basis for 
further investigation, discussion and clarification. 
The discussions held with Permanent Heads were directed 
towards questions of policy and their role in relation thereto. 
This was stated by me to the Heads with the assurance that complete 
confidentiality as to names of departments and officers would be 
maintained. Therefore no individual cases will be cited below. 
So that discussion would not he completely open-ended, the follow-
ing written questions were put before the Heads. 
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Politics. 
Could you please state what you refer to when you use 
the terms "politics" and"political"? 
In your position do you find yourself acting "politically" 
in this way? 
In your opinion should public servants be "political" in 
the way that you use the term? 
Polity. 
In what sense do you use the term "policy"? 
Do you decide or ihfluence the "policy" of your department? 
In what way should public servants be involved in policy 
making (if at all)? 
How can conflicting advice given by different experts and/or 
client groups be reconciled for the purposes of policy? 
(Who should do the synthesis? According to what criteria?) 
Minister/Permanent Head. 
How would you describe the role of departmental Minister 
(politician, administrator, policymaker, manager, defender 
of the department's interests)? 
Do you see your role as member of a minister/permanent head 
team or more specifically (as policy implementer, guardian 
of the public interest, conflict resolver, interest 
articulator, mediator, manager, professional expert or 
whatever)? 
There was no attempt on my part to interpose interpret-
ations, definitions or views into the discussion which limited 
somewhat the replies that some Heads made. But this was deliberate 
and responses were an indicator of the thought that the officers 
interviewed had previously given to their role. 
Politics. 
The terms "politics" and "political" had various meanings 
for different officers but Heads defined one meaning of these terms 
consistently as referring to the activity of political parties. 
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voters, pressure groups and others leading to elections, the work 
of the members of the Parliament and the relationships of 
Ministers, government and opposition parties. The Head sees this 
area of the political-administrative system as one in which he 
must not participate directly. The partisan advantage sought by 
political parties is not the concern of the public servant qua 
public servant. In other words the Permanent Head must be seen 
to be non-partisan as far as the parties are concerned. Politics 
in this sense is something "they" (the parties) do in their 
attempt to gain and maintain control of the parliament and the 
Head must not assist one party over another in this activity. 
This is the orthodoxy of the neutral public service which Queens-
land inherited from Britain. Politics is that which concerns the 
Ministry and the Parliament. The Head is a servant of the 
Minister and his job is to "help the government govern through 
his Minister". It is the Minister's job to look after the politics 
of the system. 
Yet this simplistic view of their work is not sustained 
when more subtle political distinctions are made by the Permanent 
Heads. 
The first point that emerged was that any competent senior 
administrator and particularly the Permanent Head of a department 
of state must understand the political system and be capable of 
anticipating community needs in the area of his Minister's respon-
sibility. To do this he must be familiar with the government 
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party's philosophy or ideology and ensure that his Minister is 
well advised. "Politics" in this sense is the expression of the 
views of the community which may not have found a place in party 
policies. The Permanent Head must anticipate these demands 
reaching the party political level, "Keeping his Minister out of 
trouble" in this respect is very important to the Head, 
A second theme which is stressed by Heads is the need 
to anticipate the consequences of decisions to be taken by the 
Head and his Minister as they affect the Minister in Parliament, 
and in the electorate. This is considered to be an essential part 
of the Permanent Head's job. Three examples will illustrate. If 
the Minister tells his Head that he intends to do something and 
he (the Minister) is unaware of some "political" consequences 
which may flow from his decision, the Head, if he is to do his 
work professionally, should point out what is likely to occur and 
the effect it would have on the Minister and his party in the 
electorate. Secondly, the Head should point out the political 
implications of recommendations for something new which he 
initiates. He should recommend what he thinks is technically 
sound (there is no question about this), but submission should 
be directed towards the political goals of the government, and 
he should indicate the potential effect on the Minister in the 
psurty and electorate. Whilst the Head does not engage in "politics" 
as defined, his work as adviser to his Minister demands that he 
"politically" advise his Minister regarding the consequences of 
departmental actions. Thirdly, when preparing speeches. 
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announcements, answers to parliamentary questions, the Head 
always takes the "political" aspects of the matter into account. 
This is not to say that there is any attempt to mislead, give 
wrong information, or such like, but merely that a "professional" 
administrator must at such times be cognizant of the political 
context of his actions. 
The interesting thing here is that, on the one hand, 
political activity is seen to be that area of the political-
administrative system in which he should not participate directly. 
It is the activity of political parties, members of the Parliament, 
and Ministers when they are in the Parliament. As one Head put it, 
"Politics is the government of the State by a political party". 
The Head is not part of this activity and sees his job as being 
apart from it. This is the "political arena". Yet he sees his 
work as being influenced at almost all points by political 
parameters. It was openly stated by several Heads that a Permanent 
Head "must be political". It is "undesirable but unavoidable" in 
the words of another. He must understand the implications of what 
he recommends for the Minister and the Minister's party, both in 
the extreme sense that he would not recommend something which is 
clearly outside the ideological possibilities set by the government 
parties and in the sense that he would be"professionally" required 
to point out to his Minister the consequences in the electorate or 
in the party of recommendations he (the Permanent Head) made or 
decisions which the Minister himself intends to take. The Head 
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would serve any Minister with equal loyalty. He is party-
politically neutral with the rider that if there is a conflict 
between Ministerial demands and professional or moral values, the 
Head would have to consider his position. In other words, the 
Head holds two "political" values as being necessary to the 
professional performance of his work, 
(1) He must be non-partisan in the sense that he does not 
support one political party over another - he is not 
political in this sense, 
(2) He must be attentive to the political (i,e, partisan) 
implications of policy and make these implications 
explicit to his Minister - he is political in this 
sense. 
This attitude towards "politics" neatly points up the 
peculiar role of the Permanent Head. Clearly, the ability to 
serve any Minister with equal loyalty is seen to be the basic 
political(?) role requirement of the position of Permanent Head. 
This follows the paradigmatic picture of the "Westminster''or "Whitehall" 
anonymous, neutral, civil servant. The system pre-supposes that 
the alternative government will one day come to power. The Head, 
as a matter of prudence and commonsense, must not commit himself 
to one party. He should be, as far as possible, politically 
detached so that he can give his Minister objective and impartial 
advice, to the best of his knowledge and ability, on all the 
16 In Queensland history the only case of this reaching the public 
was "The Creighton Case", see S.S.Parker, "Public Neutrality : 
A Moral Problem", in Schaffer, B.B. and Corbett, D.C, (eds,) 
Decisions, Case Studies in Australian Administration, 
Melbourne : Cheshire, I965, pp,201-224, 
None of the Heads interviewed experienced this dilemma them-
selves and none knew of any case where this situation arose. 
61 
relevant aspects of the problem - consequences, costs and benefits. 
Logically, the analysis in all important aspects will be political. 
It is the right of the Minister in our system to expect this 
detached, impartial advice. It is the ability and skill of the 
Permanent Head to look at the political scene and political 
personalities without being partisan and put the various elements 
together into general or "administrative" advice to his Minister 
that constitutes the professionalism of the work. 
There is no apparent questioning of the logical dilemma 
of being both a-political vis-a-vis the system on the one hand 
and being a political adviser to his Minister on the other. The 
Head does not see this attitude as ambivalent and, when questioned, 
rationalizes his position by the concept of Ministerial Responsib-
ility. The Minister is the elected representative of the people 
and party and is accountable to Parliament for his decisions and 
the activities of his department. The Head is his adviser in 
this. It does not arise that loyalty to the Minister, in logic 
at least, denies the Permanent Head's neutrality. It is seen as 
part of his professionalism that the Head could advise a Minister 
of any governing party in this way. To do this he requires a 
sound understanding of the political philosophy and goals of the 
government, the personal values of his Minister, as well as an 
awareness of how his department's activities are likely to be 
viewed politically by the community. In this way the Head 
separates politics in a "partisan" sense from politics in an 
"administrative" sense. Once a government is chosen it is an 
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inherent part of his job to think politically insofar as the needs 
of that government are concerned. He is therefore not allowed 
personal views as to which party policy is to be preferred. As 
far as public comment on his department activities is concerned 
the Head sees this as a job for the Minister. Certainly the Head 
must never publicly comment on the rights or wrongs of department 
policies. The Green and White Paper system of presenting policies 
for discussion was suggested by one Heiad as a way of directing de-
bate about policies to the substantive issues involved and away 
from "party politics". 
There was divided opinion regarding a system of Parlia-
mentary committees which would be bipartisan and before which the 
Head could be called to answer specific questions on specific 
matters. One Head felt that the task of presenting and defending 
departmental matters was the job of the Minister and was adamant 
that his confidential advice to the Minister should not be made 
known before any Committee. Another stated that whilst he did 
not reject the principle of being questioned by a Committee he 
would not be prepared to tell the Committee the full content of 
his advice. I offer no explanation of why differing views are 
held other than to suggest that the answer lies in (a) the individ-
ual personality of Heads and their capability in handling a 
committee situation, (b) the technical base on which some depart-
ments work as opposed to problematical social tasks performed by 
others, and (c) the sort of technical or other training the head 
himself has had. 
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In general. Heads tended to support bi-partisan 
committees as a means of opening up discussion on departmental 
matters, although very interesting contradictory views are held 
which highlight the difference in the ways Heads see their work. 
Some Heads are doubtful about a committee system because it is 
not in accord with the orthodox notion of anonymity and neutrality. 
They claim neutrality as far as "politics" are concerned and argue 
that they can only remain neutral if their anonymity is retained. 
The other view is that the opportunity to present and argue their 
department's position (and therefore the Minister's position) 
before a Committee of the parliament would establish their 
professionalism and neutrality. Either way Permanent Heads claim 
neutrality, but seek different instrumental values to maintain 
their neutrality. The dilemma seems to revolve around the notions 
of administrative "professionalism" publicly expressed and 
political neutrality anonymously maintained. 
The Permanent Head sees himself as the servant of the 
Minister. His orientation is towards the norms prescribed by the 
Minister and his duty is to see that these prescriptions are faith-
fully carried out. As one Head said - "I will do what I am told 
even though I don't support it - the Minister is the boss". His 
main political task as he sees it is to safeguard his Minister's 
position. The most interesting fact that emerges from this 
17 I suspect that the model which comes to mind is the U.S. 
congressional system with its blast of media publicity 
rather than the British model. 
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discussion is the open acceptance by Permanent Heads of the 
political aspect of their role (to advise and point out implic-
ations of decisions, recommendations, etc.) whilst at the same 
time proclaiming their non-partisan involvement in this role. 
Heads made little reference to inter-departmental, inter-
Ministerial or inter-party conflict or what may be called intra-
governmental politics. When this subject was alluded to by me 
the matter was not taken up as this area was apparently seen to 
be the job of the Minister. 
Policy. 
"It's a policy of this department not to use the word 
policyl" One Head half-jokingly suggested that the word would 
best be dropped altogether. In spite of this, the notion of policy 
was reasonably clear in the minds of the Heads interviewed. In 
general, policy is seen as a predetermined method of approach to 
a problem area, a set of guidelines for action, a statement of 
principles, a way of dealing with a set of problems. There is a 
hierarchy of policy levels. The highest level is stated govern-
ment party policy which may or may not be included in the platform, 
which may emerge from Cabinet decisions, but which is not decided 
by the Minister or his department although it may have been 
initiated within the department. Government policy is a frame-
work in which the Permanent Head works and within which he is 
required to devise strategies of implementation. But sometimes 
Government policy is not fully understood because its background 
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is not made known to the appropriate head and its objectives are 
too general. Further, much stated government policy at this 
level is not implemented and whilst it remains as "policy" it has 
no real impact on the day-to-day workings of the department. 
Government policy may be expressed in party statements 
at elections, legislation, cabinet decisions and directly by the 
Minister to the Head. Generally speaking it is seen to be the 
Minister's task to interpret overall Government policy for the 
department and there would probably be implications which extend 
beyond departmental boundaries. The Head should be able to under-
stand the philosophy of the particular government then in power 
and within that philosophy look at the enunciated policy broadly 
rather than merely at the particularized departmental objectives 
stated. This requires a basis of understanding as to what the 
broad policy objectives of the government are and how they affect 
the particular responsibility of the Minister. This is easy to 
say, but policy at this level shades into ideology. This was 
evident in such remarks as - "If a question arises which has 
connotations of socialism involved and the Liberal government is 
in power at the time, then obviously the question assximes an 
importance to which attention should be drawn that this may 
conflict with the general philosophy or enunciated policy of the 
government". The same approach would apply if Labor or any other 
party was in power - the Head would be required to comprehend the 
philosophy of that party. 
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It should be stressed that the great bulk of work 
performed in the public service is the same, no matter which 
political party has power. There are emphases as to which 
direction to take, but generally speaking, most work proceeds 
unaware of ideological or philosophical questions. But Permanent 
Heads felt that they and other senior administrators should be 
able to interpret government policy in these terms if they are 
to be effective in their work. 
At the next level, policy is understood to be the 
decisions of the Minister as to how a certain class of matter is 
to be dealt with within the department. How a statute is to be 
interpreted, how a discretioneiry power is to be exercised, how 
departmental priorities are to be determined. Ministerial policy 
shades into policy made by the Permanent ^ead. The distinction 
varies from department to department according to the nature of 
work and personalities of the Minister and Head. But a substantial 
part of the guidelines for the day-to-day running of the department 
is made by the Head. As one Head put it - "It is the responsib-
ility of the Permanent Head to devise implementation strategies". 
This is based on his technical and management expertise. In 
particular, housekeeping matters, e.g. personnel, accounting, 
stores, etc. are not seen to be a direct interest of the Minister 
and the Permanent Head is responsible to other agencies for these 
matters (e.g. Public Service Board, Auditor-General). The 
hierarchy of policy-making goes down the line to the level when. 
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for example, the officer-in-charge of a Records Branch would 
determine policy within parameters laid down by the Permanent 
Head, for the running of his area. Thus policy is seen as a 
guide to action, the content and importance of which varies with 
its position in the hierarchy of decision makers. 
The Permanent Head, directly through the provisions of 
the Public Service Act, and indirectly through the Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act, is formally responsible for the effective and 
economic implementation of the business of the department. This 
means that he is responsible for implementation of policy subject 
to the Minister. How the work is arranged (delegation, etc.), 
what offices are necessary, what management information services 
are set up, which variety of the great array of available manage-
ment techniques is to be used etc., are all his concern. Whilst 
the problems of policy implementation can only be separated from 
those of policy making in a very tenuous way and the whole policy 
process should be seen as a dynamic system, policy implementation 
has been the traditional concern of Public Administration and 
Management studies. The Head's role is quite explicit and well 
known in this regard. It was of greater interest to this essay 
to sketch the part played in policy formation by the Permanent 
Head according to the notion of "policy" set out above which 
appears to be the one commonly held in Queensland. As "policy" 
is such a cloudy term I will limit the discussion to the Head's 
role in the making of policy at the level where the decisions are 
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made by the Minister, Cabinet or the Parliament, that is at the 
"political" level. It is taken for granted the Permanent Head 
legitimately lays down guidelines for the operation of his 
department generally, and that these are continually under 
review subject to the Minister. The Minister is seen as being 
politically responsible for all policy in the department. That 
is, any policy decisions which have known political implications 
as set out above should be made by the Minister. (Political 
implications of departmental actions which were not seen in advance 
may surface at any time.) 
There are at least three sorts of policy problems with 
which the Minister has to deal, (l) interpretation and possible 
amendment of established policy as it relates to a specific case 
which is problematical, (2) policy initiatives which arise from 
outside the department, and (3) policy initiatives from within the 
department. Whilst all are usually subject to departmental 
recommendation there is a significant difference in their implic-
ations. Once again this typology should not be taken too 
literally as each type of policy situation overlaps in practice 
with the other. The following is presented to elucidate the 
process. 
Firstly, a decision may be required as to whether the 
matter is covered by the existing guidelines and, if action is 
taken, will the consequences for policy within the department and 
in other departments be acceptable. These matters may arise from 
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representations to the Minister or the department, or in the day-
to-day workings of a Branch. Specific cases are the daily testing 
of existing policy - does it work, is it just, are some individual 
cases being unfairly dealt with? Where the incongruence is great 
enough policy may have to be altered to suit the new circumstances. 
Such recommendations can come from any level in the department, 
but almost invariably the Permanent Head will make the final 
recommendation to the Minister. 
Secondly, where specific recommendations from outside 
the department for something new or vastly different are made, 
these are also referred to the Head for recommendation. Sometimes 
the Minister will simply inform the Head that something is to be 
done. But this is not the usual procedure. Submission for new 
policies are dealt with by departmental officers and are dealt 
with similarly to those which arise from within the department. 
The significant difference is that the Minister and his department 
are reacting to and evaluating specific claims by interest groups 
and individuals to be dealt with in a certain way by the govern-
ment. This is consistent with the pluralist notion of politics. 
Thirdly, policy may originate from within the department 
itself and this implies a different role for the department con-
sistent with the notion of positive government. Almost without 
exception the Heads interviewed said that the greatest proportion 
of policy arises from within the department (stated to be as high 
as 90S^  in one case) and comes from two sources, (a) the work of 
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professionals or experts in the department putting forward 
proposals flowing from technical developments in their own field 
of expertise, or (b) knowledge within the department of what is 
happening in the community generally, liaison with client groups 
and, particularly, in regard to areas which may not have found 
expression in "politics" and are generally unrepresented. 
There is ho doubt that Permanent Heads in Queensland 
see themselves as directly involved in policy making both as 
adviser to the Minister when general policy demands arise from 
within his party or the electorate and as the developer and 
18 initiator of programmes within their departments. Policy is 
synthesized by the Permanent Head by recommendation to the Minister. 
This is seen as a process through which various (possibly competing) 
viewpoints are pressed. Included would be such activities as -
representations by individuals and/or groups to Minister and 
department head re policies or decisions; and 
.. conflicting pressures within the department for control of 
decision making situation (such as differing technical 
opinions). 
The process is understood as a sort of game of competing 
views, forces and resources, leading to a policy recommendation. 
This is a continuing aspect of departmental life and it is necessary 
for the Head to bring together various interested parties to ensure 
that a recommendation to Minister has covered all possible 
arguments. The process of synthesizing views for Ministerial 
consideration takes into account -
18 Cf. Bland Report, para. 9.64. Where Permanent Heads in Victoria 
expressed the view that - "the Minister looks after policy 
and the department attends to administration". 
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. views of interested persons and organizations (as far as 
possible; 
personal views of Minister; 
. policy of Minister's party (if known); 
. inter-departmental and ministerial conflicts; and 
. Public Service constraints (Treasury, Public Service Board, 
Auditor-General); 
but I get the feeling that the Head is usually quite sure what he 
wants and that the process which he calls policy recommendation 
is really an exercise in testing his own point of view and not 
merely mediating between conflicting demands. The Permanent Head 
realizes that his position gives him a trump card in influencing 
policy, but rationalizes this influence as concern for the 
effectiveness of his department's operation. His position requires 
him to present his views as forcefully as possible. As head of his 
department and its technical resources, the Permanent Head is 
obliged to make firm policy recommendations. This is a legitimate 
and necessary part of his position. He sees himself as an actor 
in this process competing with other actors to influence the 
Minister and government policy. Whilst he is aware that he is in 
a very strong position of power he won't acknowledge this to be 
political in the sense above. He insists that policy initiating 
is politically neutral other than the need to indicate political 
implications to his Minister. 
Given that the Permanent Head develops policy recommend-
ations and puts these before his Minister he does not see himself 
as making policy. 
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He does initiate policy ideas and formulates plans 
following on his appraisal of organizational objectives, but 
these become the responsibility of the Minister because the 
Minister approves them. He admits that in many cases the Head 
makes policy in a de facto sense. The Minister will approve a 
recommendation, (a) because he trusts Head's technical judgment, 
and (b) there is no political danger in the recommendation. As 
to whether the determination of policy in this way was democratic 
the Head feels that the democratic political process is handled 
by the Minister and Parliament according to the principle of 
Ministerial responsibility. The Minister expects to be advised 
well and if he takes that advice the political responsibility 
still lies with him. In fact, nothing may be done in the 
department "without the Minister's approval". The Minister 
usually has his own source of advice outside the department to 
which departmental recommendations are put. One Head lamented 
"the Minister had his own political pipeline which I cannot tap". 
In any case the Minister may become an expert in departmental 
affairs himself after some time in office and the interface in 
policy making between Minister and Head becomes much easier and 
straight forward and the Head's role is to offer an opinion as to 
what course of action should be taken based on technical criteria, 
individual expertise and wisdom. 
In addition to this source of advice. Ministers have 
committees of the government parties to look at the policy proposals 
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of their departments. In matters which concern government policy 
it is generally the practice for the Minister to take departmental 
recommendations to the committee either before or after Cabinet 
decision, and if it is agtreed to, he is in a stronger position 
before the Joint Government Party meeting. Any matters which 
come up through the department as questions of existing policy to 
be resolved or new policy to be made can be considered by the 
Minister's committee (some are more active than others) and be 
referred Back to the department for further consideration or for 
the answering of any particular question as to how the policy is 
to be implemented and what effect it would have on the electorate. 
This factor varies so far as the political implications of 
particular policy matters are concerned. Additionally, proposals 
have to sustain Cabinet criticism. It will be seen that the 
Head's policy recommendation may face serious challenge before 
acceptance. 
The Head feels that whilst there was a political 
implication for every policy (e.g. threat of election), the senior 
administrator inevitably influences policy because of his knowledge 
of the department and of the possibilities for action. The Head 
should be an enthusiast for his area and seek to set and achieve 
goals as he sees them subject to Ministerial control. In any case, 
decisions are made by the government on political criteria and the 
Head's job is to study the philosophy and policy of government 
party in order to make his recommendations as close to that mark 
as possible. But he is sure that public servants at his level 
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(that of Head of a Department) should not consider themselves 
mere instruments but be actively engaged in the policy process. 
Summary. 
The relationships which develop between the Minister 
and his Permanent Head are very important because it is here 
that the permanent and temporary (?) administrators combine their 
different talents in the public interest. The nexus between the 
political and administrative aspects of government is visible at 
this point. The way that these relationships develop has 
significant implications for the development of government policy 
and the operation of the department. Because of this, the nature 
of these relationships, the way the Permanent Head conceives them 
and the effect they have on the political-administrative system 
are highly delicate and not easily described in general terms. 
Each Minister-Permanent Head combination has its own human problem 
of communication, knowledge, moral values, goals, etc. Whilst it 
is true that once the Minister says "That's itI" the Head will 
obey, and there appears to be no question of who is master, where 
expertise lies in the department, and because knowledge breeds a 
sense of righteousness (the"expert" syndrome), the Minister's 
political goals may be seen as less valid, less rational, less 
desirable than the technical values which the department represents, 
But conflict rarely occurs at this level. If it does occur the 
Head puts his department's view to his Minister who accepts it or 
rejects it. In any case the Minister takes responsibility and is 
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"politically" accountable. The Head sees this fact as indicative 
of their respective roles. 
The first and fundamental role of a Minister (as seen 
by the Head) is that of politician. The Mihister is a member of 
his political party, the Parliament and the Cabinet and this line 
of accountability determines his basic orientation. His position 
as Minister depends on his ability to maintain and retain 
domination (? leadership) of the Parliament by his party. This 
is where his job begins and whatever the Minister's personal 
values and interests, his ultimate objective is to see that his 
party's and his own interests (not necessarily in that order) are 
protected. The second role of the Minister is to ensure account-
ability of the non-elected agencies of government to the Parliament. 
He can then be seen as the top controller or administrator of the 
department. The British notion of Ministerial responsibility links 
legislature and public service in this way. Whether his role as 
politician or administrator is uppermost depends on many variables, 
including the relative electoral security of his government, the 
policy issues involved, his own capability and interests, etc. 
There cannot be a rule. The Queensland tradition stresses a strong 
interest in the administrative aspect, but this varies. The 
Permanent Head does not see the Minister as an expert although 
after a length of time the Minister does develop an extensive 
knowledge of departmental matters. The role seen for the Minister 
by the Head would not include administration of the department in 
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the management sense but this may not be what the Minister sees 
for himself. In general the Minister's job is seen (l) to be a 
politician, (2) to assist in cabinet to make government policy, 
(3) to make policy for the department, and (4) to establish an 
effective relationship with the Head and ensure that he knows 
generally what is going on in the department. 
The Permanent Head's role in the system is to exercise 
expertise and professionalism in the substantive areas of policy 
implementation, to manage his department's resources effectively 
and economically and to advise his Minister honestly and well. 
Which aspect of this role is emphasized depends on circiunstances. 
On the one hand the Head may be capable, expert and effective, 
personally in accord with the government position on policy, with 
a history of action which has proved technically sound and to the 
government's political advantage. I suspect that in this case the 
Minister would lean on his Permanent Head and the Head's role in 
their relationship would be influential on the policy making side. 
The Head in this situation would delegate his management tasks. 
On the other hand, a Permanent Head who has had a mediocre record 
of policy initiatives, whose grasp of the problems which interest 
his Minister appears low, who fails to accept his policy role, 
whose personality may clash with that of his Minister, and whose 
promotion to his position may pre-date the appointment of the 
Minister, will probably not have a great impact on policy-making, 
but will be encouraged to concentrate on implementation and 
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management. In the latter case the Minister will seek other 
advisers, both within the service and outside it. As far as I 
know, no Head has been removed from his position for these 
reasons. He is ignored as far as possible. 
The Permanent Head ideally would bring together three 
forms of knowledge, (a) he should have technical expertise in 
departmental affairs leading to sound policy recommendations and 
effective implementation, and (b) he should have management 
(administration) expertise to ensure economic and effective 
organization of the resources under his control, and (c) he should 
be worldly wise and cognizant of the subtleties of political 
reality to be able to protect his Minister's interests. His 
objective, as one Head very simply put it, is "to make his 
Minister's job as easy as possible". 
The Minister's role in the system combines political and 
administrative values inseparably and the Permanent Head (the top 
public administrator) sees his job as necessarily involved in both 
aspects of that role. Yet he assiduously claims neutrality vis-a-vis 
the political system. How can this be? 
The problem is simply put. On the one hand, text book 
writers tell us that the orthodox distinction of politics and 
administration is no longer useful - they are inseparable and 
commingle throughout the agencies of government. On the other side, 
the practitioner sees himself as neutral and whilst administration 
is carried on in a political context, what he does is not politics 
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but administration. Theory and practice seem far apart. The 
balance of this essay will attempt to resolve this apparent 
confusion. 
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III THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. 
Old Wine in New Bottles. 
Australian public administration is a mixture of British 
constitutional practice and American administrative theory. Under-
standing of both practice and theory is darkened by the politics-
administration distinction which is a new name for the old problem 
of how the polity is to be governed. 
It is a mistaken view that the category of human action 
which we now call public administration is something new or the 
creation of our time. What is new is the systematic self-conscious 
study of the activity and its factual and conceptual relationship 
to other parts of the political-administrative system. There has 
been a long tradition of advice to riilers (Plato, Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, etc.), but - "Administrative thought - in the sense 
of specialized, concentrated, continuous, and recorded observation 
and speculation - is distinctly a modern development." 
"The term 'public administration' began to creep into 
European Languages during the seventeenth century to distinguish 
between the absolute monarch's administration of public affairs 
2 
and his management of his private household." That is, the public 
business was differentiated from other activities of the monarch's 
1 Gross, Bertram quoted in La Palombara, Joseph. "Values and 
Ideologies in the Administrative Evolution of Western 
Constitutional Systems", in Braibanti, Ralph (ed.). Political 
and Administrative Development, Durham N.C. : Duke University 
Press, 1969, p.168. 
2 Caiden, Gerald E, The Dynamics of Public Administration : 
Guidelines to Current Transformation in Theory and Practice. 
New York : Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1971, p.31. 
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household and given a name. Eventually power passed to competing 
political groups, the monarch became a Civil List item in the 
national budget, or replaced by a nominal presidential figure. 
Public offices excluded proprietary offices and sinecures. 
Bureaucratization spread as the diversification and complication 
of government increased. The first systematic studies in modern 
administration were conducted by professors in the cameralist 
sciences in Prussia and contemporary scholars have contrasted the 
development of the Franco-Prussian and British political-
administrative forms, and the values they were said to represent. 
Twentieth century Public Administration is distinctly 
American in character, that is, whilst other states have concen-
trated on the doing of administration, the Americans have added 
a large body of writing on the subject as they understood it. In 
fact %erican texts give the impression that Public Administration 
commenced with Woodrow Wilson's famous essay, and that he almost 
invented the term. However, Wilson's essay was an attempt to 
bring European scholarship about public administration to the study 
of government in America and he acknowledged his debts to the 
European tradition. 
3 See particularly La Palombara, op.cit.; Chapman, Brian. The 
Profession of Government, The Public Services in Europe, 
London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959; and Barker, 
Ernest. The Development of Public Services in Western Europe 
1660-1930, Hamden Connecticut : Archon Books, 1966. 
4 Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration", Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol.56, No.2 (June I887), pp.48l-506, reprinted 
in Woll, Peter (ed.). Public Administration and Policy, New 
York : Harper and Row, I966, pp.15-41. References will be 
made to the Woll reprint. 
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Prior to the European study of administration however, 
there has been a long history of activities which can be reason-
ably compared to functions performed by the modern public servant. 
At least the relationship of these officials (not "public" in the 
modern sense) to the source of political power in their societies 
was similar even if the content of their work was different. For 
example, Gladden studied ancient societies and differentiated 
historically, (l) the leader, initiator, headman or ruler, (2) the 
middle man or official who sees that the wishes of the head are 
carried out, and (3) the large body of lower class worker and 
slaves who undertake the productive work of the community. He 
says -
"A hard and fast line cannot be drawn between the governor and 
the leading officials, nor can the more menial official be 
excluded from the worker group, but in the main the public 
administrator figures in the middle group."^ 
The naming of members of the middle group as "public administrators" 
may be debatable. Others may call them managers. For example, 
George, using different terminology, has pointed to much ancient 
material which shows that -
"Prior to the existence of such rulers as Solomon, however, 
there arose the need for some way, some system, to govern 
and manage the people. Many ancient rulers used their 
trusted servants to carry out their wishes, giving such 
servants the necessary authority to act for the ruler. 
These servants collectively then became the council or 
advisory board for the chiefs."g 
5 Gladden, E.N. A History of Public Administration, London : 
Frank Cass, 1972, Vol.1, p.2. 
6 George, Claude S. Jr. The History of Management Thought, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice Hall Inc., 1972, p.3. 
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The terms administration and management may be used 
synonymously and which of the two we use usually signifies our 
academic interest. The point here is that an activity can be 
sensibly called administration and identified in long past 
7 
societies. Officials have been authorised to implement rules 
and decisions made by kings or headmen and have sought ways and 
means to do this. Such modern concepts as legitimacy, authority 
and power, immediately come to mind to refer to this activity. 
The significant thing is that this exercise of power by the middle 
men was authorised by another - the official did not in his own 
person possess authority. Gladden calls this administration and 
George names it management. 
Eisenstadt applied sociological concepts to the analysis 
of historical bureaucratic empires up to and including western 
Europe in the Age of Absolutism and noted that -
"In close connection with the differentiation of political 
roles and with the drive toward specific, autonomous 
political goals, several special organizations of political 
activity developed in these societies. The most important 
were (l) bureaucratic administrative organs and (2) special 
channels of political struggle."© 
After the ruling elite the most important group participating in 
the political struggle in these societies was the administrative 
bureaucracy itself. Its upper echelons, who were not merely 
technical or administrative executives, gradually developed an 
7 Also see Childe, V. Gordon. What Happened in History, Barmonds-
worth : Penguin Books, 1946, p.103 re divine households being 
"administered" by corporations of priests. 
8 Eisenstadt, S,N, The Political Systems of Empires, London : 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, p.21. 
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ideology emphasizing autonomy and responsibility for implementing 
the chief goals of society in contrast to the policies of the 
9 
rulers. Eisenstadt shows that the bureaucratic administrative 
organ's autonomy or freedom from control, and its power to make 
major decisions were constantly under review by the King who tried 
to safeguard the royal power. 
The point here is that historically the official, the 
administrator, the manager of public affairs has not only been part 
of the bureaucratic administrative organs of government but has 
participated in what Eisenstadt calls the channels of political 
struggle. There is no problem in understanding the history of 
political-administrative systems in this way. The prize sought 
was control over the legitimacy and coercive resources of society 
in order that specific values could be achieved. The capability 
to make effective decisions for the polity (the political organiz-
ation of society) implies control over the means to have those 
decisions put into effect. Legitimacy allows implementation without 
bayonets, but in the end coercion must be available, and, as the 
ruler, monarch or head must govern through others, and must perforce 
share his legitimacy and coercive resources, there is a built-in 
potential for conflict. 
What characterizes the modern study of government is (a) 
the attempt to analytically separate politics and administration, 
and (b) the design of institutions to conform with prescriptions 
9 Ibid, pp.157-160. 
10 Ibid, pp.160-161. 
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based on this separation. And this approach is used by scholars 
not specifically concerned with Public Administration. For example, 
one anthropologist has stated that the government of a society 
always, and everywhere, implies a double form of action. He 
defines social action as political when it seeks to control or 
12 influence decisions concerning public affairs, that is, policy, 
and this action always operates within the framework of competition 
between individuals and groups. Political action takes place at 
the level of decision and the formulation of programmes. It is 
defined by power but is of its nature "segmentary" since it is 
expressed in the interplay of groups and persons in competition. 
On the other hand, administrative action takes place at the level 
of organization and execution. It is defined by authority and is 
by its nattire hierarchical, for it organizes to varying degrees 
and according to strict rules, the direction of public affairs. 
"Consequently, political systems are distinguished only to the 
extent in which they vary in the degree of differentiation 
and the mode of association of these two kinds of action. 
Their typology should not therefore be discontinuous, like 
that of contrasting segmentary and centralized state societies, 
but form a series of types in which political action and 
administrative action are combined in different degrees."^-
Which is to say that varying mixes may be found where groups, in-
cluding officials or office-holders, compete for power over policy. 
11 See Balandier, Georges. Political Anthropology, Harmondsworth : 
Penguin Books, 1972, p.29 re the work of M.G. Smith. 
12 The "political" may be defined in many other ways - see 
Part IV. 
13 Ibid, p.29. 
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There has always been, and still is, a built-in stress 
centred around the making of authoritative decisions for the polity 
and their implementation. The basic analytical concepts of 
responsibility and accountability derive from consideration of 
this conflict. I wish to look at both British and American ways 
of dealing with this question in order that public service in 
Queensland may be understood on a theoretical level as part of 
this perennial problem of government. 
British Administration. 
The most important British contribution to the problem 
of controlling the power of officials was the invention of the 
14 Ministerial department. British public administration (and 
Australian practice), is grounded on two "principles" - ministerial 
responsibility to the Parliament and civil service neutrality. How 
these principles are to be interpreted is a function of where you 
sit in the system, and your ideological justification for the 
exercise of political power. Birch has suggested that there are 
"two languages in which the relations between Parliament and the 
15 
executive are described". On the one hand, back benchers, 
14 For the 19th century creation of Ministerial departments, see 
Schaffer, B.B, "The Idea of the Ministerial Department : 
Bentham. Mill and Bagehot", Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, Vol,3, Nov,1957, pp.60-78; Wettenhall, R.L. 
"The Ministerial Department : British Origins and Australian 
Adaptations", Public Administration (Sydney), Vol.XXXII, No.3, 
Sept.1973, pp.233-250; Parris, Henry. Constitutional 
Bureaucracy, The Development of British Central Adminis-
tration Since the Eighteenth Century, London : George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1969, Chs. I and III. 
15 Birch, A.H, Representative and Responsible Government, An Essay 
on the British Constitution, London : Unwin University Books, 
1964, p,l65. 
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journalists and academic commentators speak of the Parliament as 
a watchdog of the executive in a system where there is no separ-
ation of powers, of Parliamentary sovereignty and of responsibility 
of Ministers to Parliament for the work of their departments. On 
the other hand, ministers, civil servants and opposition leaders 
who hope to become ministers talk of responsibility of the 
government for the administration of the country, of protecting 
civil servants from political (meaning parliamentary) interference, 
of Parliament's function as a debating chamber in which public 
opinion is aired through the parties between elections. The 
Government (the Ministry and the civil service) in the second 
version is ultimately answerable to the electorate (not the 
Parliament), through the party, for their performance and the 
parliament is seen as a forum for party controversy rather than 
substantive legislative decision making. 
But both languages suggested by Birch must be tempered 
by the facts. Whereas the institutions of the constitution have 
conventional, legal and ideological functions of justification, 
the major locus of power in the ongoing system resides in the 
governing political party (however the policies of the parties may 
originate or be implemented). Ministerial responsibility in a 
practical sense is responsibility to the party not the parliament 
and government is carried on by the party and the public service 
which is its servant (within the law) for the time being. There 
is a conceptual paradox here which goes back to the development 
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in Britain of the idea of a permanent, anonymous civil service 
headed by temporary political Ministers. It revolves around the 
different notions of politics and administration, which in turn 
derive from the older problem of how political power is to be 
formed and exercised. And this last named is the problem attacked 
by contrasting Anglo-American theories of parliamentary sovereignty 
and separation of powers. The solutions may differ but the 
problem is the same. The British invention of the Ministerial de-
partment as "a government agency headed by a single and exclusively 
responsible politician with a permanent head as his chief adviser 
16 
and as general manager of the department" was the solution of 
19th century British liberalism. The subsequent use of public 
corporations as an executive arm of government has not undermined 
the fundamental notions of the political responsibility of the 
minister and the administrative subordination of the civil service. 
Hierarchical control on the Weberian model attempts to ensure 
straight accountability from civil service to minister and thence 
to parliament and the people. As ministries change, the civil 
service remains and therefore (so the theory goes) the civil 
service should be anonymous and neutral. The assumption is that 
senior officials should not hold any public attachment to a 
particular political party but should sustain the system through 
changes in ministries. 
16 Spann, R.N. "Bagehot on Public Administration", Public 
Administration (Sydney), Vol.XXVI, No.4, Dec.1967, p.3l4. 
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It is important to separate the notions of anonymity, 
permanence and neutrality, and place them into a fit with the 
concept of partisanship. One does, not depend on the others logically 
or in practice as comparisons of different systems show. The 
lumping together of these notions in the British idea of a 
ministerial department suited elected ministers and appointed 
officials (for different reasons). But there is nothing about 
this form of government organization which should be seen as holy 
writ. Both empirically and prescriptively the theory of civil 
service anonymity and Ministerial responsibility is under attack. 
And this is central to consideration of public administration in 
Australia. 
Historically Parris has shown that, in respect to the 
British system, the departure of the Crown and the civil service 
from the political arena began about I78O and the process was 
17 irreversible by 1930. As with the United States founding 
fathers, the early British constitutionalists felt that the 
executive - the King - had unduly influenced the legislature with 
harmful effects. Such influence was exercised in two ways -
(a) by putting administrators in the House of Commons; 
(b) by rewarding M.P's with offices - or "places", for 
themselves or th^ir dependants.^o 
The eighteenth century reforms were motivated by the desire to 
reduce the political influence of the Crown and the above practices 
17 Parris, op.cit., Ch.I. 
18 Ibid, pp.33-34. 
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gradually ceased. Concurrently with this process the effective 
unity of cabinet was established. In I782 there occurred the 
first example of a collective resignation of a ministry.^ 
During the next 50 or so years the Prime Minister gained effective 
control of his cabinet and the convention that he should resign 
or ask for a dissolution if his ministry were defeated in Parlia-
ment was developed. Collective responsibility of the government 
and the novelty of the change of whole teams of ministers implied 
either a spoils system or a more precisely defined security of 
20 
tenure. This problem was further compounded by expanding 
departmental business and its increasing complexity. The British 
solution was a separation of elected and appointed officials and 
the embryonic permanent civil service came into existence. 
"Permanent" to allow continuous administration, "civil" to 
distinguish appointed servants of the Crown from the militsury and 
21 from elected officials and a "service" to enable control through 
the public purse (subject to dismissal, after good service 
eligible for superannuation and with the staff "establishment" 
22 
approved by Parliament). The separation of politics and adminis-
tration implied in these early developments signified a distinction 
in the method of getting to the office concerned. The notions of 
anonymity and neutrality came later as the idea of the ministerial 
19 Birch, op.cit., p.133. 
20 Parris, op.cit., p.40. 
21 Ibid, p.39. 
22 MacKenzie, W.J.M. and Grove, J.W. Central Administration in 
Britain, London : Longmans, 1957, PP.4-5. 
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departmental organization developed. Certainly many permanent 
officials in mid-nineteenth century Whitehall stemmed from the 
tradition of the "public officer" and were far from anonymous 
23 
or neutral. As late as I859, Northcote "in spite of having 
been an official himself, and in spite of having recently carried 
out important enquiries into the civil service, revealed a 
complete unawareness of the doctrine (of anonymity)". 
The notion of anonymity revolves around the question, 
who will be responsible to parliament - elected Minister or 
permanent civil servant? The first responsibility of a Minister 
is to advise the Crown and the notion that he should also be 
individually responsible to Parliament for the work of the 
permanent officials developed later. The doctrine has two strands^ 
- (1) the political head (that is the elected Minister) and only 
the political head is answerable to Parliament, and (2) the 
political head must receive "the whole praise of what is well done, 
the whole blame of what is ill" and resigns if serious mistakes 
occur. The permanent officials at the highest level are in an 
advisory relationship to the Minister and therefore absolved of 
responsibility to the Parliament for both advice and executive 
action. Ministerial responsibility as doctrine requires depart-
mental subordination through hierarchical control, and this 
23 See examples in Parris, op.cit., pp.93-105. 
24 Ibid, p.100. 
25 Birch, op.cit., pp.l39-l40. 
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includes anonymity for those other than the Minister, regarding 
both contributions to policy and executive action itself. The 
notion of the "public officer" accountable to the parliament 
contradicts these precepts at every point. 
26 
It was Bagehot who supplied the fullest statement. 
The distinction between Minister and official, and the use of the 
Minister as a politician in the House and as an administrator in 
the department, these were pointed to by Bagehot and recommended 
as the ideal-type arrangement for ensuring administrative 
responsibility. The separation of politics (elected representatives) 
and administration (expert permanent officials) was made clear and 
the nexus between the two was embodied in the Minister who would 
fill two roles. For Hagehot the permanent official was a specialist 
and the "generalists" of administration were not seen as coming 
from the ranks of the bureaucrats (the conception of the Adminis-
trative class had not developed fully) but from a well educated 
27 
race of political administrators drawn from the parliament. 
Whilst Mill was not completely in accord with Bagehot's 
view of responsibility his separation of political (parliamentary) 
and administrative (departmental) offices was well formed, 
stressing the special skills required in administration. 
"... a popular assembly is still less fitted to administer, 
or to dictate in detail to those who have the charge of 
26 Schaffer, op.cit., p.23. 
27 Spann, op.cit., p.3l6. 
92 
administration... Every branch of public administration is 
a skilled business, which has its own peculiar principles 
and traditional rules..." n 
The notion of Ministerial responsibility has two sides, 
(l) The Minister is answerable for his department and (2) the 
Minister controls and authoritatively prescribes norms for his 
department. The politics-administration distinction is inherent 
in the role of the Minister. The Minister is an administrator 
vis-a-vis the Parliament. In other words he is supposed to 
implement the will of the Parliament. The Minister also interprets 
this will for his department, that is, he prescribes political 
norms for his department. The essential feature of the idea of 
ministerial responsibility is the ability of the legislature to 
make some minister responsible for each and every act of his 
department. The Minister's job can therefore be understood in two 
ways - (l) as the person who controls his department, who has the 
power to prescribe norms which his subordinates are obliged to 
follow, who has legitimacy; from the viewpoint of his subordinates 
this is his political role, and (2) as the person who answers to 
the parliament for his work and the work of his department, the 
servant of parliament; from the viewpoint of Parliament the 
Minister is an administrator. 
Administrative reform in Britain in the nineteenth 
century developed in a climate conducive to agreement by leading 
28 Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism. On Liberty and Considerations on 
Representative Government, London : J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 
1972, p.231 - note the use of "public administration". 
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politicians, senior officials and other public figures. There 
seems to have been nothing resembling the trauma that American 
reformers had to suffer, firstly to focus attention on the 
problem of reform, and secondly to do something about it. In 
Britain the separation of parliament and executive took the form 
of institutionalized recruitment and career channels, and this 
development was organized to reflect the similar social and 
29 
educational background of member and senior civil servant. 
There was a mutual recognition that public partisanship by the 
civil service was a liability to both groups and the twin 
principles of ministerial responsibility and civil service 
neutrality as a way of linking the parliament to the civil 
service was easily accepted. Thus, there was no need for deep 
analysis and theorizing about the nature of administration and 
the role of the civil servant. It was taken for granted and 
conventionally followed. British Public Administration scholars 
have traditionally been more concerned with problems which arise 
in specific fields (the organization of the Civil Service, the 
social services, local government finance, nationalized industries, 
etc.). They seek to define, to examine, and to solve the problems 
which arise in these fields rather than attempt to find a general 
29 Parris comments that "the Administrative Class type was not 
created by Open Competition. Open Competition served to 
perpetrate a type which had already come to the top.", 
op.cit., p.159* 
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theory of Public Administration. The almost universal 
approbation which the British Civil Service received (and the 
complacency as to its function in the political system) was shaken 
in the 1960's by critics of the system and the findings of the 
Fulton Committee. 
These criticisms of the Civil Service, of its efficiency 
and the quality of its advice, highlight the difficulties in the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility. The growing disillusion-
ment with Britain's economic growth and foreign policy sought to 
blame the "Establishment" which was personified in the Civil 
Service, particularly its Administrative Glass. This is convenient 
because of the constitutional convention against civil servants 
answering such criticisms and allegations. There is a paradox here. 
If the cabinet and ministers are in control, then the civil service 
is accountable to them, and they are responsible. If the civil 
service is "held to account" by the parliament, the media and the 
public, then ministers are not in control and are therefore not 
responsible. The problem is one of joining theory and practice. 
The scale and complexity of contemporary events are straining the 
19th century notions which justify the British model. 
30 See Robson, William A. "The Present State of Teaching and 
Research in Public Administration", Public Administration 
(London), Vol.39, Autumn I96I, pp.217-222. 
31 For good summaries, see Birch, op.cit., Ch.X; Brown, R.G.S. 
The Administrative Process in Britain, London : Methuen and 
Co.Ltd., 1970, Ch.II; and Garrett, John. The Management of 
Government, Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1972, Chs. 1 & 2. 
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An example of the problems in understanding that can 
develop will be seen in an editorial review in Public Administra-
tion (London) on the Fulton Report. 
"The impression one gains is that the civil service should in 
the future be both more efficient and more powerful : this is 
regarded as a functional necessity, given the belief that the 
tasks of government must continue to multiply... Yet this 
change in the status and role of the civil service can only 
take place at the expense of the elements of political control 
and leadership in our society, only if the bureaucracy takes 
more responsibility for political decisions... Unless this 
political system is itself modified, it is hard to see how the 
civil service can acquire the attributes of professionalism 
and self accountability which the Fulton report exhorts it to 
cultivate. In fact it seems more likely that we shall go on 
having a bureaucracy which is both aware of and inhibited by 
its political servitude. It will continue to be denied the 
right to impose its professional judgment at the expense of 
the preferences expressed in the political milieu.",-
(Emphasis added.) 
Obviously "political" does not qualify "decisions" and "servitude" 
in the same meaning. In the first case, political refers to 
policy or decisions affecting the polity. In the second, it 
refers (I think) to the fact in Britain that the career civil 
service accepts the "rules of the game" which demand neutrality 
as to the content of policy and a professionalism more akin to 
that of a lawyer advising his client. The problem here lies in 
the nature of "professional" judgment and its confrontation with 
political preferences. But this is an example of the original 
problem of how (?) the public interest is to be defined, of who 
(?) is to govern and according to what rules. As organizations 
32 Editorial : "Reforming the Bureaucracy", Public Administration 
(London), Winter 1968, Vol.46, pp.373-374. 
96 
become more professional, more complex, more able to withstand 
the efforts of elected officials to control their influence, 
there is an increasing need to relate what public administrators 
do to the consumers of their actions in some political way (i.e. 
"the bureaucracy takes more responsibility for political 
decisions"). Responsibility is still the problem as it was in the 
19th century. 
If we ask the questions, "Is the work of a public 
servant different from that of an elected representative?", "In 
what way are their roles similar and overlapping?", we must use 
concepts which can do the analytical job for us. The answer may 
be, "Entirely different, not different, or different in aome ways 
but not others". The normative question then becomes, "In what 
ways should senior officials' work be different?" These appear 
to be very simple questions. Public servants must not be 
political. But are the questions to be directed to the justifi-
catory theory and its concepts, the stated "rules of the game" or 
to the facts of the political-administrative system - to words or 
things? 
This may seem to be unnecessarily heavy going about a 
simple practical problem of demarcation between (a) the work of 
the "politician" and that of the "official" and (b) those who 
govern and administer and those who don't. But putting the 
problem in this way simply begs the questions which the politics-
administration distinction is trying to answer. We can simply 
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distinguish politician and official on the basis of elections but 
there is nothing in the elective or appointive procedures which 
defines politics and administration unless we are speaking 
tautologically. The problem of demarcation is not simple as the 
Maud Committee on Management of Local Government found when they 
attempted to draw a dividing line between what it is proper for 
33 
politicians and officials to do. Yet it is an important problem 
if the political values of responsiveness and accountability are 
to be pursued. A,F, Davies has sketched the thesis of a steady 
34 
evaporation of politics. He suggests that to a large degree, 
the'professionals" in various fields preformulate public policy 
by their own discussions, researches and demands. The rising 
influence of the public service, i.e. the appointed official, in 
the governmental system can be traced to this fact and professional 
command over knowledge resources. The simple matter of demarcation 
becomes clouded with problems of communication between professionals 
35 (?scientists), politicians and publics.''^ ''^  A further complication 
is that behaviour in bureaucratic organizations can be understood 
33 For discussion see Dunsire, A. Administration, The Word and 
the Science, London : Martin Robertson, 1973, Oh.9, and 
his remark that those who find "policy" too slippery a 
concept to use do not appear to find any difficulties with 
"administration". (p,155) Dunsire's book is an extended 
statement of these difficulties, 
34 Davies, A.F. "Politics in a Knowledgeable Society", Public 
Administration (Sydney), Vol.XXIX, No,2, June 1970, pp.85-100. 
35 See Habermas, Jurgen. "The Scientization of Politics and Public 
Opinion", in Pizzorno, Alessandro, Political Sociology, 
Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1971, pp.64-82. 
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as political vis-a-vis control of the organization's resources. 
There is much at stake professionally as well as politically in 
the content of public policy. 
The theory of ministerial responsibility and official 
neutrality is not a theory in any scientific explanatory sense. 
It is a statement of the conventions and rules which guide the 
political-administrative expectations and behaviour of those in 
the system. The British solution to the problem of the political 
control of officials was the result of a unique series of 
complicated historical events and there is nothing inevitable 
about it. The "theory" is simply a way of dividing the labour of 
running a polity. There are other ways of dividing this work and 
different variations on the British theme. The United States, 
Canada and Australia, for example, have their own historical 
solutions. What is common to these politics which are run on the 
assumptions of periodic multi-party elections, is the practical 
problem of determining the rules and conventions which guide this 
division of labour. Australia's colonial history, generally, and 
Queensland's history of long lived governments, have shaped these 
relationships in this state. The pervasiveness of the Minister 
in the running of things is the result. V/hat is important is that 
Queensland is not Britain and what constitutes both a justificatory 
theory and a fair description of the real world in Britain need be 
36 For discussion and Book-list, see Rigby, T.H. "Bureaucratic 
Politics : An Introduction", Public Administration (Sydney), 
Vol.XXXII, No.l, March 1973, pp.1-20. 
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neither in Queensland. What Ministers and permanent heads do in 
the Queensland system very largely depends on how the Minister 
sees his role, his personal predeliction and intellectual capacity 
and the ability of the head. 
What senior officials do in either system only becomes 
a problem for our understanding when we put a name to it. What 
the British permanent secretary does is "administrative" work, 
but from another viewpoint it is "political" in its influence. 
And what is called administrative in Britain may be called 
variously managerial, clerical or administrative in Queensland. 
The difficulties in these words are well known,•^ ' but what is 
important is not the indigenous usage but the distinction between 
the theory about the real world that the words are supposed to be 
stating and the political action when the words are used as 
justificatory rhetoric. This is so because any division of labour 
between elected and appointed officials is a sharing of power in 
the polity and therefore is a problem in political theory. The 
study of Public Administration seen in this way, and in the 
context of the theory of ministerial responsibility, is therefore 
a study which is fundamentally concerned with a political relation-
ship and the notion of official accountability. And official 
accountability may be achieved in many ways other than by 
ministerial responsibility. What characterizes both British and 
37 For example, see Schaffer, B.B, "The Distinction Between Exec-
utive and Administrative Work", Public Administration (Sydney), 
Vol.XVII, No.2, June 1958, pp.112-118, who discusses the 
meanings given to "administrative" and "executive" work. 
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Queensland systems is the notion of the power of "last resort", 
and subordination of official to the party political Minister. 
The legitimacy of the Minister's authority in the theory derives 
from his ability to direct his subordinates reasonably well and 
whether he is properly accountable for their actions, that is, if 
he is responsible. It follows that a theory of Public Adminis-
tration must be grounded in the reality of ministerial account-
ability and legitimacy. 
The generalist administrator in the British system 
separated both political and administrative sides of the system 
by doing the work of both. As a confidant, and in some ways an 
equal to the Minister, as a policy adviser and guide, as an 
intellectual elite able to interpret the ministerial mind, the 
old British administrative class kept the rest of the civil 
service (the specialists and the managers) out of the policy area. 
He separated politics from administration by doing both -
38 
"facilitator", "mediator" and "arbiter" in Brown's words. When 
this British model is applied to the interpretation of public ser-
vice in Australia it is necessary to also apply the justificatory 
political theory. That is, that the legitimacy of official 
behaviour defined by the Westminster model, to a large extent 
derives from the reality of ministerial accountability. One 
cannot sensibly be discussed without the other. It is of little 
theoretical concern whether officials are "political" in the sense 
38 Brown, op.cit., pp.261-262. 
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that they advise on policy, or whether they are "administrative" 
or "managerial" or "clerical" in the sense that they carry it out. 
What is important in terms of the justificatory political theory 
and then in terms of administrative theory, is to know who does 
what and how he is to be called to account and to whom. The 
theory of ministerial responsibility implies a political and 
administrative system and each element cannot be taken out of 
context without doing damage to the theory as a whole. My examin-
ation of Queensland permanent heads looked at only one side of the 
picture. 
American New Public Administration. 
The British system of responsible administration under 
political leadership distinguishes but links the political and 
administrative aspects of government by the subordination of the 
public resources of the civil service to a committee of the 
prevailing political party. The system grew out of the liberal 
notions of parliamentary government and cabinet responsibility 
and its easy acceptance can be attributed to the triumph of 
liberalism in Britain in the nineteenth century. 
However, the British ideas of parliamentary sovereignty, 
a strong cabinet (collectively and individually responsible for 
policy and administration respectively), and a neutral non-partisan 
civil service laid the basis for a theory of public administration 
based on the separation of politics and administration. It was 
Bagehot's admirer, Woodrow Wilson, who attempted to clarify the 
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implications of British practice for reform in the United States, 
and set the American study of Pubic Administration along its way. 
Comparisons between British, American and Australian 
systems indicate differences in degree not in principle. The 19th 
century British idea of a permanent civil service, neutral as to 
party interests, expert and capable of sustaining the government 
through changes in political leadership, has won the day in all 
these systems. American students created the politics-administra-
tion "dichotomy" for historically understandable reasons, but the 
real issue has been one of subordination not separation (as Mill, 
Bagehot, Wilson and Goodnow pointed out). The use of the terms 
politics and administration will cease only if other concepts can 
be formed to sustain the subordination of expertise to political 
power. What I wish to argue is that there is no need to replace 
these concepts but rather they should be refined and made operational 
so that the political theory of our governmental system can be 
analysed, and our values clarified and acted upon. The tendency 
in American Public Administration to oscillate between extreme 
intellectual positions has confused us in this respect. By 
creating a "dichotomy" (a paradigm which limits thinking about 
government) and then by rejecting not only the dichotomy but also 
a useful conceptual distinction, and not replacing it with any 
other paradigm, they have left a serious gap in the ^erican 
theory of public service and tended to confuse understanding of 
our own system, because so much Public Administration literature 
is American. 
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As was pointed out in the introduction, the choice of 
a conceptual schema is dependent on the student's point of view, 
his evaluations and the ideologies of his time and place. The 
emphasis on the term "policy" instead of "politics" in the litera-
ture of Public Administration reflects contemporary values. 
"Policy" emphasizes positive action, objectives, doing something 
important in society and therefore is of substantive professional 
concern to practitioners. Whereas "politics" is given overtones 
of deceit, personal interest, even corruption, "policy" making is 
something to which all public servants can aspire as a legitimate 
professional part of their work. This seems to mean that the 
American public official sees himself as a professional in policy 
formulation up to the point where the elected officials or 
politically appointed officials want their own way.^° 
In any case, the politics-administration distinction has 
not been settled by all American scholars. Martin Landau argues 
that the conceptual categories of the older writers, politics and 
administration, have been retained. What has been repudiated is 
4o the notion that they are empirically separable. Dwight Waldo 
states that the politics-administration distinction has not been 
39 Ojf course American public administration is complicated by the 
existence of strong regulatory commissions, but in the final 
analysis these are creations of the Congress so that the 
above statement is valid. For discussion of the role of 
these bodies and some specific recommendations to increase 
Congress's power through more specific legislation, see 
Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism : Ideology Policy and 
the Crisis of Public Authority, New York : W.W, Norton and 
Company Inc, I969. 
40 Landau, Martin. Political Theory and Political Science, New 
York : The Macmillan Company, 1972, pp.196-197. 
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replaced by a set of beliefs which performed the justificatory 
function of the older distinction - getting agreement, motivating 
action, informing the solution of problems, defining institutional 
41 functions and specifying operational relationships. Fred Riggs 
argues for the analytical and model building usefulness of the 
42 distinction. 
It seems to me that the definition of the public interest 
and its working out in practice correspond rather well with the 
distinction of politics and administration first formulated by 
«j'ilson, Goodnow and the other American pioneers. The interesting 
question is still - who does what and how is it to be institution-
alized? The crucial word in the above comment is "how" the public 
43 interest is to be defined. Are we to take the v/ord to mean "by 
whom" or "using what technology" or "according to what value" and 
does public interest itself mean substantive public policy 
proposals or the value criteria against which they can be judged? 
Whatever the answer, it should be understood as political business 
to be worked out in a political process. At this point all I wish 
to note is that to ask these questions, concepts are needed to 
41 Waldo, Dwight, (ed.). Public Administration in a Time of 
Turbulence, Scranton : Chandler Publishing Company, 1971, 
pp.264-265. 
42 See Part IV of this essay. 
43 The difficulties in using the term "public interest" in 
political discourse are well known. For a short but useful 
review of the various approaches, see Benn, Stanley I. 
"The Public Interest" - Myth or Reality? Paper presented 
to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, 
August 1963. 
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allow us to order our experience, to name regularities and classes 
of behaviour, to logically and empirically test hypotheses and to 
name those things which we value. American students used the 
politics-administration distinction to do the job and because of 
the historical situation, turned this descriptive tool for the 
study of government into a prescriptive slogan of civil service 
reform and management. When scholars realized that the real 
world of public organizations would not accord with their pre-
scriptions they rejected the distinction. 
But the original American theorists never intended that 
Public Administration be separated from the study of government* 
The contrary applied : public administration was understood as an 
inherent part of government. This fact still clouds the issue when 
public service is being discussed in Australia because so much of 
our Public Administration literature is American and modern scholars 
in the field state that the separation (logically? in fact?) of 
politics and administration is not valid. Yet the same scholars 
seem to wish that these aspects of government could be separated. 
Because words are needed to talk about the things that public 
services do, and because talk about public service is invariably 
concerned to change or justify the things that they do, a re-
examination of some American notions of "politics" and "adminis-
tration" may be useful simply because these terms are part of both 
Australian and American political rhetoric. The history of Public 
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44 Administration study in the United States can be described as 
a conversation about the logical and empirical relationships of 
the concepts "politics" and "administration". What I want to do 
here is to briefly look at the contributions to this conversation 
by Wilson, Goodnow and Appleby. Each of these scholars contributed 
to our understanding of these relationships. 
Woodrow Wilson's I887 essay, "The Study of Administration", 
was the first attempt to delineate politics and administration in 
the American study of government. Australian students of Public 
Administration are usually referred to Wilson's seminal attempt to 
clarify the issues. The essay itself raises more questions than 
it resolves (which in no sense is a bad thing), and its value is 
the insight that political problems may be usefully examined by 
the study of administration. I do not want to fall into the trap 
44 For a critical history of ideas in American Public Adminis-
tration, see Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State. A 
Study of the Political Theory of American Public Adminis-
tration, New York : The Ronald Free Press, 1948. For a 
recent discussion of contemporary issues, see Caiden, The 
Dynamics of Public Administration. For an outline of values, 
knowledge, theory and heroes, see McCurdy, Howard E, Public 
Administration : A Bibliography, Washington D.C. : College 
of Public Affairs, The American University, 1972. The 
"dichotomy" itself is staple fare to American text book 
writers and is usually referred to mainly to point out that 
it has been destroyed. The history of the controversy has 
been traced and similar conclusions reached in an unpublished 
monograph, Caiden, Gerald E. Politics and Administration, A 
Short History of an Untenable Dichotomy, Haifa, Israel : 
Department of Political Science, Haifa University, 1974. 
For a short statement of the different stages of American 
Public Administration in terms of the politics-administration 
distinction, see Golembiewski, Robert T., et.al. A Methodo-
logical Primer for Political Scientists, Chicago : Rand 
McNally and Company, I969, p.l95. 
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of asserting "what Wilson really meant" in the Essay, but some 
background is necessary to understand what he was getting at. 
Wilson was an Anglophile and impressed with the 
effectiveness and morality of the British system of government. 
His major intellectual influences -^  were the Social Darwinism of 
his time, the writings of British theorists and statesmen like 
Bagehot, Burke, Gladstone, Cobden and Bright (as indicated by 
citations in his student essays), and importantly, the Civil 
Service Reform doctrines of the l880's. Additionally, he was 
exposed to the major European writings on administration, partic-
ularly German. He was greatly influenced by the writings of 
Bagehot and the British idea of strong cabinet government. It is 
clear that Wilson was somewhat unsure as to the nature of his 
study and that the Essay derived from an intellectual attempt to 
place the European and British political writings on administration 
in the context of the American separation of powers doctrine and 
the contemporary democratic belief. 
The theoretical basis for the essay was Wilson's 
Congressional Government (written in 1884) which contrasted 
45 See Stillman, Richard J. "Woodrow Wilson and the Study of 
Administration : A New Look at an Old Essay", American 
Political Science Review, V0I.6I, June 1973, p.584; and 
Turner, Henry A. "Woodrow Wilson as Administrator", in 
Public Administration Review, Vol.XVI (1956), No.4, p.250. 
46 Congressional Government : A Study in American Politics, 
Boston : Houghton Mifflin and Company, l895, referred to here 
as C.G, For discussion of the theoretical asstunptions 
behind the Essay, see Ostrom, Vincent, The Intellectual 
Crisis in American Public Administration, University Alabama : 
University of Alabama Press, 1974, pp.23-29; Stillman, op.cit., 
pp.584-585; and Turner, op.cit., p.250. 
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government by congressional committee with the ministerial 
direction and responsibility of the British government system. ' 
Seeking principles to reform the "legislative and administrative 
machinery" Wilson sought a locus of power in the American system. 
He argued that "the more power is divided the more irresponsible 
48 it becomes". If government was to be responsible, a centre of 
power (sovereignty) should be discovered from which the machinery 
of government might be unravelled and understood. He saw the 
49 
"literary theory" ^ of the American constitutional system, the 
checks and balances which were designed to limit sovereign power 
of any one part of the system, as being not in accord with the 
facts of government by standing committees of congress which he 
regarded as irresponsible because power was so divided and not 
accountable. Accepting the value that "the representatives of the 
people are the proper ultimate authority in all matters of 
government, and that the administration is merely the clerical 
50 part of government" Wilson then concluded that -
"One of the conditions precedent to any real and lasting reform 
of the civil service, in a country whose public service is 
moulded by the conditions of self-government, is the drawing 
of a sharp line of distinction between those offices which are 
political and those which are non-political. The strictest rules 
of business discipline, of merit-tenure and earned promotion, 
must rule every office whose incombent has naught to do with 
choosing between policies; but no rules except the choice of 
parties can or should make and unmake, reward or punish, those 
officers whose privelege it is to fix upon the political pur-
poses which administration shall be made to serve."_^ 
47 C.G., p.VI. 48 C.G., p,93. 49 C.G., p.284. 
50 C.G., p,273. 51 O.G., p,290. 
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As the members of the Cabinet (the Secretaries) were 
neither exclusively political nor non-political, but semi-political, 
and their offices were not easily defined, Wilson's conclusion was -
"If they are not properly or necessarily party men, let them 
pass the examinations and run the gauntlet of the usual tests 
of efficiency, let errand-boys work up to Secretary-ships; but 
if not, let their responsibility to their party be made strict 
and determinate. That is the cardinal point of practical civil 
service reform."--
5<^  
Here Wilson made a pretty clear statement of the 
distinction which was to take hold of civil service reformers in 
the United States. Congressional Government continually praises 
the British system and its stress on parliamentary sovereignty, 
ministerial responsibility and a permanent anonymous civil service. 
The idea of accountability was central to his thesis -
"If there is one principle clearer than another, it is this : 
that in any business, whether of government or of mere 
merchandising, somebody must be trusted, in order that when 
things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished... 
Power and strict accountability for its use are the essential 
constitutents of good government."j._ (Wilson's emphasis.) 
What Wilson was seeking was subordination of the executive to the 
sovereign authority of congress, and at the same time, the strength-
ening of the power and the accountability of the executive branch 
in its legitimate activities on the model of British Cabinet 
government as it was then developing. The separation of powers 
and an elective chief executive had made it difficult to rule 
effectively without the manipulation of public offices or the 
expectation of such manipulation by job seekers and party groups 
52 C.G., p.291. 53 O.G., pp.283-284. 
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similar to the earlier methods employed by the British monarch and 
the cabinet to control parliament. V/hereas the British solution 
was a permanent anonymous civil service to accommodate the embtyonic 
government by political parties, and changes in whole ministries, 
the Americans went the other way. Under Jackson, who proposed the 
principle of rotation which would cover all positions, the spoils 
system enabled a party system of ins and outs to survive and 
suited the entrepreneurial politics concerned with mobilizing a 
citizenry concerned mainly with development. No valid comparisons 
have been made about the quality of the staffs employed in the 
American and European bureaucracies prior to the Civil War.^ But 
the post Civil War decline in the moral standards of public life, 
the corruption of politics, party affiliation as the sole test of 
competence, and party patronage, and the contemporary developments 
in Europe in civil service and politics reform gave rise to demands 
for change. 
The dilemma that Wilson faced was not resolved. His 
problem was how to apply a model of parliamentary sovereignty and 
ministerial responsibility which he valued, to a system which was 
constitutionally and historically governed in a manner contrary 
to those values. Congressional Government did not recommend a 
cure for the ills of the American governmental system as he saw 
them. From the viewpoint of the study of Public Administration, 
54 Caiden, Politics and Administration, p.34. Also see Van Riper, 
P. History of the United States Civil Service, Evanston 111. : 
Row and Peterson, 1958. 
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its importance was its espousal of the principle of a sovereign 
congress and a strong but accountable executive, based on the 
British model. It is in this light that "The Study of Adminis-
tration" should be seen. He chose to study administration as 
part of an attempt to correct the political abuses of his era as 
he understood them. 
The essay itself is full of statements that can lead to 
55 
opposite interpretations and Wilson's writings seem to support 
any position one chooses to take in the politics-administration 
problem with the help of selective quotation. The first fend usual) 
interpretation is that Wilson was concerned to separate adminis-
56 
tration from politics and his own words seem to support this. 
But Wilson also argued that this administration is subservient to 
American democratic values and the thrust of the essay is that 
public administration must be a vehicle for the political values 
proposed earlier in Congressional Government. Wilson's essay may 
be readily understood as an attempt at synthesis firmly based on 
a political value system. 
Administration for Wilson was public administration or 
governmental business and what he was interested in was the 
problem of political control and administrative responsibility. 
He was concerned with separating the two sides of the governmental 
55 See Stillman, op.cit., p.582, and Schaffer, B.B. "Public Admin-
istration and the Political Education", Public Administration 
(Sydney), Vol.XXI, No.4, December 1962, p.345. 
56 Wilson, "The Study of Administration", pp. 28, 29, 37, 39-
57 Ibid, pp.21, 35, 38, 39. 
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system, the way that public opinion was to be mobilised and 
expressed institutionally (he favoured a sovereign legislature on 
the British model), and the way that opinions once expressed were 
to be implemented by an accountable administration (once again on 
the British model). In Congressional Government he sought to 
identify the boundary line between political and non-political 
offices in the executive government (as the British had done) but 
in the essay failed to provide anything further to join his 
British ideas to the facts of American political life based on the 
separation of powers. He simply restated the problem. 
But there need be no residual puzzles about what Wilson 
meant. The essay is rhetoric of a sincere and distinguished kind 
which endeavoured to combine high political principle with 
democratic ideals and efficient scientific technocratic but 
responsible non-party professionalism. The making of the dichotomy 
was a "condition precedent" to reform of the political-administra-
tive system. He was not trying to explain the system so much as 
trying to change it. That is, his essay can be understood as a 
political rather than analytical statement, prescription rather 
than description, normative rather than empirical. His problem 
was that of "running the constitution" as he wished to see it run. 
The lesson for our understanding of public service in Queensland 
is that Wilson's politics-administration distinction, like the 
notion of ministerial responsibility is an attempt to join the 
work of political parties and non-partisan officials, and, at the 
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same time, keep them separate by clarifying their respective 
responsibilities. By linking administration with public law 
(cf. Wilson's German studies) and making officials more independent 
of politicians, public servants can be given positions of trust, 
accountable to partisan officials, who in turn are accountable to 
their party and public opinion. "Trust is strength in all 
relations of life ... it is the office of the administrative 
organizer to fit administration with conditions of clear cut 
responsibility which shall insure trustworthiness." The politics-
administration distinction which Wilson formulated is directly 
linked with the notion of ministerial responsibility and, under-
stood in this way, is still relevant to administrative understanding 
and reform. 
Whereas in Britain the system of government evolved out 
of the socio-political history of that state, the circumstances 
prevailing in the United States in the 19th century made adminis-
tration into a problem for Wilson and his successors. But the 
problem was a political problem and it was the same problem that 
the British reformers had wished to solve. The study of adminis-
tration so conceived is not the study of means separate from the 
political ends sought, but the study of ends and the logical 
implications of the desired ends for the means employed, and 
administration need not be understood as being separated from 
politics, but as a "mirror" or reflection of the political 
principles of the polity. 
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"No topic in the study of government can stand by itself -
least of all perhaps administration whose part it is to mirror 
the principles of government in operation. It is not a mere 
anatomy of institutions. It deals directly, indeed, and 
principally with the structural features and operating organs 
of the state life... Administration cannot be divorced from 
its intimate connections with the other branches of Public Law 
without being distorted and robbed of its true significance. 
Its foundations are those deep and permanent principles of 
politics which have been quarried from history and built into 
constitutions. .."j-g (Emphasis added.) 
Ostrom's recent book on American Public Administration, 
whilst rejecting almost all Wilson's theoretical proposals, really 
restates Wilson's thesis as to the nature of the study. Basing 
his approach to the study of government and administration on 
modern political economists he proposes "democratic" administration 
instead of "bureaucratic" administration which he credits to Wilson 
(and Weber). He rejects the notion of legislative sovereignty as 
proposed by Wilson and recommends a return to the separation of 
power and overlapping jurisdictions schema of Hamilton and Madison 
in the Federalist but states -
"The choice of a paradigm in public administration depends 
upon the relative advantage which can be derived from a 
reliance upon one or another approach. To estimate the 
relative advantage inherent in different approaches, we 
must clarify basic assumptions about the nature of political 
organization and determine the consequences which are likely 
to follow from relying upon differently designed structures 
or organizational relationships."eg 
One can disagree with Wilson's values and conclusions (such as they 
are), but still recognize, as Ostrom implicitly does, that Wilson's 
statement as to nature of Public Administration as a field of study 
is still valid. 
58 Wilson (1891), quoted in Stillman, op.cit., p.587. 
59 Ostrom, op.cit., p.100. 
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The similarities between Wilson and Goodnow were 
60 
striking. Both recommended the strengthening of the executive 
over internal administration and the reduction of legislative 
control and interference. Both shared the same admiration for the 
British system and advocated that the United States should move 
closer to British practice. They denigrated professional politic-
ians and hoped to improve the moral tone of public business. In 
other words Goodnow was also intendedly political in that he wished 
to reform the system. Whereas Wilson offered no clear statement of 
the logical separation of politics and administration, Goodnow in 
61 1900 attempted to do just that. 
Goodnow was engaged in what Landau calls "abstractive 
62 differentiation" which allows us to group together, to classify 
certain activities, to make sense of them, to distinguish one 
behaviour from another. "Special aspects of behaviour have to be 
abstracted from the whole if any sense is to be made." Landau 
argues (and Goodnow's writing supports this view) that Goodnow in 
distinguishing politics and administration was not making concrete 
distinctions but differentiating behaviour, that is, abstracting 
out aspects for analytical purposes. In this way Goodnow was not 
describing institutions but formulating concepts to describe aspects 
60 Caiden, op.cit., p.56. 
61 Goodnow, Frank J. Politics and Administration. A Study in 
Government, New York s Russell and Russell, I967. Note that 
politics and administration, taken together are government -
the words indicate the intention of Goodnow's thesis. For 
critical statement, see Waldo, op.cit., pp.l06-109. 
62 Landau, op.cit., p.195. 
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of behaviour. What became known as the "instrtunental theory" of 
Public Administration developed from this point. Goodnow talked 
somewhat metaphysically about "the action of the state as a 
political entity" and the function of government as the "express-
ion of its will" and "operations necessary to the execution of 
63 
that will". This can be interpreted simply as the talking (in 
parliament, congress) and the doing (implementation, execution). 
The British notion of ministerial responsibility, with cabinet 
ministers and their advisers, links these sides of the government 
process. Goodnow omitted this part of the system from his 
analysis. The point here is that Goodnow used the terms politics 
and administration to name the functions of government. The 
"organs" of government were a separate category. His work is 
important because he attempted to distinguish politics and admin-
64 istration in the separation of labour in a polity. 
The terms are analytical concepts to be used for con-
structing models, typologies and similar theoretical devices. 
The functions named politics and administration could have been 
designated G;^  ^^^ ^2 with the same effect. Goodnow himself 
admits that his use of the term "politics" does not accord with 
traditional usage "^  and that the term "administration" is 
"somewhat misleading;, for the word when accompanied by the definite 
article is also used to indicate a series of governmental 
authorities". 
63 Goodnow, op.cit., p.9. 64 Ibid, p.10. 
65 Ibid, p.18. 66 Ibid, p.20. 
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Whilst the functions may be distinguishable in all 
kinds of governments, and further, whilst more or less different-
iated "organs" are established in every polity concerned "largely 
or mainly" with the discharge of one or the other of these 
functions, the administration function is not always assigned in 
67 different states to the same organ of government. This is so 
because politics and administration differentiate functions of 
government and the absolute assignment of such functions to 
separate authorities is impossible (cf. Wilson). 
Goodnow makes an empirical assertion that any concrete 
government is organized so that there are "three kinds of 
authorities which are engaged in the execution of the state will" 
(a) Judicial, (b) Executive and (c) Technical. These statements 
can be falsified. But there is absolutely no way of falsifying 
Goodnow's definitions of politics and administration. It is simply 
a question of whether they are useful. It is submitted here that 
whilst they may not be adequate as presented by him, there has been 
no better analytical scheme produced by his critics. Scholars have 
not developed a formula to replace the distinction (as Landau and 
Waldo pointed out - see pp. 103-104 above). 
Politics and Administration was (a) attempting to develop 
concepts to enable analysis of any system of government ("the 
action of the state as a political entity"), (b) explaining the 
development of American government, and (c) making a recommendation 
67 Ibid, pp.11, 16, 22. 68 Ibid, p.17. 
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of an "if - then" basis. Goodnow stated that the chief ends of 
all political systems should be the securing of popular government 
69 
and efficient administration. The definitional categories 
"politics" and "administration" in discussing American government 
and his conclusions as to the way that concrete institutions 
should therefore be constructed must be seen as an example of a 
goal based theory intended to achieve these ends. 
If the terms politics, policy and administration are 
continued to be used by those who wish to study Public Administration, 
a student must decide whether the terms are (a) to denote real 
people (politicians, administrators) and real institutions (legis-
latures, departments), either descriptively or prescriptively, or 
(b) to be concepts which define certain aspects of behaviour for 
the purpose of analyses, so that they can be brought to bear on 
any factual situation to establish a fit. Scholars seem to use 
both these approaches simultaneously with consequent muddle. The 
suggestion that there are "political" and "administrative" aspects 
of what public servants do is an empirical proposition capable of 
being tested if the analytical terms are defined. The important 
task is to place the aspect that interests us into the analytical 
context in which it belongs, that is the study of the political 
aspects of public servants' work is part of the study of politics 
generally - the administrative aspect part of the study of admin-
istration generally. Both aspects are necessary if we are to study 
69 Ibid, p.255. 
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government as a whole. And that was what Goodnow was attempting 
to do. 
The difficulty with Goodnow's proposal revolves around 
his desire to make the administration function "subject to the 
control of politics" yet "absolutely free from the influence of 
70 
politics." The values of scientific method and the rational 
open search for laws unaffected by party political values appeared 
to be one way out. If such laws or principles could be found and 
applied in practice the study of Public Administration could 
stand independently and its practice made independent of partisan 
influence. The administrative criterion of correctness which 
Goodnow sought was to be unconnected to the value criterion of 
political choice. Political control over administration was 
thought to be a good thing only where there were no internal 
criteria by which administration could carry out its function. 
The values of science were confronted with the values of politics. 
His statement was -
"The fact is, then, that there is a large part of adminis-
tration which is unconnected with politics, which should 
therefore be relieved very largely, if not altogether, 
from the control of political bodies. It is unconnected 
with polities because it embraces fields of semi-scientific, 
quasi-judicial, and quasi-business or commercial activity -
work which has little if any influence on the expression of 
the true state will. For the most advantageous discharge 
70 This is the same problem referred to by the Editor of Public 
Administration (London) - see page 95 above. 
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of this branch of the function of administration there 
should be organized a force of governmental agents 
absolutely free from the influence of politics."„, 
(Emphasis added.) 
Goodnow was sure that a division on this basis could 
not be made between the "organs" of government (legislature, 
executive), but that within these organs a separation of political 
activities and administrative activities, statistical, semi-
scientific, technical and housekeeping kind, was suggested. 
Political control was to remain over what Goodnow called executive 
function which meant that whichever organ expressed the will of 
the state must have control over the execution of that will. 
(The chief executive, for example, must be accountable to the 
Congress for implementing the law.) Additionally, at the highest 
level where "the incumbents of offices have a determining 
influence on questions of policy" provision should be made for 
"political control". Otherwise the judicial, quasi-judicial, 
statistical, semi-scientific, technical and housekeeping activities 
could be studied independently of politics and practised as the 
instrument of politics (the expression of the will of the state). 
Thus a classificatory framework for the dichotomy was set with a 
mixture of politics and administration in the three branches of 
government (the American separation of powers), but the study of 
71 Goodnow, op.cit., p.85. Fulton's "hiving off" of areas of 
administration which can be made accountable without direct 
ministerial control is based on the same sort of analysis. 
See Garrett, John. The Management of Government, 
Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1972, p.192. 
72 Ibid, p.79. 
73 Ibid, P.9I0 
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public administration was to be concerned with the administrative 
component wherever it was found, and administrators were to be 
educated with this new knowledge. Importantly, Goodnow emphasized 
that the branches (American) of government were a mixture of 
politics and administration and nowhere said that one should be 
studied independent of the other. 
All this may appear irrelevant to my thesis which is 
more concerned with understanding Queensland public service than 
with the history of American ideas on administration. But 
comparative study was the basis of the early writers on government 
and the great mine of American thought on the subject can be 
discounted only at the risk of not understanding our own system. 
The story of the continuing crises in American Public 
Administration is well known and need not be repeated at length, 
but the point should be made that the way Public Administration 
is viewed in that country and the different intellectual positions 
arrived at appear to be a function of the politics of the system 
and not the result of cumulative scholarship. There is a dialect-
ical relationship of ideas and action which shows the futility of 
trying to define political institutions according to some 
nomothetic law or principle. 
Gulick at the National Institute of Public Administration 
and Willoughby at the Brookings Institute both sought to formulate 
principles which could be at the basis of all administration. 
For example, Gulick's question (in 1928) set the problem. 
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"Must we not discover the principles and laws which govern 
man through the same techniques that we have used to 
discover the laws which govern atoms? Surely we must, 
through science, develop human engineering, when we have, 
through science mastered our material environment with 
mechanical, chemical, civil, electrical and civil 
engineering."„r 
And Willoughby's assertion (in 1927) that there were -
"... certain fundamental principles of general application 
analogous to those characterizing any science which must 
be observed if the end of administration, efficiency in 
operation, is to be secured, and that these principles are 
to be determined and their significance made known only by 
the rigid application of the scientific method of their 
investigation."„„ 
In this way the study of Public Administration became concerned 
with establishing these principles within a general theory of 
76 
administration. The depression confronted the principles 
approach of administrative study with the facts of political life 
and because the strict separation of politics and administration 
i^ practice did not seem relevant to the political issues of the 
day (as it had to the original reformers) it soon lost ground as 
"thd' way to study administration. 
Under Roosevelt, patronage returned, autonomous agencies 
mushroomed, overlapping functions became commonplace, all as a 
part of Roosevelt's style of administration which functioned as 
a system of checks and balances and competitive policy making and 
administration. The times had respect for "principle" only if 
74 Quoted in Caiden, Politics and Administration, p.l09. 
75 Ibid, p.116. 
76 For a "codification" of 1926-27 ideas in Public Administration, 
see Sayre, Wallace. "Premises of Public Administration : 
Past and Emerging", Public Administration Review, Vol.XVIII, 
1958, No.2, pp.102-105. 
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this were useful. The object of the New Deal could not be 
handled by existing government machinery and Roosevelt's new 
programs and policies required improvisory skill in administration 
which went against the "principles". From 1933 onwards there was 
a questioning of the notion that Public Administration should be 
concerned with general principles which excluded political 
considerations. Democracy demanded political control and politics-
administration was a seamless web where no practical division could 
be found.^^ The Brownlow-Brookings debate (1936-1939)*^ and the 
implications for the locus of political power in the system (cen-
tral bureaucratic leadership and congressional supervision), 
brought the inherent political theory in Public Administration 
well into the open. Importantly, both reports subordinated 
administration to politics in that management theory could be 
manipulated to prove any political case. Sociologically, the 
notion of a concrete separation of politics and administration 
was no longer necessary. The search for principles based on a 
politics-administration dichotomy was questioned and students 
became divided into two camps. Those who continued to link public 
administration with private administration, with scientific 
management, with the new human-relations theories, with scientific 
laws applicable to administrative organizations generally. 
77 See Gulick, L. "Politics Administration and the New Deal", 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. 169 (1933), pp.55-66. 
78 Se6 Schaffer, B.B. "Brownlow or Brookings : Approaches to the 
Improvement of the Machinery of Government, New Zealand 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol.24, No.2, March 1962, 
PP.37-63. 
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(Public and private administration became a field for psychologists, 
sociologists, systems analysts, quantifiers and the host of organ-
izational theorists.) The separation of administration from the 
study of politics here is complete. And secondly those who 
accepted the political context and substance of what public 
administrators do and sought to maintain the study of public 
administration, not as a science of management (?administration) 
but as part of political science concerned with policy making and 
implementation. This is roughly the present position. 
The above simplistic account of a very complicated story 
should be understood in the light of what was happening in the 
American political-administrative system in the fifty years 
preceding (say) 1930. Having said that, it does not follow that 
Goodnow's analytical attempts to classify the processes of govern-
ment have been discredited. If a public service based on merit, 
permanence, and neutrality is to be non-partisan or separate from 
party-politics, what are the values that such a service should seek? 
For Goodnow this "ideal" category of administration would possess 
internal coherence and criteria of correctness which are valued 
for themselves. Neutrality and anonymity are not such valuea4 
they are relative to other positive values and meaning giving 
contexts. Goodnow was right to seek a criterion by which adminis-
tration could be separated in fact from politics if he desired 
such a separation. The analytical distinction of political and 
administrative functions does not require that they are separate 
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i^ fg^ ct. However it does provide conceptual signposts to enable 
us to find out. This is the value of American scholarship in the 
field to the study of Australian government. 
Paul Appleby is credited with giving "... the scholarly 
deathblow to the simplistic formulation of the classic dichotomy 
79 
and a new classic statement." Caiden states that "since Appleby, 
80 
nobody had denied the political nature of public administration." 
8l 
The work they refer to is Policy and Administration published in 
1949. Appleby's approach to public administration cannot be 
divorced from his political theory, that is, his theory of how 
democratic responsibility of the public service can be achieved. 
It is opposed in principle to Wilson's notion of a seat of 
82 
sovereignty after the British model. His ideas on policy and 
administration derive from his pluralism and once again show the 
nexus between the study of public service (? public administration) 
and political assumptions. As Appleby is credited with destroying 
the politics-administration distinction it is important to under-
stand how this was done and the relevance of his ideas to the study 
of public administration today in our country. 
79 Dunsire, Administration, The Word and the Science, p.98. 
80 Caiden, Dynamics of Public Administration, p.67. 
81 Appleby, Paul H. Policy and Administration, Alabama : 
University of Alabama Press, 1949. 
82 The two opposing paradigms are discussed in Ostrom, The 
Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, 
fio^ N-i^ir^-n.:>Ti. W-iTliam A.Jr. Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government, Chicago : Aldine-Atherton, 1971, and his paper 
Bureaucracy*Servant or Master? Lessons from America, London : 
The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973, for an economic 
theory of public service. Ostrom's book is based on the 
ideas of political economists such as Niskanen. 
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For Appleby, the problem of taking"politics out of 
administration" - that is, the spoilsman, party patronage and a 
partisan personnel system - had been largely solved. The second 
problem of taking "administration out of politics" - that is, of 
developing a body of management knowledge which was unaffected qua 
knowledge by partisan interference - had also been largely resolved 
although this was still a matter of controversy. In any case 
Appleby, the practitioner, was interested in public administration 
in the sense of getting things done. 
"Although administration is often thought of as an end in 
itself, it finds significance only in programs, the carrying 
on of which is the task of administration... So-called 
housekeeping functions and so-called administrative manage-
ment are subordinated in this view to p:eneral administration, 
which is devoted to the carrying out and development of social 
programs. Efficient administration is that which is socially 
desirable and acceptable."g^ (Emphasis added.) 
Policy and Administration is a development of this point 
of view. Note that the distinction implied in the title now 
refers to "policy". 
Appleby states that politics is used "invariably" in the 
sense of "the science dealing with the organization, regulation 
and administration of a state, in both its internal and external 
affairs." Government as part of this organization is therefore 
part of the science of politics. The pluralist assumption in 
Appleby's thesis is that politics is a good thing, a value (cf. 
Wilson, Goodnow). "It is in politics - the interacting of citizen 
83 Appleby, op.cit., pp.80-8l. 
127 
sentiments and political institutions as a whole - that exists 
the limitations on the power of officials, and the power of the 
people ultimately to require any kind of action, positive or 
84 
negative, about which they are sufficiently agreed." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Those involved in government can be viewed as "more 
political" or "less political". "More political" connotes 
democratic virtue and responsibility and applies to situations 
which are "more controllable by and on behalf of the whole public, 
85 less controllable by individuals or small special publics". 
Appleby nowhere describes explicitly what he means by 
policy. However "administration" is viewed "as the government 
in direct action on behalf of and in restraint of citizens; policy 
making in administration is the exercise of discretion with respect 
87 to such action," and "Much administration may normally be left 
to administrators if all administration is part of and subject to 
00 
the various political processes." "Administration" is treated 
89 
as a "broad term involving policy-making and execution" and "In 
the end, all decision-making in the executive branch is adminis-
tration..." Hence public administration is "that intermingling 
of policy-making and management which occurs below the levels of 
84 Ibid, p.154. 
85 Ibid, pp.26-27. The difficulty in Appleby's presentation is 
evident in such phrases as the "political control of our 
political affairs - government." (p.47) 
86 Also see Dunsire, op.cit., p.l55._ 
87 Appleby, op.cit., p.l5. 88 Ibid, p.20. 
89 Ibid, p.24. 90 Ibid, p.72. 
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legislative, judicial, and popular-electoral policy determinations." 
A policy problem (that is a problem of public adminis-
tration) is capable of being "pushed upward" for political 
92 
resolution. Anything done within the executive branch can be 
moved up if there is sufficient concern about it. Those matters 
93 
which are not moved up are administratively resolved. The role 
of parties is to provide machinery for developing majorities, to 
94 develop, elevate and identify political leadership, and to 
95 
nominate issues which can be formulated usefully for the party. 
Only a small part of the system is partisan. That is 
to say, political parties only deal with issues when those issues 
seem capable of being formulated in useful ways. "The executive 
government has little partisan character. This is the sense in 
96 
which politics and administration are most sharply differentiated." 
He accepts the distinction between politics expressed through 
political parties and politics expressed through the executive 
government. This is an important point and reflects the traditional 
dichotomy. 
Appleby also makes a distinction in the administrative 
branch itself. "The top political administrator is not to be 
judged by professional-administrator standards. Those standards 
apply only to the professional administrators. The political 
administrator is pre-eminently the political and organizational 
97 
synthesizer." 
91 Ibid, p.25. 92 Ibid, p.6l. 93 Ibid, p.82. 
94 Ibid, p.48. 95 Ibid, p.153- 96 Ibid, p.53. 
97 Ibid, p.49. 
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It may be argued that Appleby does away with the use-
fulness of the traditional distinction by defining as adminis-
tration everything (including the work of the President as Chief 
Administrator, and his Cabinet) which is below the work of 
legislative and judicial agencies. But his distinction of 
professional administrator (= civil servant) and political admin-
istrator (= President and Cabinet), of professional standards and 
political standards, of partisan and non-partisan values, of 
general administration (= developing and carrying out social 
programs) and administrative management (= housekeeping activities), 
are well in the tradition of Wilson and Goodnow. His emphasis on 
the fact that both politics (policy) and administration are 
functions of the executive branch was pointed to by these scholars 
fifty and more years previously. For Appleby and other American 
scholars of the 1940's this was not a matter of concern. But the 
"dichotomy" was not demolished. There was simply no normative de-
mand for factual separation so that the analytical separation was 
also discarded. 
Appleby offers one insight which helps us to understand 
further the nature of the politics-administration relationship. 
"It is where administrative questions become policy questions 
of a sort needing public debate that the two merge at the 
public level. They merge at every governmental level in 
precisely the same way ... certain aspects of administration 
and certain aspects of policy require treatment together ... 
At every level, the answer to the question 'V/hat is my 
judgment about this which I have to decide, or about this on 
which I need to have a judgment?'is a policy question. In 
the perspective of each successive level everything decided 
130 
at that level and above is 'policy', and everything that may 
be left to a lower level is^'administration'. In the 
perspective of an outside observer, policy and administration 
are treated together at every level."QO 
But, we may add, they are analytically different and can be use-
fully discussed as distinct relationships within the hierarchy of 
policy-administrative decisions. The practitioner will see a 
decision problem in all sorts of ways but always within a context 
of possibilities which are in the nature of things best expressed 
as constraints - (a) the control others have over him and (b) the 
control he has over others. Such controls include law, authority, 
status, expertise and similar influential factors. Thus a middle-
level official has authority, legal power, organizational authority 
and material resources to ensure (hopefully) that his subordinates 
will act in a desired way and that some substantive goal will be 
achieved. His relationship to his subordinates is of a different 
kind to his relationship to his superordinates. The many studies 
of hierarchical organizations have given us much empirical knowledge 
of this process. The hierarchical upward-downwards dichotomy offers 
an understanding of the nature of administration which I will 
develop in the next part of this essay. 
Summary. 
There is now no one school (British or American) which 
can claim to represent Public Administration as an academic 
discipline, but rather a host of approaches, methodologies and 
98 Ibid, p.21. 
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and "sciences". Public Administration in the classic 1920's 
American version no longer holds the field as an academic discipline 
and if the scholars referred to in Part I above are an indication 
there is now no real point in arguing that such an academic 
discipline exists in that sense. Does this mean that the practit-
ioner does not have a core of knowledge which he can "profess"? 
Circumstances change and the demands made on knowledge 
change also. But the fundamental problem is perennial. Someone 
or some group wields power in the community with the consequence 
that the lives and well being of others are affected. The political 
problem is who is to do this - king, headman, official or whoever? 
In our time this problem is complicated because the people, in the 
mass, are said to be sovereign, and the "will" of the people is 
difficult to define. Effecting a consequence is also complicated 
because the modern mode of government is the large organization 
based on hierarchy and delegation. How to decide anything at all 
is a mammoth task. How to effectively make the decision real in 
the lives of the people is equally difficult. The whole govern-
mental system is involved in these problems but in the same way 
that some specialization of labour within organizations seeks 
greater achievement of organizational ends, some specialization 
of labour within the polity seeks an optimum level of responsibility 
for actions taken on behalf of the polity. 
The influence of the distinction between politics and 
administration is pervasive in our polity. Officials make use of 
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the distinction to signify the meaning of what they do and scholars, 
in spite of themselves, continue to designate phenomena in this way 
and to order their subject matter with these words. The problem 
seems to be that we have taken something which is very simple and 
made it unnecessarily complex. If we go back to V/ilson's original 
statement which started the whole thing off in America, we note 
two things, (l) he was attempting to graft a system of responsible 
executive government onto a system designed on the principles of 
separation of powers - he was concerned with establishing the 
responsibility of the executive for its actions (politics, admin-
istration or whatever) to the legislature, and (2) he was advocating 
a "science" of administration which was of interest only to the 
extent that it was directed towards that goal. Goodnow*s formu-
lation has the same real objective. If activities with an internal 
criteria of correctness can be discovered, the intervention by 
partisan political machines into the workings of public organizations 
can be brought to account and public service can stand on its own 
feet in much the same way as does the administration of justice 
through the courts. The problem was, and still is, "how to achieve 
the responsibility under law of those charged with running things?" 
But the manner in which the problem is stated is a function,of the 
political needs of the time and place. The American study of 
Public Administration concentrating on the executive and attempting 
to limit the study to the administration side of the "dichotomy" -
to non-partisan matters and principles of practice with internal 
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criteria of correctness - can be understood from the viewpoint of 
99 
the sociology of knowledge. 
That public servants in America (and Australia) are more 
than instruments of the partisan side of the governmental system 
was known by the early theorists and in fact the "myth" of 
concrete separation was itself a form of political activity in 
that power over a part of the governmental system was asserted to 
be outside party political interest. Appleby's statement that all 
government is political is a truism the way it is put by him. and 
all public administration is political in that sense. The problem 
of how to clean up government in the United States was attacked 
through reform of the public service because this seemed to be the 
only way at that time. But government is politics and administra-
tion. In the sense the dichotomy will never be a valid description 
of public service in any absolute sense. But the important and 
rather simple point is that there is a useful conceptual distinction 
defined by the politics-administration formula if we do not feel 
compelled to limit the terms to concrete institutions. 
The fundamental interest, as V/ilson pointed out, is 
the part that public opinion shall take in the conduct of adminis-
tration. How is the public to censor the actions of those with 
power to make decisions affecting it? That is, how to make 
99 For example, Waldo's The Administrative State, (op.cit.), ques-
tioned the ideological assumptions behind the "principles" 
approach and the notion of efficiency. He argued that the 
study of administration should be placed in a particular 
American philosophical context of social values. 
100 Wilson, op.cit., p.33. 
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officials (both appointed and elected) accountable. The problem 
stated in this way is not restricted to the work of public 
servants but to that of all actors authorized by the people to 
act on their behalf. Public Administration is concerned therefore 
with one part of the more general problem of political responsib-
ility. The zig-zag past of American scholarship can be understood 
as reaction to this problem at particular times. The single most 
important fact is that in our polity the public service (as well 
as the parliamentary service) has only a conditioned or derived 
authority and acts in the name of the public interest as expressed 
by the public. 
What follows if this is accepted is that the study of 
management (or administration if that is taken to be synonymous) 
and the study of policy making techniques cannot be understood 
without reference to political legitimacy. Parliaments do not 
always represent the interests of the public, public services do 
not either, and neither are they always effectively accountable to 
either the public or the parliament. If we are interested in 
public service specifically (as I am) we cannot ignore the way 
parliaments are formed, the cabinet-parliamentary relationship, 
the rationality of policy, the effectiveness of implementation and 
the efficiency of means because these are the elements in the 
chain of responsibility which might legitimate the work that public 
servants do. Therefore the study of public service is fundament-
ally concerned with the notion of political responsibility and 
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this notion is central and subsumes much else that is discussed 
in the field. The importance of this assertion is no different 
today than it was in the nineteenth century. The objective of 
Public Administration is the design of "procedural devices" to 
make the work of public officials (including elected officials) 
responsible. What is "efficient?'administration? What is "good" 
policy? These are different but related questions which can be 
discussed and clarified only if some theory of political responsib-
ility grounds the discussion and this inevitably leads us to the 
work of political theorists and such notions as justice, the good 
society, equity, etc. Therefore, in the end, a scheme for public 
administration study based on a notion of responsibility must do 
three things -
(1) determine the values implied in our conception of the polity 
and the locus of legitimate power. We look to the political 
theorist and political sociologist for this knowledge. 
These scholars should be asked to make clear to us what 
values the community asserts, and what values we should seek; 
(2) relate the work of scholars working in the fields of 
management and public policy making to these values in such 
a way that the nexus is clear (if ... then basis); and 
(3) devise formal arrangements intended to achieve these results. 
It is the third task which I see to be the objective of 
those concerned specifically with Public Administration. In this 
scheme Public Administration is not only the study of internal 
management, nor is it only the study of policy making. It is a 
study concerned with the interface between the two and the formal 
arrangements by which both policy making and internal management 
136 
are brought into a fit with the political theory of a particular 
polity at a particular time. In this way Public Administration 
is not culture bound (as was Dahl's complaint), but neither is it 
value free (as it seemed to be to those who aimed for efficiency 
as the only concern of the study). Responsibility, and the 
relationship between political and administrative processes, once 
again become the central concern of the study. Descriptively, 
the question is "who does what in the polity and who is account-
able to whom and why?" The design of procedural devices and 
reform of machinery of government constitutes the prescriptive 
side. The British idea of a non-elected, non-partisan civil 
service goes hand in hand with the political responsibility of 
Ministers. Without Ministerial responsibility a neutral impartial 
civil service does not make sense. Someone must make political 
decisions if Ministerial direction is absent. The appointed 
official (career or partisan) in the American system has this 
role. It was the need to make this role more responsible, more 
predictable and more controllable in a system without institution-
alized elective leadership at the department level that made it 
necessary to devise the notion of a dichotomized system. 
The British model of subordination of career officials 
to responsible political officials does not in fact demand a 
separation of policy and administration at the highest level. 
But it does demand the placing of a member of the parliament in 
a hierarchical position of authority over permanent officials and 
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his accountability to the parliament for what those officials 
are doing. Subordination is the key to understanding the 
relationship of what public servants do and what elected 
officials do in the Westminster model. The semantic and ideo-
logical ambiguity inherent in political language makes under-
standing difficult. At the highest level (for example, 
permanent head) "policy" and "administration" commingle in the 
work of both elected and appointed officials, but the Minister 
is the bureaucratic head and has authority over his subordinates. 
There is no concrete separation of policy and administration. If 
we substitute "politics" for "policy" the meaning changes because 
we equate politics with party politics and thus we say that politics 
102 
and administration are separated. It is this semantic problem 
which causes confusion and this arises because so much writing on 
101 It is very interesting to note that this proposition is still 
being put forward as a solution to American Executive-
Congressional relationships. See Time, June 9, 1975, where 
Weisband, Edward & Franck, Thomas M. Resignation in Protest, 
is reviewed. The authors specifically recommend that Cab-
inet members be picked exclusively from Congress but keep 
their congressional seats whilst serving the Administration. 
102 For example, see Caiden, G.E. "The Political Role of the 
Commonwealth Bureaucracy", Public Administration (Sydney), 
Vol.XXIV, No.4, Dec.1965, p.312. "The doctrine of minis-
terial responsibility does not recognize any distinction 
(between policy and administration) as it holds the 
Minister responsible for all departmental actions whether 
or not he knows personally about them." And compare 
Parker, R.S. and Subramaniam, V. "Public and Private 
Administration", International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, Vol.30, 1964, p.359, n.22. "In British admin-
istration an instrumental theory (the distinction between 
politics and administration) is implicit ... in the 
principle of Ministerial responsibility which holds the 
Minister fuHy responsible for the acts of his agents." 
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public administration is American and intended to solve the 
political problems of that polity. 
The wealth of empirical description and theoretical 
analyses which the Americans have provided feeds back into the 
study of British and Australian public services and with our 
magpie instinct we now say that the politics-administration 
distinction does not apply to Australian government and thereby 
lose an insight into how our system works. The value of American 
Public Administration lies in the extensive study of the 
processes of internal management that scholars in that country 
have achieved, the critique of the assumption that politics and 
administration, values and facts, partisan politics and neutral 
policy making can be easily separated in practice, and that 
administration can only be studied apart from politics at the 
risk of misunderstanding its real meaning. 
It is obvious (as it has always been) that politics, 
policy making and administrative management (implementing 
legitimately made policy) commingle more or less throughout the 
organs of government. What is necessary for a theory of 
responsibility (including ministerial responsibility) is that 
the actions of each participant be clarified as far as possible, 
with the objective of enhancing those political values which the 
polity (Britain, U.S.A. or Australia) sees as important. Obfus-
cation of the subject is the only result of asserting that because 
these aspects are interdependent and commingle throughout the 
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system, therefore they ought not to be dealt with separately. 
"Good" policy making, "effective" implementation and efficient 
management are interdependent objectives. But these notions are 
analytically separable and can be regarded as separate aspects 
of the one 30b in spite of the fact that they are performed more 
or less by the one official. Concrete separation is not necessary 
although it may be desirable in particular circumstances. It is 
the task of Public Administration to analyse the work of officials 
in this way through the focus of responsibility. 
Whilst the problem can be simply stated (as most profound 
social problems can) there is no reason to suppose that the study 
of the most complex, value laden and potentially important 
organized group in modern society should be simply resolved. Any 
knowledge, scientific, ethical, historical or aesthetic, which can 
inform our understanding is useful. But to be clear about the 
problem itself is to be well on the way to success. Before a study 
of public administration practice can begin, the environment of 
value must be either (a) described or (b) created. Policy formu-
lation, management and applied expertise only then becoipe meaning-
ful in Public Administration terms. 
If we reconsider the work of the Queensland Permanent 
Heads we will see that the analysis in this section fits very well 
with what they in fact do. 
Firstly, the Head has some substantive subject matter 
exjpertise. He is expected to make recommendations to his Minister 
i4o 
regarding policy formulation. If the Parliament has no definite 
policy on the matters which concern his department, if the subject 
matter itself is technical and scientific or professional, if the 
Minister has little expertise or is not particularly interested, 
then the Head has much influence in the way policy recommendations 
are prepared and presented to the Cabinet. He is accountable to 
his Minister for the quality of this work. 
Secondly, the Head is accountable for the administration 
of given areas of policy and the achievement of goals if they are 
defined or creating them if they are not (subject to the Minister). 
There is nothing in this part of his job which states that the 
Head is only an instrument. He could be, if legislation was 
specific enough, quantified enough and clear on what the elected 
officials wanted. Normally this is not the case. Discretion is 
inherent in the notion of someone performing work on behalf of 
another where standards only are defined. 
Thirdly, the Head is required to arrange the internal 
affairs of his department in such a way that both his policy 
formulating function and his administration function are maximised. 
This is his management role for which he is accountable to the 
various control departments. 
In all this work the influence of the Minister is 
pervasive, more or less, and the work of Minister and Permanent 
Head overlaps in practice. This means that any study of public 
service at this level is also the study of politics. Alternatively, 
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any study of politics is also the study of administration. This 
seems to cause confusion. And the confusion is compounded when 
the distinction between politics and administration is replaced 
by a distinction between policy and administration. Appleby's 
influence is at fault here. He distinguishes partisan politics 
and non-partisan politics and asserts that both partisan and non-
partisan political actors are involved in policy thus destroying 
the policy-administration distinction. This may be true but is 
largely irrelevant to the problem that the politics-administration 
distinction was concerned with. There are different analytical 
and practical problems involved in the two formulations. The 
practical problem for our system and the theory of ministerial 
103 
responsibility is to subordinate "non-partisan politicians" to 
partisan control. For Appleby (unlike Wilson) subordination was 
in terms of American pluralism. For Australia, subordination means 
Ministerial control and responsibility and the use of electorally 
accountable political parties to express the public interest. The 
legitimacy of administration is directly related to the effective-
ness of Ministerial responsibility. 
That the senior public servant must wear three hats -
political (policy) adviser, manager and subject area expert - if 
he is to be the compleat public administrator is clear from the 
actual work performed by a senior official in Queensland (see Part 
II above). The "politics" of the work creates difficulty from the 
103 See Caiden, op.cit., p.312. 
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viewpoint of both the practitioner and the public. For example, 
if a policy is made with which a senior official disagrees and 
opposes within the organization (or fails to oppose) the official 
does not feel responsible. This is a "political" decision. On 
the other hand, if he successfully recommends policy which is 
adopted, this is seen as the application of expertise. "Politics" 
and "policy" are separable notions with separate justificatory 
functions. The public service is not expected to be "political" 
and therefore cannot b£ political. Somehow the above three 
characteristics of the senior official must be brought together 
in a philosophy of public service and practical arrangements 
designed which are acceptable both within and without the 
bureaucracy. 
The remainder of this essay can be seen as an attempt 
to present some conceptual tools which may be helpful from the 
practitioner's viewpoint. Because the terms "politics" and 
"administration" have been and are so promiscuously used, an 
attempt will be made to define (prescribe) meanings for these 
concepts. What I am interested in doing is constructing a concept-
ual scheme in which the practitioner can place his work meaning-
fully, and in which the contemporary schools of public policy and 
management science can be thought about together as a profession 
of what public service may mean in our time and place. 
The objective is not an understanding of the "how to" 
of public service (the techniques necessarily required by 
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administrators in practice) but (l) an integrated set of concepts 
defined in such a way that empirical hypotheses can be devised, 
and explanatory theory developed (the "how"), and (2) a value 
framework to give such empirical theory meaning for action (the 
"why"). The aim is academic respectability and utility for those 
public servants who may wish to accept, reject or modify the 
framework in respect to their own work. 
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IV REoPONSIBILITY. 
The Ethical Dimension. 
Part II of my thesis presented a description of the role 
of a permanent head in the Queensland Public Service to ensure 
that subsequent theoretical discussion related to the real world 
of public service. It was suggested that one characterization of 
that world was the interface between partisan politics and what is 
variously called administration, professionalism, expertise and 
management. In Part III the British and American notions of 
ministerial responsibility and the politics-administration 
"dichotomy" were brought together and it was argued that both 
paradigms of understanding are intended to resolve the tensions 
inherent in this relationship. These solutions are not descriptions 
of the real world but attempts to settle on rules and convention 
which would structure the behaviour and expectations of actors in 
the governmental system in order that the labour of running the 
polity can be rationalised according to a political value. In 
this sense both ministerial responsibility and the politics-
administration dichotomy are "necessary myths". For example, 
Ministers in Queensland are only qualifiedly responsible and 
public officials are intendedly political. What both myths or 
conventions provide is a bench mark against which behaviour can 
be measured. 
In this final Part of my thesis I want to bring together 
some further ideas (once again mainly American) in an endeavour to 
analyse these "myths" from a practitioner's viewpoint. Obviously 
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what constitutes a "problem" for me is a function of the value 
framework which structures my understanding (as was pointed out 
in Part I). Let me assert simply that the theory and practice of 
"public service" are inherent in the words themselves and are 
concerned with the relationship of public officials to the public 
interest. And more specifically the theory is concerned with 
institutional design problems in providing for the public interest 
to be publicly expressed and implemented. Call this Public 
Administration if you wish. As practice, this view requires the 
development of a well defined set of ethics which is known to all 
who serve the polity including elected and appointed officials 
and against which behaviour can be publicly measured. I also 
wish to argue that the partisan-nonpartisan interface at the 
permanent head level does not, either in logic or in practice, 
absolve public servants at all levels from coming to terms with 
the obligations of public service as a "profession of government". 
At the highest level the problems are simply more immediate. 
As society's demands increase and the technologies 
available to provide for them become more complex, three important 
consequences for the nineteenth century solutions to the problem 
of political control of administration occur - (l) officials play 
a larger role in formulating policy (expertise, professionalism, 
etc.), (2) officials are given greater discretionary power in how 
the policy will be applied, and (3) the responsibility of the 
minister to the parliament is correspondingly diminished unless 
procedures are built in to ensure that (l) and (2) are made account-
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able to that extent. Participation, delegation, autonomy, are 
power orientated values and the actions of those seeking these 
values in public organizations are political in terms of the 
system. Thus the public official is said to have or to be getting 
too much power. 
The problem of bureaucratic power arises because 
offices cannot be constructed in such a way that discretion can 
be eliminated. If this were possible we would not need men -
machines would be more efficient. Because some discretion or 
creative intelligence is required, even if only minimally, critics 
of bureaucracy can argue that power is exceeded, or that rights 
are not respected, or that what is expected does not occur. The 
criticism is so vocal because the official is the servant of the 
state and the critics themselves feel they should control the 
state and through it the erring bureaucrats. 
For the public servant the problem is one of action -
of what to do. All action within the public service is both 
political and administrative. The official should be av/are of 
this and I hope the following may help to bring this about. But 
the practitioner is in a bind here. He cannot simply understand 
his role as a political-administrative relationship without taking 
the next step of coming to terms with the problems of personal 
1 Bureaucracy and bureaucratic are used here as names for the 
hierarchy of offices iirhich constitute one component of the 
government system and the intended meaning is in no sense 
perjorative. "Public service" and "bureaucracy" are inter-
changeable more or less - see later. 
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responsibility for his action within that relationship. There 
has to be some way of linking theory to practice because decisions 
leading to action are not taken by organizations but by individ-
uals. The Queensland system does not prescribe ways and means by 
which the political function of public servants is made explicit. 
Quite the contrary, in fact. The officialfe problem is that uiiless 
he has a "professional" accountability to a non-public service 
professional body he has no acknowledged point of responsibility 
or way of expressing his sense of obligation. One can argue that 
the public servant's professional duty is to his Minister and that 
is the end of it. But this doctrine itself soon evaporates when 
political issues demand it. For example, the present leader of the 
opposition in the Australian Parliament recently stated -
"There could be circumstances, I believe, in which a Treasury 
official could regard his overriding duty to Australia as 
being greater than his duty to a government, and, ultimately 
duty lies to Australia first ... it would have to be a major 
matter of conscience."-
What Mr. Fraser is saying is that the public servant has some duty 
to his (the public servant's) understanding of the public interest. 
Those who "leak" information from public services offer this 
rationale in justification. But are not Ministers in our polity 
charged with defining the public interest for policy purposes and 
does not the permanency of the public servant require him to have 
a duty to the ministerial office, if not the temporary incumbent? 
Alternatively, if officials are recognized as being partisan in 
2 The Hon. M. Fraser, M,P,, A,B.C. Four Corners, 6/7/75. 
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that they are committed to carry through specific party programmes 
(for example, recent permanent head appointments in the Australian 
Public Service appear to be explicitly partisan in nature), can 
they reasonably be seen as loyal to a different government with 
different programmes? 
The ambiguous role of the permanent head which exempli-
fies public service generally and the absence of any agreed upon 
professional ethic other than subservience makes it difficult to 
develop an ideology of public service with which younger public 
servants can be inculcated. In this section I want to argue that 
we should look again at the notion of structural differentiation 
based on political-administrative functions in an attempt to make 
our system more democratic (= rational = understandable = open to 
challenge = scientific) and that Public Administration study can 
best be seen as a search for "procedural devices" or "design 
principles" which will link the public interest expressed by the 
public to the bureaucratic machinery. This is the original 
Wilsonian meaning of the study. The structuring of offices accord-
ing to these principles then is the practical aim of Public 
Administration, as it was in the beginning. If this is agreed, 
the questions to be asked are - "Whom d£ public servants serve?" 
and "Whom should they be expected to serve?" The British First 
Division Association in this report on Professional standards in 
that country commented that "It would be ironical if the Fulton 
3 See "Professional Standards in the Public Service, A Report by 
a Sub-Committee of the First Division Association", Public 
Administration (London), Summer 1972, Vol.50, pp.l67-l82. 
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Report's stress on non-ethical aspects of professionalism were to 
give free rein to the idea (that higher public servants are simply 
participants in a vast power game) ... that official activity is 
a game without rules and some v/ere to allow this idea to influence 
their conduct." It would indeed, but there does not appear to 
be any great interest in setting down these rules. Practitioners 
in Queensland feel that there is no problem here and if there were 
the notion of ministerial responsibility takes care of it. 
The proposition that public servants have a duty qua 
public servants only towards the minister whom they serve and thus 
to the government of the day is too simple. What must follow if 
the notion of non-partisan neutrality is also proposed is a duty 
to some non-partisan value. Dr. H.C. Coombs has said that a public 
servant can give different kinds of government honest service only 
if he "believes in a system broadly for which he works : not 
necessarily for this government or for that government, but 
believes that the system, by and large, is an appropriate one for 
the country in which he lives." The views expressed by Dr. 
Coombs are substantially the same expressed by Queensland Heads. 
It seems then, that the first duty is (as Mr. Eraser points out) 
not to the Minister or the Ministerial office, but to the philosophy 
of a particular government insofar as it accords the values of the 
4 Ibid, p.169. 
5 Coombs, H.C. quoted by Playford, John. "Who Rules Australia", 
in Playford, J. and Kirsner, D. Australian Capitalism, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972, p.134. 
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polity. In this way the claims of authority over the public 
servant shift from the Minister to some abstract value such as 
the public interest, or the interests of Australia. 
The difficulty with this position derives from the 
Westminster model which demands that the public interest should 
be defined through the parliament, the cabinet and the responsible 
minister. In this system, the minister represents the public 
interest and is accountable both collectively for the making of 
policy and individually for carrying it out. Therefore the formal 
duty of the public servant, to his minister and thus to the 
"system broadly", is contingent on the effectiveness of Ministerial 
responsibility for the system. The greater that the function of 
responsibility can be established the greater the duty the public 
servant has to serve his Minister unequivocally. The less the 
Minister is accountable to the polity (through the parliament) 
the less is his legitimacy in terms of the system values and thus 
the less the public servant can justify duty to the ministerial 
office per se. If a senior official and Minister are able to 
combine political and administrative talents in such a way that 
neither is accountable (because the official is de facto permanent 
and anonymous and the Minister's responsibility is to party not 
the parliament), then responsible government and hierarchical 
legitimacy break down. Any talk of public service professionalism 
and ethics must begin at the level where these questions can be 
asked not at the managerial level, nor again at the level of 
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substantive policy, but at the procedural level where the values 
of the system can be maintained. 
In theory ministerial responsibility means hierarchical 
subordination of the bureaucracy to a Minister responsible to 
parliament and then to the people, who in turn demand change through 
the same channels in reverse order. Duty derives from the effective-
ness of this chain, and where the links are broken duty is confused. 
The fact that Queensland Heads do not feel that there is any such 
break down does not mean that there may not be, could not be, or 
will not be in the future. The furore about the Australian Labor 
Government's overseas loans activities and the view of Mr. Fraser 
as to the duty of a public servant clesirly indicate how delicate 
is the notion of duty to a Minister and how it is expedient to 
claim other justificatory rationales when psirtisan values are in 
question. The leakage of cabinet documents in Queensland and their 
5a 
use by the Labor opposition are further examples.-^ ^ 
The difficult thing for the public servant is that in 
such a situation he must decide for himself what is the ethical 
thing to do. He cannot evade this responsibility because this 
duty defines the most fundamental aspect of his job qua public 
servant. He is a servant of the polity subject to his Minister 
whose authority is justified by the values which exist in the 
polity. Claims of authority above individual judgment within 
the hierarchical relationship may be made in one of two ways, 
(l) positive and negative sanctions, and (2) legitimacy of 
5a See Courier Mail, Brisbane, 8/5/75, P.l, P.3 and p.4. 
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the directions flowing down. There is a balance between these two 
elements. Australian public servants have never had to serve an 
unconstitutional government and the legitimacy of authority is 
taken for granted. Thus hierarchy is normally seen to be a 
problem of management and the concern of managers interested in 
maximising organizational goals. However hierarchy in a public 
bureaucracy could be more realistically understood as a way of 
containing values for the purposes set by the political parties. 
But if those purposes are not set in accordance with the consti-
tution, the political values of the community or accepted 
conventions, legitimacy breaks down or may be seen to break down 
by the official. Public service professionalism is therefore 
concerned with political values. There is no known version of 
the public interest acceptable to all and conflict over the 
content of that concept largely defines the area of the political. 
But there is no need to mystify and make difficult something which 
should be very simple. 
The aim of Public Administration as an academic pursuit 
has always been concerned with accountability (= who does what and 
according to what rules). What is also needed is a statement for 
our polity of the ethics of the professional public official so 
that the public and its servants know what to expect. Abuse of 
public service power, both in the making of policy recommendations 
and in administrative work, is always the possible cost of too much 
trust. There is no reason to believe that public servants are any 
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less selfish, or less likely to do the wrong thing than any other 
part of the community. But there is always a great demand for high 
standards of ethical conduct and a sense of responsibility demanded 
of the public servant. The "leakage" syndrome which has been 
encouraged by media people has seriously undermined this notion or 
at least created a demand for re-evaluation of a public servant's 
responsibility. "Open government", right of public comment, 
erosion of anonymity, have all contributed to this need. What is 
expected of the senior public servant? What is his responsibility? 
The demands for autonomy within organizations generally 
are based on the normative notion that employees have the right to 
participate in making decisions which affect the interests of 
members of the organization and consumers outside the organization. 
V/hen applied to public service these ideas have the effect of 
making public officials question their obligation. Such question-
ing may challenge the right of those at the top of public organ-
izations to issue directives of a certain kind, or a policy may 
be questioned for any number of reasons, or individuals may claim 
a right for personal growth within the organization in conflict 
with the manifest goals of the organization. An example would be 
where there is a serious social conflict as to a particular policy 
output of government. It is most likely that claims of these 
affected will flow over to criticism of how the policies were made, 
that is, their legitimacy. Were all viewpoints taken into account? 
Were all concerned consulted? Does it matter? Is one section or 
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minority being relatively deprived to benefit another? Is this 
legitimate? If so, how was it decided and by whom? How the 
individual public servant responds defines his obligation. Will 
this "response" be "responsible"? 
It is a form of political rhetoric to assert that 
public servants are neutral. All that can be said is that they 
should be neutral vis-a-vis political parties. No one in the 
position of a permanent head (say) is in fact, nor is expected to 
be, neutral regarding the content of policy. But if permanent 
heads and other officials are to be safeguarded against what the 
British First Division Association called the "threats arising 
from habits of tendentious briefing" and maintain this neutrality, 
some ethic, a bureaucratic bill of rights, a code of conduct, is 
desirable. There should be"an insistence on clarity of function 
and intention in government organizations". The following is an 
attempt to achieve such clarity. 
The Structure of Bureaucracy. 
The original statements by Wilson and Goodnow employed 
n 
a method which Landau calls a "logic of relationships", and the 
line of inquiry was set by such concepts as structure, function, 
process and adaptation. They saw a government system as a set of 
functionally interrelated processes. Henry Jones Ford in reviewing 
Goodnow's work stated that "structure and function are correlative" 
6 "Professional Standards in the Public Service, etc.", pp.l79-l80. 
7 Landau, Martin. Political Theory and Political Science, New 
York : The Macmillan Company, 1972, p.133. 
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and an institution, or practice or procedure is to be interpreted 
"by establishing its consequences for the larger system". Systems 
theory in political science has had a great influence on American 
Public Administration since World Vi/ar II in both policy and 
9 
management schools. Different commentators have differing inter-
pretations of the meaning of "system" and how it can be applied to 
politics. Broadly speaking the systems approach to political life 
is a guiding metaphor not a theory. A systemic analogy to 
biological organisms is usually developed which provides concepts 
to guide us in how we attend to the various aspects of our study, 
that is, it provides criteria of relevance. In biology, the idea 
of an organic system in which various parts function so that the 
organism continues to survive, is useful as a theoretical construct 
and has a reasonable fit with empirical reality. 
When biological analogy is brought to political study 
(including the study of organizations), the "life processes" of 
8 Quoted in ibid, p.l38. 
9 See particularly Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political 
Life, New York : John Wiley and Sons, I965, which is the 
commonly acknowledged basis for the input-output model of a 
political system. See Silverman, David. The Theory of Organ-
izations, A Sociological Framework, London : Heineman, 1970, 
for discussion of various approaches to organizations. See 
particularly an excellent critical paper by Doyle, D.A. The 
Poverty of Systems Analysis with Special Reference to Develop-
ment Theory, presented at eleventh annual conference of the 
Australasian Political Studies Association, Sydney,August 1969. 
10 See Gregor, James. "Political Science and the Uses of Functional 
Analysis", The American Political Science Review, June I968, 
Vol.62, No.2, pp.425-439. Also see McDonald, Lee C. "Myth 
Politics and Political Science", Western Political Quarterly, 
Vol.22, 1969, pp.141-150, for the use of "root metaphors" in 
systematic enquiry. 
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the social system are talked about to explain the persistence of 
the system. The political system is defined as a functional 
requisite for the existence of society because there must be some 
authoritative allocation of values. As I understand it, the 
notion of a political system as normally used is a logical con-
struct. V/hat is sought is an abstraction which can be defined 
in such a way that the behavioural variables are "functional" for 
the persistence of the political system and, by postulation, of 
society itself. The system itself is autonomous and persists 
through time as an essential system within an environment, receiving 
inputs (demands, supports, etc.) across systemic boundaries, pro-
cesses them and issues authoritative rules, goods, services, etc. 
back into the environment which then feeds back into the system 
further inputs. The analogy with a biological entity is clear. 
The delineation of certain variables of human behaviour 
and their definition as discrete systems in interaction across 
systemic boundaries are a logical exercise without concrete refer-
ents. Political, economic, cultural, religious and other defined 
systemic variables are abstracted analytically from a flux of 
phenomena in which the variables are interacting continuously and 
congruently over time. And importantly, if we use Easton's 
political system as an example, the analysis is abstracted beyond 
variable forms to a level where the "system" as defined, continues 
11 Easton's approach is an "integrated conceptual framework at 
the highest level of abstraction". Easton, op.cit., p.12. 
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through change, including revolution, evolution, structural change, 
changes in values, etc. As long as society persists the political 
12 
system persists by definition. In other words, a distinctly 
political instance of failure to persist cannot be formed because 
it has been defined out of existence. 
The notion of "function" itself in systems analysis is 
ambiguous. Much of the emphasis on functionalism flows over from 
sociology and in its structural-functional form has influenced 
13 political scientists. Behaviours are "functional" for system 
survival, others are dysfunctional. At a different level of 
analysis some behaviours are seen as "manifest" functions, others 
as "latent" functions. Such terms are ways of describing variables 
given the nature of the analytical system. The term function has 
been defined in many ways but a generally acceptable definition 
14 
would probably be "a system relevant effect of structures". 
Functional requisites are operational conditions that must be met 
if the system is to continue to persist and do not refer to 
empirical phenomena, but to the logical relationships "required" 
by the definition the analyst uses in discussing his notion of a 
system. In other words it is logic not real life which provides 
the basis for functions as a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the survival of a system analytically defined. 
12 See Thorsen, Thomas Landon. Biopolitics, New York : Holt Rine-
hart 8c Winston Inc. ,1970,Ch.5, for this critique of Easton. 
13 See papers by Flannigan, William and Fogelman, Edwin, and Holt, 
Robert T. in Charlesworth, James C.(ed.)»Contemporary Pol-
itical Analysis, New York : The Free Press, 1967, pp.72-107. 
14 See Holt, op.cit., p.88. 
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When systems theorists attempt to make their concepts 
operational the naming of relatively concrete entities is 
inevitable because sub-systemic units (economic systems, political 
systems) are abstractions and therefore cannot interact, they can 
only correlate. This point has been well made by Etzioni. 
"When the abstract concept of system is used it should be noted, 
the components of the system cannot interact; they can only 
correlate. In abstract system language it makes no sense to 
state that an actor 'responded' or 'reacted' to a rise in 
integration, interaction, or other such concepts, as they are 
concepts of the observer and not descriptive units in the 
observed world, the world of action. Description of action 
and of concrete factors that an actor reacts to can be 
analysed by the use of these variables; but the action 
concepts and the observer variable will never be coextensive 
unless the observer commits the 'sin' of reification."-,-
15 
Etzioni recommends the concepts of a "synthesized" 
social system defined as a relationship in which changes, in one 
or more members, initiates change in all the others which in turn 
have feedback on the members in which the changes occur. Relat-
ively concrete units are defined, such as collectivities, societies, 
organizations, movements and government agencies. The units act 
on each other, not just in terms of changes in the rates of 
abstract variables but in concrete systemic relationships in which 
the state - courts, police, government agencies, etc. - is the 
primary link. 
The 'function" of the political system for society is the 
allocation of resources. This is an analytical formulation. But 
15 Etzioni, Amitai. The Active Society, New York : The Free Press, 
1968, p.123. 
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the political "system"does not allocate resources. This is 
undertaken by concrete entities. 
Herbert J. Spiro made the observation that "the 
utility of systemstheory, as of all else in political science, 
depends upon the understanding of politics with which it works, 
16 
the notion of the political upon which it is based". Struc-
tural-functional systems theory, because it derives from sociol-
ogical analysis, usually regards the political system as a sub-
system of the social system and the nature of political behaviour 
as a dependent variable determined by social, cultural or economic 
change. The alternative view which structures my thesis is that 
politics can be viewed as the more or less deliberate efforts to 
bring about that change and that the nature of social, cultural 
and economic phenomena is a dependent upon political action. 
Taking this view, a political system is not analogic but existen-
tial. That is, human consciousness attempts to construct 
institutions in order to achieve valued ends. A political system 
in this scheme of things is the only "existential" system amongst 
the other "social" systems. 
It is the abstract nature of systems analysis, both in 
political science and organization theory, that has caused me 
difficulty in understanding. Fred Riggs, in a series of articles 
16 Spiro, Herbert J. "An Evaluation of Systems Theor^ ', in 
Charlesworth (ed.), op.cit., p.170. 
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17 1968-1970, turns the sociological model upside down and his 
notion of a system is useful for a theory of public service. For 
Riggs, a "system" is not an analytical category, but refers to a 
l8 
concrete structure of action made up of component structures, 
and the terms politics and administration describe functions, 
that is, system relevant consequences of the interaction between 
structures. He argues that the debate about these terms and 
their "separation" lies in the failure of those who use them to 
decide whether they are speaking analytically about functions or 
concretely about structures and it is this distinction which his 
classification scheme endeavours to clarify. 
Riggs warns against sociological reductionism based on 
the premise that there are functional requisites of any political 
system because this may lead to the enumeration of types of action 
as though they are functions, and then the identification of 
concrete structures with these functions. What the analyst does 
is to devise a list of structural components defined in terms of 
their assumed functions. In doing this we are concealing a basic 
hypothesis which asserts that -
17 Riggs, Fred W. "Professionalism, Political Science and the 
Scope of Public Administration" in Charlesworth, James C.(ed.). 
Theory and Practice of Public Administration, Scope, Objec-
tives and Methods, Philadelphia : The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 1968, pp.32-62. "The Struct-
ures of Government and Administrative Reform", in Braibanti, 
Ralph (ed.). Political and Administrative Development, Durham 
N.C. : Duke University Press, 1969, pp.220-324. "Bureau-
cratic Politics in Comparative Perspective", in Riggs, Fred 
W. (ed.). Frontiers of Development Administration, Durham 
N.C. : Duke University Press, 1970, pp.375-414. 
18 Riggs (1969), op.cit., p.225 and for clarification, see Holt, 
in Riggs (1970), n,4, p.306. 
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"... empirically speaking, the exclusive function performed 
by bureaucrats is administrative, and offices which serve 
political functions are then excluded from the concept of 
bureaucracy... (But) everyone knows that bureaucrats do in 
fact exercise political functions ... (and) it is often said 
that in so doing bureaucrats abuse their power. Administrative 
reformers often urge that public officials be confined to 
tasks which have only administrative consequences for the 
polity."^^ 
Nov; clearly I can call the work which public officials carry out 
administration and include the political functions therein, but 
this leads only to confusion as I have been stressing throughout 
this paper. If I can classify and describe the structures engaged 
in government and the ways that the actions of these structures 
affect each other and the government seen as a whole system, I 
will be in good shape to propose explanatory hypotheses and per-
form more effectively as a practitioner. 
Riggs also stresses that behaviouralism and quantitative 
methods of research, whilst very useful tools, are sometimes based 
on the belief that the governmental system is "nothing but" the 
sum of its components. We discern in the system sets of structures 
(courts, public services, legislatures) and study them separately. 
Further, we divide these components into sub-components (depart-
ments, branches) and then into further sub-components until we 
make the "fatal jump : we equate the role with its incumbent and 
assume that if we can learn about officeholders, we will understand 
the offices they fill". Both sociology and psychology have 
contributions to make to the study of government but (whilst Riggs 
19 Riggs (1970), p.79. 
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does not say this) their findings become the tools of political 
action and system design. Thus the analysis should begin at the 
20 level of the whole system. What is sought is a way of discerning 
the basic pattern of governments as a whole (in an attempt to see 
the forest rather than the trees) - what are the major component 
structures and how do they fit (i.e. function) together? 
The oldest and most easily recognizable component structure 
is the king, ruler, headman, monarchy or head of state. This struc-
ture, whilst present in all modern forms of government, is not a 
distinctive feature of modernity. Riggs names this structure the 
"executive". The traditional and modern feature of the office of an 
executive is the activity of asserting authority over the polity as 
a whole. For example, in Queensland the Governor (as the Queen's 
representative and advised by his Executive Council) is formally 
the Executive head of government in this state, with formal 
authority over other components in the system. But the structure 
of the office of the executive defined in this way does not allow 
us in any way to say that the executive effectively exercises power 
in the polity. The function of the executive, that is the conse-
quence for the system of the relationship between this office and 
other components, varies within wide extremes (compare parliamentary 
forms of government with presidential). What characterizes modern 
20 This was also suggested by Spiro, op.cit., p.l67, who pointed 
out that early Greek political and natural philosophers saw 
the polis as the most ii^ portant entity from which they pro-
jected notions of the individual and of nature. "The 
political system is still (or again) the archetype, even 
when scholars explicitly assert the opposite." 
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21 
Western forms of government is that the executive is either 
elected and subjected to re-election and replacement, or, if a 
constitutional monarch he appoints the Prime Minister from the 
elected body. 
Accountability of the executive is determined by the 
nature of the structure which functions to control this office. 
Riggs names this structure the "constitutive" system and the 
institutional device which makes this system possible is a method 
of voting and consensus on the legitimacy of the outcome. This 
is a relatively modern phenomenon. Procedures for holding 
elections, for constituting a body of voters, rules for voting, 
for nominating candidates and mobilizing majorities (political 
parties) and for constituting a "college of offices" filled in 
these ways constitutes the second major component of the govern-
ment system. It is defined structurally. That is, these patterns 
of actions are either present or they are not. Once again the 
function of this structural component for the system cannot be 
asserted merely by its presence. As with the executive office 
the degree of power of the elected assembly varies within wide 
limits. 
Almost as old as the executive or head of state, is a 
hierarchy of offices subject to the authority of the executive. 
Subordination of offices and their derivation of authority from 
21 Riggs's classifications cover all forms of government. I am 
concerned with Anglo-American features. 
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the authority of superiors characterize this component of 
government which Riggs names "bureaucracy". Such a structure 
includes all offices up to but not including the executive office, 
that is, it includes offices filled by cabinet ministers, the 
military, career and non-career appointees. (The offices of the 
public service in Queensland would then be part of the bureaucracy^ 
Once again the relationship of the bureaucracy to the executive 
and the constitutive system, that is its function, cannot be 
determined by a structural definition. What this definition 
denotes is a concrete set of offices hierarchically arranged. In 
no way does it tell us the relative power of the bureaucracy in 
the polity. Riggs suggests a fourth major component (or at least, 
potentially so) but does not include it in his analysis as it 
22 
would ''.unnecessarily complicate our task". This is what he 
calls "freeholds" or life tenure offices which are not subject to 
election, nor to hierarchical removal (judges, academic positions). 
This is not discussed further here. 
Riggs's definition seems to add to the conceptual 
ambiguity which surrounds the notion of bureaucracy, particularly 
23 in view of Weber's formulation. He is certainly aware of this 
but stresses the possibilities in using his model. At the level 
of government considered as a whole system, a certain clarity 
appears if his definitions are accepted. 
22 Riggs (1970), p.390, n.ll. 
23 For various meanings of the term "bureaucracy", see Albrow, 
Martin. Bureaucracy, London : Macmillan, 1970. 
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The political-administrative system (that is the govern-
mental system) can thus be described structurally as consisting of 
three primary components. 
(a) Executive - an office which asserts authority over a polity. 
(b) Bureaucracy - a hierarchy of offices subject to the author-
ity of an executive (including the public service). 
(c) Constitutive System - an elected assembly, electoral system, 
one or more parties. 
The constitutive system is based on a "polyarchic" 
principle of organization in which "a few do (administratively) 
what many (politically) decide". Authority flows up from the 
people by means of the vote. The bureaucracy functions on a 
different principle of organization where "the many do (adminis-
24 
tratively) what the few (politically) decide". The executive 
25 is a kind of "joint or fulcrum" which holds the other structures 
together in a sort of balance - the office is accountable to the 
constitutive system but asserts authority over the bureaucracy. 
In general terms the paradigm which most Australians adhere to can 
be expressed -
Executive = Governor (Governor-General) = formal authority. 
Constitutive System = Parliament, Parties, Electors = political 
function = prescribing norms = policy determination. 
Bureaucracy = Public Service (may be Military and other offices) 
=• administrative function = accepting norms set by constitutive 
system = policy implementation. 
The Functions of Bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracy is a structure and therefore it is not a 
variable. We cannot talk about being raoie or less bureaucratic in 
24 J?iggs (1968), pp.47-48. 25 Riggs (1969), p.248. 
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structural terms. A set of offices is either present or it is 
not. If we have two structural components of government (bureau-
cracy/executive, bureaucratic offices) and they are related in 
such a way that one component (A) prescribes norms which are 
accepted as authoritative premises for action, by the other (B), 
then (A) performs a political function for (B) and (B) an admin-
istrative function for (A). The actions of both (A) and (B) are 
structurally defined but their inter-relationship is analytically 
broken up into political and administration functions. 
To do this we must separate the consequences of action 
(the function) from the statement of intent and the actual 
behaviour (the structure). Authority characterizes structure. 
It is an assertion of intention, a formal statement that something 
is to be done. But as we all know, to issue such a statement does 
not necessarily mean that the intention or purpose will be achieved, 
The offices which assert formal authority may not have effective 
control in relation to other offices. Politics and administration 
are chosen here as important functional relationships in the study 
of public service. Othersmay be analytically defined. For 
example, the Department of the Public Service Board in Queensland 
is structurally defined as a set of offices charged with the 
economic and efficient administration of the State Public Service. 
That is, the structure is defined by concrete offices and formal 
declaration of intent. It is designed that way. Intended actions 
have intended consequences and taken together define the structure. 
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Empirically the consequences of action may accord with the 
intention, or they may not. The actual consequences of the Board's 
relationship with a specific department are defined as its function 
vis-a-vis that department. These consequences may be administrative 
(the Board merely complies with norms set by department's personnel 
demands), political (the Board actively prescribes norms which are 
in fact accepted as authoritative premises for action by depart-
ments, setting standards and enforcing them), ceremonial (the Board 
is merely a visible form which functions to satisfy an accepted 
need for such a structure), facilitating (the Board neither 
prescribes for nor accepts norms set by other departments but 
merely facilitates communication between departments) or whatever. 
Administration, politics, ceremony and facilitation are functions 
of the interactions between departments. Structure should not be 
confused with function - intended action with actual consequences. 
If the above is accepted as a way of defining the 
government system, I can now make the following assertions. With-
out politics there is no administration - without administration 
there can be no politics. No action in itself can be characterized 
as either political or administrative because actions are defined 
as structures. What is administrative or political is the conse-
quence of that action for other components in the system and there-
fore for the system itself. Politics and administration are there-
fore relational concepts. One cannot talk of administration as an 
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activity in this sense. It may only be said that this pattern of 
activity (structure) is performing an administrative function in 
relation to another pattern of activity (structure). In this 
scheme the office of a public servant is an adraindstrative or 
political office only in relationship to another office in the 
system. This is not mere playing with words but goes to the crux 
of how the public servant can perceive his role. 
The mistake that is made by commentators and practition-
ers is to equate the bureaucracy, the structure, of which the 
career public service is a part, with the notion of administration 
which is one function of the bureaucracy's relationship with other 
components. The problem of understanding arises, for example, 
when the structural term referring to the set or sub-set of 
offices, "the" bureaucracy and the functional term in one of its 
variations are used interchangeably (bureaucrat = good = rational 
legal decision maker; or, at the other pole, bureaucrat = bad = 
inefficient official). Riggs distinguishes three functions of the 
bureaucracy for the other major components of the governmental 
system. 
(a) Bureau-rationality. This generally is in line with Weber's 
idea of a legal-rational framework of authority. Unlike 
V/eber's model this does not refer to the structures but the 
functions of legality and rationality and the efficient and 
effective achievement of system goals. 
(b) Bureau-pathology. This is the familiar neologism for the 
malfunctioning of the organization - a system of malaise, 
inefficiency, red-tape, etc. 
(c) Bureaucratism. The rule by bureaux - the relationship of 
power of the bureaucracy over the other component of 
government. 
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The concepts, bureaucracy, bureau-rationality, bureau-pathology 
and bureaucratism, have distinguishable meanings which are well 
known but rarely brought together in this way. They refer to 
consequences for the political system and therefore are names of 
bureaucratic functions. Politics and administration can be 
understood in the same way. But the structure (= bureaucracy) 
can not be identified by these functions. Riggs postulates that 
the political and administrative interaction between two structures 
will depend on four variables. 
(1) Political potency - the degree to which the prescriptions 
of one structure are enforced or are enforceable on another. 
(2) Political responsiveness - the degree to which one structure 
accepts or internalizes the norms set by another structure 
as premises for action. 
(3) Administrative capability - the degree to which a structure 
is capable (men, methods, materials, etc.) of implementing 
another's norms. 
(4) Administrative sensitivity - the degree to which one struc-
ture is aware of the consequence and effect of prescribing 
norms and the degree to which these norms are modified 
accordingly. 
The analysis can be repeated for any level, that is, any 
sub-structure (department, branch, etc.) can be regarded as a 
whole system and the political and administrative functions for 
that system can be described. ViThat this scheme allows us to do 
is to order our experience of sub-structures within the bureau-
cracy and establish which office relates to which office in 
political or administrative terms as defined. Both functions are 
present at each level. This approach is very similar to Appleby's 
conclusions as to the levels of "policy" and "administration" (see 
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page 129 above) but is more precise and capable of empirical 
formulation. A major objection may be made against the definition 
of politics as a function whereby one structure prescribes norms 
for another which are accepted as authoritative premises for 
action at the sub-system level. For a theory of public service 
this way of using the term should be seen to be useful and it is 
to this question I will now turn. 
In the Australian situation, to call something "politics" 
is to downgrade it because other values, e.g. commerce, science, 
religion, have higher subjective ranking. The transition in Public 
Administration literature from the usage "politics-administration" 
to "policy-administration" is a symptom of this attitude. In some 
way policy is a more rational, scientific and "objective" concept, 
whilst politics is equated with personal aggrandizement, ideologies 
and "subjective" values. But concepts are concepts and not things 
and people continue to do what they have always done in a situation 
of scarcity and in any known society there are relationships of 
26 power which are maintained by custom or law. The study of these 
relationships varies from time to time and produces various meta-
phors, paradigms and models to assist our understanding. When 
ossified into dogma such models become artifacts which are used 
to conceptually reconstruct the phenomenal world and therefore 
close off alternative (and perhaps more useful) ways of seeing. 
The real world is forced into the shape of theoretical constructs 
26 Balandier, Georges. Political Anthropology, Harmondsworth : 
Penguin Books, 1972, p.35-
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with consequent dialectical acrobatics. The difficulties of 
scope, objectives and methods in the study of politics are well 
27 
known, and compound the problems in studying public administra-
tion because one cannot realistically be studied apart from the 
other. 
Given that the academic field of politics is in a sense 
defined by the way the study of politics is conducted, then 
politics is what students of politics agree that it is. The 
"political" therefore shifts from time to time in its application 
to the real world. The activities of people in the real world 
are only in a limited and unconfirmed sense dependent on the work 
of scholars. This is evident in the varied impact Public Adminis-
tration theory has on practitioners. But there is some connection, 
and this is probably dependent on the meaning the theory has for 
the individual person, and the use to which he wishes to put the 
27 For example, see - Charlesworth, James Charles (ed.). A Design 
for Political Science : Scope, Objectives and Methods, 
Philadelphia : American Academy of Political & Social Science, 
1966. 
Charlesworth, James C. (ed.). Contemporary Political Analysis, 
New York : The Free Press, I967. 
Dahl, Robert A, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs 
N.J. : Prentice Hall Inc., I963. 
Eulau, Heinz. Behaviouralism in Political Science, New York : 
Atherton Press, I969. 
Landau, Martin. Political Theory and Political Science, New 
York : The Macmillan Company, 1972. 
Mackenzie, W.J.M. Politics and Social Science, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, I967. 
Runciman, W,G. Social Science and Political Theory, Cambridge : 
University Press, I969. 
Van Dyke, Vernon. Political Science, A Philosophical Analysis, 
Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, I96O. 
Young, Roland (ed.). Approaches to the Study of Politics, 
Evanston, Illinois : Northwestern University Press, 1958. 
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theory. The study of what we call politics provides not only 
knowledge of what is the case (that is, it attempts description 
and explanation of social phenomena), but in so doing provides 
the tools for social change and the prescription of fresh norms 
(that is political action). Thus a theoretical scheme not only 
gives us insight and understanding but helps us to engineer 
change. 
A political relationship involves to a significant 
?8 
extent, power, rule or authority and is "concerned largely with 
specific living individuals, and in particular with powerful men 
involved in contests about big decisions affecting large numbers 
29 
of people". Dahl would call political the workings of any 
human association where such characteristics are present. Wolin 
on the other hand identifies the political with what is general 
to society and stresses that the idea of treating business cor-
porations (for example) as political entities confuses the meaning 
which has traditionally been given to political responsibility 
which connotes "a form of responsibility owed to a general constit-
uency and which has been a problem because society contains a 
multiplicity of groups... What makes responsibility political is 
its general quality deriving from what is common to its constit-
uents",-^^ I agree with Raphael"^  that the usage of the term in 
28 Dahl, op.cit., p.6. 29 Mackenzie, op.cit., p.l4. 
30 '^ Volin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation 
in Western Political Thought, Boston : Little, Brown and 
Company, I960, pp.432-433. 
31 Raphael, D.D. Problems of Political Philosophy, London : 
Macmillan, 1970, p.30. 
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such phrases as "university politics" and "organizational 
politics" is parasitic on the larger usage in connection v;ith 
the affairs of the polity. "Because political affairs include 
the seeking of power and the exercise of influence the intro-
duction of these features into other features of life is called 
political." Confusion is avoided if we are clear in which way 
we intend the meaning, that is political relationships involving 
power over organizations and political relationships involving 
"52 power over the social whole of which the organization is a part. 
The interesting thing here is that only within public 
administration is there a formal identity between these tv;o 
usages. Power exercised within public organizations (or organ-
izations performing publicly legitimated tasks) i s , in the end, 
power over the affairs of the social whole. This is the distin-
guishing characteristic of "public" administration. As students 
of public administration, we find that logically and empirically 
the control of public organizations is the central focus. Seen 
in this way the politics of public organizations are the politics 
of the state, that i s , conflicts over power within organizations 
publicly legitimated to run some part of the state's affairs is 
power in the political sense. 
Obviously there are many structural similarities in all 
organizations, public or private. For example, Morstein Marx has 
32 Parallels in the study of both levels have been noted in 
Kaufman, Herbert. "Organization Theory and Political Theory", 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, March 
1964, No. 1, pp.5-15. 
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indicated that there is much in common between the management of 
33 private and public organizations. Parker and Subramaniam have 
given us what seems to be regarded as the classic statement on 
34 
"public" and "private" administration. 
"... public administration can be demarcated as the study 
primarily of those organizations in a society which have 
been differentiated from other sub-systems so as to 
specialize in integrative and resource allocating functions 
for the whole society, and secondarily for organizations 
with productive or service functions which are directly 
sponsored by and integrated with Governmental organizations."™-
Thus the public administrator "by the very nature of 
Government's integrating function, must look at all the organiz-
ations in society and integrate different interests into something 
36 like a general interest". Parker's statement is normative, a 
recommendation that public administrators in a democracy should 
look to the general interest. But why must a bureaucrat do this? 
Is he to be called something else if he does not integrate different 
interests? If so, what? How are we to decide if he has done this? 
What is integration? According to what criteria? Who benefits? 
Who loses? In asserting that the politics-administration dichotomy 
has been "intellectually discredited" and that it should be replaced 
with the more "sophisticated" basis for comparing public and private 
33 Morstein Marx, Fritz. "Intersections Between Management Thinking 
and Political Thinking", Management International Review, 
Vol.7, Nos.4/5, 1967, pp.117-124. 
34 Parker, R.S. and Subramaniam, V. "'Public' and 'Private' 
Administration", International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, No. 30 : 1964, pp.355-366. 
35 Ibid, p.364. 
36 Ibid, p.365. 
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organizations, Parker and Subramaniam have substituted a socio-
logical functional requisite (= integration) for the political 
framework rejected. Whether any organization is, in fact, 
integrative for the whole society describes the function of that 
organization for that society. And there are alternative values 
involved in any action problem of the "integrative and resource 
allocating" kind. How these problems are resolved in any society 
defines its politics and its administration. The action may be 
intendedly integrative or it may not. By suggesting that only the 
actions of those organizations (= structures) which are integrative 
(= functional) for the whole society come under the heading of 
public administration reflects the liberal democratic paradigm. 
And even here someone does the allocating "for society as a whole", 
perhaps according to some principle, but certainly with winners 
and losers - the "for" defining how this is done. 
By association, "politics" in the secondary usage would 
denote the actions of men when they control or influence the 
integrative or allocative functions for a single organization. 
Let us call these Pi and P2. It would be possible for P2 to 
operate without going over into Pi but Pi always involves P2 even 
though Pi action may range from bloody revolution, parliamentary 
debate to group pressure. This is so because formal organizations 
are necessary to implement any decision determined by Pi, 
Ideologically, the Australian political-administrative system is 
expected to provide Pi through the constitutive system, that is, 
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through the Parliament and the Cabinet as the committee of the 
majority party(s). For example, a description of the structure 
of Ministerial control is that the Minister will prescribe norms 
for the permanent head (the intended action), who will accept 
them as authoritative premises for action (the intended conse-
quences). This, at a different level, is grounded in the 
assumption that the constitutive system ought to prescribe norms 
for the bureaucracy and to do this Ministers are appointed to the 
bureaucracy at the level immediately below the executive, to 
ensure that these norms are accepted and implemented. The Minister 
performs a political function for his permanent head, who in turn, 
performs an administrative function for his Minister. This is the 
normative paradigm which defines the permanent head as an 
administrator. 
The above discussion has centred around the role of the 
senior official but the politics-administration analysis can be 
used at any system level with good results for our understanding. 
The hierarchical principle of organization which characterizes the 
bureaucracy (the P2 level) implies that derivation of authority 
from above to subordinate offices always in fact involves discret-
37 
ion. Human regulative behaviour cannot be reduced to goal seeking. 
What the constitutive system prescribes as norms for the bureau-
cracy is not a determined set of measured goals (or at best only 
incidentally) but a set of standards by which the consequence of 
37 See Vickers, Geoffrey. Value Systems and Social Process, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, I968, p.128. 
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bureaucratic behaviour for the governmental system as a whole are 
to be evaluated. It is a commonplace that the more complex govern-
ment becomes, the greater is the need to define these standards 
generally in legislation and allow the instrumental decisions, that 
is, the defining of goals, to be taken by the bureaucracy. At the 
sub-system (e.g. department) level the same process is followed. 
And so on down the hierarchy (sub-department, branch, etc.) until 
the lowest systems level where bureaucratic standards of behaviour 
and definable goals are identical. Following Vickers's practice, we 
can define policy making as "the regulation of relations" and norms 
as "the standards by which these relations are to be judged". If 
norms prescribed by the constitutive system are accepted as author-
itative premises for action by the bureaucracy (responsiveness) 
whose structure is capable of implementing these norms (capability) 
we can say that the power to determine the standards by which "the 
integrative and resource allocating function for the whole society" 
are to be judged (Pi) resides in the constitutive system which 
therefore provides a political function for the bureaucracy which 
in turn provides an administrative function for the whole system. 
And by the assumption of capability the hierarchy of political-
administration functions would then spread down through the bureau-
cracy. This is an ideal type and is similar to, but not the same 
as, Weber's idea of bureaucracy which was essentially a rational-
legal structure, a formulation which causes difficulty because the 
structure may not function rationally or legally. 
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In the suggested model, standards of performance (norms) 
rather than specific goals are prescribed. Politics and adminis-
tration are analytically distinct at any level. Only at the top, 
and at the bottom could offices be exclusively political or admin-
istrative. The political function (characterized by the degree of 
authority and sensitivity) and the administrative function (char-
acterized by the degree of capability and responsiveness) can be 
located in descending order of comprehensiveness. 
The usefulness of this focus is that the intended actions 
of an office (the structure) at any level are determined by that 
level's administrative relationship to the next higher level and 
thus directly to the Pi level where the constitutive and bureau-
cratic structures meet. The system is designed that way. The 
actual political functions at any level may or may not comply with 
the design. The ability to prescribe authoritative norms does not 
necessarily recognize hierarchy. But the bureaucratic structure 
(= the intended actions with intended consequences) is designed to 
carry out an administrative function for the system. Hence the 
muddle about politics and administration when the actual conse-
quences (the function) is identified by name with the intended 
action (the structure). But in all of this the P1-P2 nexus is the 
Minister and the actual exercise of power at whatever level (its 
function) must find political legitimation at the level of the 
whole system, which in the Westminster system is embodied in 
Ministerial responsibility. 
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At this most general level the standard for the setting 
of standards is the constitution which gives legitimacy to the 
whole thing, and relates public service to the polity. Public 
servants can internalize, and accept as authoritative, premises 
for action with which they disagree because constitutional 
procedures legitimate these premises. A public servant may dis-
agree with a policy-directive but follow it enthusiastically 
because this higher standard has been respected. If the public 
servant feels (rightly or wrongly) that the process of decision 
making does not conform to a legitimate standard his obligation 
is confused. Thus we can hypothesize the greater the legitimacy 
of a policy norm the greater will be the office holder's respon-
siveness (if he accepts the constitutional standard), and this 
with the degree of capability, will enhance effective implementation 
of standards. If this is valid then the professional training of 
public servants should stress the study of the political values 
which manifestly legitimate the policy making process. This is 
not the case. 
Structurally there should also be available formal 
machinery to allow public servants to speak out, not against 
policies per se, but against non-legitimacy in terms of known 
constitutional standards. In this way the bureaucracy's role 
vis-a-vis the constitutive system at the level of government as 
a whole, and also the public servant's role at the level of sub-
structures, can be put into a more symmetrical relationship. 
i8o 
Rights and obligations would both be respected. And this principle 
would consistently apply at all levels of public organizations. 
Only in a limited sense has bureaucracy been discussed 
in this way. More often than not it is the bureaucracy's role in 
policy-making at the highest level, the alleged intrusion into 
politics, which has been analysed. I am arguing that the form 
(= rules, procedures, expectations) are at least as important as 
the cohtent of public service. I am not arguing against the value 
of ministerial responsibility but asserting that this value would 
be enhanced if we recognize structurally that the senior official 
cannot be politically neutral. Three alternatives exhaust the 
possibilities. He is partisan and therefore political, he is 
non-partisan, expert, influences policies and therefore political, 
he is non-partisan and expert, but is concerned with implementing 
the standards set by others and therefore administrative, but not 
neutral because he accepts the standards as being legitimately 
made. The last named is how public servants are encouraged to 
understand their role. But, and this is the crux, this alterna-
tive ca.n be sustained only if the system provides for responsib-
ility in government. And what this means for the training of 
public servants who are to fill top positions is an understanding 
of the political values of the system as a whole and a formal 
avenue for the official to act as a countervailing power to 
partisan politics where these values are or appear to be under 
threat. 
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Because they are two aspects of the one relationship, 
politics and administration cannot be separated. An office may 
perform almost entirely in an administrative sense, that is, 
accept fully norms prescribed. But by doing so the political side 
of the relationship is also accepted because the two sides cannot 
be separated. They define the relationship. The offices of the 
public service are structured to perform administrative functions 
for the system, that is, to accept norms prescribed by partisan 
officials as premises for action. Using the above structural-
functional framework it should be clear that the acceptance of the 
norms also entails the acceptance of the procedural values embodied 
in the political side of the relationship (= constitutional values). 
If this is accepted then to talk about public service as 
a profession requires professional standards of self-management 
and accountability, which, by virtue of the nature of the work, are 
political standards. 
The self-management of the public service in terms of 
the merit system and personnel controls have dissipated all but 
a few fears of patronage and party interference. These safeguards 
are taken for granted and keenly defended. But something further 
is necessary. In the contemporary world those who make decisions 
on behalf of the polity are faced with multi-valued alternatives. 
How the decisions are made, the process itself, is becoming 
increasingly important in maintaining the whole-system, non-partisan 
values. All should know what all are doing. The self-management 
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principle should be extended to ensure that public officials are 
formally required to protect these values in the same way as they 
are on the personnel side. I am not suggesting that public 
servants be given more power. I am re-stating what the editor of 
Public Administration (London) and Fulton called "professionalism 
and self accountability" (see page 95 above) and recommending the 
development of known rules and standards for this purpose. The 
alternatives appear to be self-aggrandisement and either cynicism 
or apathy, all which may threaten a service with claims to serve 
the polity. 
At least three possibilities for change are available 
should anyone care to pursue them. Firstly, the creation of a 
38 Head of the Public Service to which the whole non-elected 
bureaucracy would be accountable would provide a sense of separate-
ness from the elected official and someone to whom the Departmental 
Head could turn where his Minister may not be playing the game and 
to which the Minister may turn where his Head is incompetent, or 
unacceptable for other reasons. This position would tend to unify 
38 Of course the Westminster model has a head of the civil 
service. Previously this office, designated Head of the 
Home Civil Service, was filled by one of two Permanent 
Secretaries of the Treasury. Since Fulton, this role 
is filled by the Permanent Secretary of the Civil 
Service Department and Head of the Home Civil Service. 
Also see Nicolson, I.F. Administrative Reform : Minding 
the Machinery, paper delivered at the seventeenth annual 
conference of the Australasian Political Studies Assoc-
iation, Canberra, July 1975, which argues strongly for a 
similar structure in Australia. 
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the service and provide a point of accountability both to the 
public and the parliament. Ministerial responsibility may appear 
to be diminished in a hierarchical sense but complex bureaucracies 
with various functional networks (finance, personnel, works, policy 
co-ordination) are becoming commonplace. What the Head of the 
Service would do is to provide a professional head of the service 
as a whole - to speak on behalf of it - to explain its role - to 
argue for its independence where appropriate. In this way the 
independent non-partisan role of public servants subject to such 
headship would be extremely enhanced. By enlarging and making 
visible the public service in this way, both official and minis-
terial responsibility would be made more explicit. This office 
would be responsible to parliament (as is the Auditor-General), 
or alternatively, the Governor's office would be extended and 
given these responsibilities. A third and ready made alternative 
would be to make the Chairman of the Public Service Board Head of 
the Public Service and the two Commissioners clearly subordinate 
to him in this regard. 
The responses given by Queensland Permanent Heads 
indicate a departmentalism and a kind of non-organization within 
the "natural whole" of government. Promotion and personnel 
management practices reinforce this by dividing the "career 
service" into departmental careers. For exsunple, nine of the 
twenty-six Permanent Heads have served in only one Department. 
And, because little real effort is made, the specifically 
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administrative function is not co-ordinated. Permanent Heads 
are separated from each other in "departments" under Ministers 
and, as many Heads pointed out, little is known of what their 
colleagues are doing. And, what is more to the point, some of 
the Heads were not very interested. The Department not the 
Service is the centre of interest. The responsibility for the 
running of the Public Service as a whole is thus divided into 
twenty-six parts and because so many are responsible, no-one is 
responsible. If the Public Service is to be regarded as a 
unified career service with objectives common to all its parts, 
efficient, effective, accountable and non-partisan, a unifying 
centre should also be all of these things. 
There are two sides to this proposal, (l) the co-
ordination and control of recruitment, establishments, training, 
discipline and rules of conduct and (2) the protection of Public 
Service administration from the intrusion of party-political 
interests. That is, the Head of the Public Service would be 
concerned with the functions of the bureaucracy as a whole, with 
making it responsible as a whole to the constitutive system (as 
well as ensuring accountability at the sub-system level of 
individual offices), and with separating the work of the two so 
that all will know what all are doing. This office would not be 
concerned with the content of Departmental policy which is the 
responsibility of Ministers and for which they should be account-
able in another direction. What he would be concerned with is 
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that Public Service participation in policy making is open and 
according to known rules. 
The second suggestion follov/s from this point and like 
the first is not at all novel. This is the formation of bi-partisan 
parliamentary committees before which officials could be called to 
discuss the "expert" content in policies. This was advocated by 
some Queensland Heads as a way of making explicit the neutral 
professionalism of the public servant. Once again. Ministerial 
responsibility to the Parliament and official anonymity is put 
forward by some as a reason why this cannot be achieved. But this 
argument is fallacious and is built on a confusion of structure 
and function. A committee system would in fact make Ministers 
visibly responsible for their policy choice. 
In any case, talk about the responsibility of Ministers 
and official anonymity is largely justificatory rhetoric and does 
not always accord with the facts. This can be illustrated in 
several ways. 
(1) A Minister speaks for his public servants to the Parliament 
and ^  his public servants for the Parliament, but no longer 
is the Minister punished through loss of office for the 
misdeeds of his public servants.39 Ministerial responsibil-
ity is not accountability in this sense. The Cabinet and 
collective responsibility have for all useful purposes 
replaced individual accountability of ministers. 
(2) The operation of the Ombudsman (e.g. Queensland Parliament-
ary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations) seriously 
challenges the notion that the public servant is an extension 
of the Minister (see Part II above). In Queensland the 
39 Cf. Parris, Henry. Constitutional Bureaucracy, London : George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., I969, p.299. 
186 
public servant's "administrative actions" including "the 
formulation of a proposal or intention" and "the making of 
a recommendation (including a recommendation to a Minister)" 
are subject to questioning by the Parliamentary Commissioner 
and his direction to rectify. The Minister is not account-
able in this situation. 
(3) The Australian Senate has called public servants before it 
to answer questions on the work of departments thus destroy-
ing anonymity. And the federal permanent heads are far from 
anonymous and their names are well known to the media 
together with fair knowledge of their policy positions. 
This appears to be an accepted trend. Movement from senior 
positions to the Canberra lobby are commonplace. 
(4) Queensland departments have close liason with client groups 
and the names and policy orientations of officials are well 
known to these groups. Anonymity in Queensland is present 
only insofar as the general public is concerned. Specific 
publics know who has views about what policy. 
Official anonymity is a desired value in direct relation-
ship to the effectiveness of Ministerial responsibility. The more 
effective the communication of decision premises to the parliament 
by the Minister, the less the need for breaking down the "doctrine 
of anonymity". However the office of the Minister, in a complex 
situation, cannot provide the parliament with the expertise and 
action premises required to carry out its intended function. The 
limitations on Ministerial time, complexity of business, sheer 
size of the policy making process makes this impossible. Officials 
can be made directly responsible to the clientele group - a 
solution more in line with the American system. Alternatively, the 
parliament (that is all parties) can be provided with the neutral 
professional expertise of the bureaucracy. This could be done 
through the suggested committees (albeit expensive and time con-
suming), with the specific aim of specifying both ministerial and 
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public service accountability for both political and administrative 
actions. It is not possible for parliament to judge policy 
decisions (if that is what our polity values) unless all the 
premises on which the policy was decided are known. 
Thirdly, structures within the bureaucracy could be 
designed in such a way that functional specialization (politics-
administration) could be made explicit. This would aim for 
explicit responsibility within the service itself. For example, 
policy making units and policy implementation units would be 
separated. Fulton recognized the need but because this involved 
"parliamentary and constitutional issues" and "related questions 
of machinery of government" which were beyond their terms of 
reference, the matter was not developed other than by recommending 
that action be taken -
"(a) to distinguish those within departments whose primary 
responsibility is planning for the future from those 
whose main concern is the operation of existing policies 
or provision of services; 
(b) to establish in departments forms of organization and 
principles of accountable management, by which individuals 
and branches can be held responsible for objectively 
measured performance." 
Planning Units under a Senior Policy Adviser with direct access 
to the Minister were recommended as a step in this direction. The 
role of the Permanent Head was left ambiguous in Fulton's scheme. 
He was to retain overall responsibility under the Minister (subject 
to the Senior Policy Adviser's role in planning) for all the 
40 Fulton, Cmnd. 3638, Ch.5. 
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affairs of the department. But the Head was not to continue as 
policy adviser in the present sense. There is a built-in 
mechanism for conflict in this arrangement because the machinery 
of government questions were not faced explicitly. Policy formu-
lation and departmental management functions are specified but the 
political implications of structural differentiation limited the 
analysis (although "hiving off" based on Swedish boards and 
American regulatory commissions was discussed). This is a good 
example to show that v/hilst administrative functions can be 
separated analytically and offices structurally designed to achieve 
these functions the relationship between such structures cannot be 
ignored. We are only fiddling with the system v/hen we try to deal 
only with administrative arrangements and ignore political relation-
ships. 
The Queensland Permanent Heads generally insist that they 
and only they should advise the Minister departmentally on policy 
as well as manage the department. The model of a small central 
department under a Permanent Head, concerned with policy over-
sight but with the substantive management functions left to the 
sub-departments was recently tried in Queensland. But the Head 
appointed could not work in this way - nor would his Minister 
accept that the Head was there primarily as a policy adviser with 
responsibility for administration (= management) at the level of 
sub-departmental head. The experiment failed probably because 
such matters cannot be dealt with in isol-tion, but as a part of 
189 
an administrative philosophy which applies to the whole service. 
Related to the notion of functional specialization within the 
Public Service at the level of policy is the preparation of 
"Green Papers" and "Consultative Documents". These are coming 
4l into use in British Government, and were suggested by some 
Queensland Heads as a way of opening up the technical component 
in policy for debate. One Head in particular stated that he had 
strongly recommended the use of Green Papers to his Minister but 
to no avail. He argued that if these forms of public policy 
making were utilized the non-partisan technical component in the 
policies would be made known to all concerned. Taken together 
with the use of bi-partisan parliamentary committees, the use of 
these consultative devices would help to make the functions of the 
bureaucracy, both political and administrative, more accountable. 
In all of this the structures should not be confused 
with the way they function for the whole system. I have been 
concerned with the political and administrative functions of the 
bureaucracy because these have been at the centre of both the study 
and practice of public service. At the interface between public 
service non-partisan technocratic professionalism and the legiti-
mate demands of partisan officials, tension occurs because 
functions are confused with structures. It really makes little 
4l For an excellent description of these documents, see Silkin, 
Arthur. "Green Papers and Changing Methods of Consultation 
in British Government", Public Administration (London), 
Vol.51, Winter 1973, pp.427-448. 
190 
difference whether elected officials administer or appointed 
officials make policy provided all of this is done according to 
known rules and conventions and expectations of being called to 
account for actions taken. It is a convenience for large scale 
complex government systems to separate these specialized functions 
in differentiated structures, more or less, but it is not 
inevitable. The problem for the student is to find out who does 
what within the system as a whole v/ith the objective of designing 
structures to ensure that politics and administration are account-
able wherever the functions are performed. This is still the aim 
of Public Administration as it was of both British and American 
writers. 
"It should be apparent to all the world who did everything, 
and through whose default anything was left undone. 
Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is 
responsible.".p 
"All sovereigns are suspicious of their servants, and the 
sovereign people is no exception to the rule; but how is its 
suspicion to be allayed by knowledge? If that suspicion 
could but be clarified into wise vigilance, it would be 
altogether salutary; if that vigilance could be aided by 
the unmistakable placing of responsibility, it would be 
altogether beneficient. Suspicion in itself is never 
healthful either in the private or in the public mind."^. 
42 Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on 
Representative Government, London : J.M. Dent and Sons 
Ltd., 1910, p.332. 
43 Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration', m Woll, 
Peter (>:>r^.'). Public Administration and Policy, New York : 
Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p.32. 
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Responsibility and the Individual. 
Up to this point I have been concerned with government 
as a whole system and with understanding political and administra-
tive functions in the system. It will now be clear that the inter-
face between the constitutive and bureaucratic structures at the 
Minister-Permanent Head level can be defined as political-adminis-
tration and the functions analytically understood as variables. 
The relationships at any level (sub-system) of the bureaucracy can 
be understood in the same way. Thus the abstract model proposed 
provides classificatory definitions which describe the formal 
organization of public service as an arrangement of political-
administrative relationships at each level up to the level of the 
polity. The assumption of political democracy would demand that 
the contributions of esich office (the functions) be made explicit 
and known to all - who does what, according to what rules and how, 
if at all, is the office called to account. Accountability is the 
central political focus which gives much else in the field its 
meaning. The aim in this respect is the design of "procedurial 
devices", rules, institutions and structures for this purpose. At 
the highest system level these are problems of the distribution of 
constitutional authority and power. At the sub-system bureaucratic 
level it is a problem of job design and accountable management. Ify 
thesis is that both problems are of one kind concerned with making 
those who serve the polity accountable for their actions on behalf 
of the polity* 
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Accountability in its simple original meaning was to be 
under an obligation to give an accoimt of something, to be required 
to explain or justify one or more actions of one or more individuals 
or bodies. Thus, a steward or trustee is expected to account for 
his work with other people's pro£>erty by showing that his actions 
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were authorised by the conditions of his trusteeship. The public 
servant is a steward of the public estate and is called to account 
through the hierarchical structures of the bureaucracy for his 
stewardship of some part of that estate. This iis what public 
service means. Much writing on public administration proceeds 
apparently unaware of this fundamental point. For exeunple, the 
behavioural mode of the 1950's and 1960's which forms such a large 
part of management science, and much of the policy sciences of the 
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same period, seem to assume a stateless polity. Their technol-
ogical criteria of value ignore the fact that when officials in 
government make decisions they are (or ought to be) acting on 
behalf of the polity. Much public administration literature 
concentrates on techniques (in spite of the "discrediting" of the 
dichotomy its emphasis is instrxanental), and takes the political 
order for granted and whilst such work has provided knowledge of 
44 See Stanyer, Jeffrey. "Divided Responsibilities : Accountabil-
ity in Decentralised Government", Public Administration 
Bulletin, Ho.17, December 1974, p.14, and Spiro, H.J. 
Responsibility in Government.Theory and Practice, Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969, Ch.VI. 
45 See Lowi, Theodore. "Decision Making vs. Policy Making : 
Toward an Antidote for Technocracy", Public Administration 
Review, May/June 1970, p.315. 
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bureaucratic processes, scholars in general have not provided a 
systematic and theoretic scheme to encompass the political function. 
Why study the thing in the first place? The answer is still that 
of the environment of political responsibility in which these 
processes take place. 
Public organizations are formed and maintained with the 
manifest intention of accomplishing goals. In practice the 
parliament regularly leaves decisions with high policy content to 
public servants (for various reasons). In these cases, officials 
are expected to be responsive to community values and answerable 
for their actions. If "democracy" (the community acting through 
the political institutions) fails to provide the rationality 
necessary to link legislative policy with administrative action, 
then practitioners are left with a dilemma concerning the relation 
of ends and means. 
Given an assumption of intended rationality in organiz-
ations, procedural devices to achieve accountability must largely 
be built on the clarity with which goals or policies are prescribed. 
That such clarity is not normally achieved does not mean that it 
ought not to be. This is so because the greater the level of 
rationality or clarification of values, the greater the possibility 
of making people accountable for both policy and administration. 
Someone makes a value choice in making policy decisions and it is 
46 For a philosophical discussion of the issues, see Leys, Wayne 
A.R, "fithics and Administrative Discretion", Public Admin-
istration Review, Vol. 3, 1943, pp.10-23. 
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in the interests of democratic government to have this choice 
made in such a way that the polity and its representatives can 
critically judge it and be judged against it. I think this is of 
great importance^ Herbert Simon put it very well. 
"Rationality can be applied in administrative decisions only 
after the relative weights of conflicting values have been 
fixed... somewhere, sometime in the administrative process 
weights actually are assigned to values. If this is not 
done consciously and deliberately, then it is achieved by 
implication in the decisions which are actually reached. 
It is not possible to avoid the problem by hiding it among 
the unexpressed premises of choice... (such questions are) of 
fundamental importance for the maintenance of democratic 
control over the value elements in decision.". „ 
(Emphasis added.) ^' 
Simon's rational-comprehensive model of decision making 
has come under attack and the contemporary theoretical debate in 
American policy-studies centres around this question. Simon sees 
the value of explicitly examining as many alternate behaviours as 
possible in order to make the decision choice as rational as 
48 possible. Charles Lindblom, in d series of articles and books, 
has attacked Simon's formulation. Whilst Simon admits that admin-
4 Q istrators "satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize" 
he has endeavoured to provide the tools to increase man's rationality 
47 Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behaviour, A Study of Decision-
Making Processes in Administration Organization, New York : 
The Free Press, 1957-
48 See Dahl, Robert A, & Lindblom, C.E. Politics Economics and 
Welfare, New York : Harper and Bros., 1953* Lindblom, 
Charles E, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'", Public 
Administration Review. 19, 1959, pp.79-85. Lindblom, Charles 
E, The Intelligence of Democracy, Decision Making Through 
Mutual Adjustment, New York ; The Free Press, 19o5» 
49 Administrative Behaviour, p.xxiv. 
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because rational administrative behaviour demands goals to be 
defined as precisely as possible. His subsequent work is con-
cerned to provide tools for achieving comprehensive rationality 
through information theory, cybernetics and the programming of 
"artificial intelligence" into computers.^ Lindblom's "muddling 
through" and "partisan mutual adjustment" are proposed as democratic 
values and safeguards against the costly failures of overplanning. 
The debate essentially concerns the conflicting political values 
of centralized positive government and pluralist piecemeal adjust-
ment. The administrative reality is better described by Etzioni's 
51 
"mixed scanning" model, which attempts to talk about real work 
in public organizations and combines both Simon's and Lindblom's 
ideas. At a different level, Dror and Vickers have proposed the 
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study of "policy science" or a policy of how to make policy."^  In 
these circumstances it will be obvious that a "good" policy 
decision is problematical and accountability far from clear. 
At the level of the whole system various "solutions" to 
53 the problem of public service accountability have been proposed. 
50 For critical essay, see Dreyfus, Hubert L. "Artificial 
Intelligence", in Lamberton, Donald M. (ed.). The Information 
Revolution, Philadelphia : The American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 1974, pp.21-33. 
51 Etzioni, Amitai. "Mixed Scanning : A»Third' Approach to 
Decision Making", Public Administration Review, Vol.27, 
No.5, 1967, pp.385-392. 
52 See Subramaniam, V, "Two Complementary Approaches to Macro-
Decision Making", Public Administration (Sydney), Vol.XXX, 
No.4, Dec. 1971, pp.337-348. 
53 See Dotson, Arch. "Fundamental Approaches to Administrative 
RAspoTiRihilitv". Western Political Quarterly, Vol.X, No.3, 
September 1957, pp.701-727. 
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Conservative Reaction. 
Traditional accountability maintaining device^ are said 
to be breaOcing down because officials conspire to seize power and 
there is a decline in the popular spirit of freedom. The suggested 
remedy is to reduce public services and limit bureaucracy to 
essential functions. The difficulty with reducing public services 
can be found in the private sector itself. "The problem of admin-
istrative responsibility is caused by the problem of private 
responsibility, as the community has been forced to create public 
agencies to restrain or supplement the application of private 
power." 
Rule of Law. 
In this analysis the courts will ensure bureaucratic 
responsibility. Or put another way, responsibility exists where 
the rule of law exists and where judicial review ensures rational-
ity and regularity interpreted by the "judicial regime". If all 
bureaucratic decisions are formalized and subject to judicial 
review then the advantages of cheap, speedy and efficient action 
would be lost. This would be cause for further complaint. 
Executive Supremacy. 
The President (American) is administrator-in-chief and 
through such principles as the chain of command and unity of 
command, he would control the bureaucracy. This solution has 
great difficulties because delegation is necessary and the substance 
of bureaucratic decisions is political. The top executive cannot 
ensure responsibility because most of political reality is informal. 
Corporate Objectivity. 
Tjiis approach rejects the conspiracy theory but admits 
that traditional devices cannot work in the complex situations of 
modern government. Legislative control is not equal to task. 
Voters cannot provide policy. In the end the public official is 
more or less uncontrolled. Subjective "inner check" - (regard for 
preference in the community) and objective responsibility (the 
technical standards of the "profession" - "fellowship of science") 
are distinguished. The difficulties with this solution lies in 
making the subjective-objective distinction. 
Legislative Supremacy. 
Bureaucratic responsibility may be understood only in 
relation to the character of democratic government. Administration 
must be subject to the legislature whose duty it is to translate 
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the general interest into law and exercise effective punitive 
control over its implementation. The main difficulty here is that 
if Parliament is to be an effective controller its policy resources 
would have to match those of the bureaucracy or effective control 
devices designed to oversight both political and administrative 
functions of the bureaucracy. 
Which of the above is considered to be the solution is 
a political decision involving the distribution of power in the 
polity (which again emphasises that Public Administration is 
concerned with political theory). All these statements of public 
service accountability are consistent in that the official is to 
be made accountable in order to restrain him. He should be more 
responsive, capable and accountable. What is also required is a 
statement of the positive responsibility which the public servant 
has (and should have) for influencing political events and the 
delivery of government services, as well as how to determine his 
obligation. 
Probably the most famous debate on the subject of 
bureaucratic responsibility took place between Carl Friedrich and 
54 Herman Finer during the period 1935-41.*^ An oversimplified 
characterization of the two points of view would be that Finer was 
concerned with bureaucracy's excessive use of power - the "problem" 
54 Friedrich, Carl J. "Responsible Government Service under the 
American Constitution", in Friedrich, Carl J. et.al. Problems 
of the American Public Service, New York : McGraw Hill, 1935, 
pp.3-74, and "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative 
Responsibility", in Friedrich, Carl J. & Mason, Edward S,(eds.). 
Public Policy, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1940, 
pp.3-24. Finer, Herman. "Better Government Personnel", 
Political Science Quarterly, (1936), pp.569 ff. and "Admin-
istrative Responsibility in Democratic Government", Public 
Administration Review, Vol.1, No.4, (l94l), pp.335-350. 
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of responsibility for him was one of making power accountable. 
Friedrich, on the other hand, was more concerned to enstire that the 
official had enough resources to perform his role in modern govern-
ment and he put his faith in the concept of public service profess-
ionalism and "the sense of craftmanship". The interesting thing 
about this debate is that both scholars seem to be talking past 
each other. Their "solutions" are not contradictory and if taken 
together offer a way out of the dilemma of administrative 
responsibility. It is not either making officials accountable or 
making them more powerful, but rather making them more powerful 
and more accountable, that is, by making both political and 
administrative functions explicit. 
"Responsibility", like many other words in political 
discourse, carries many meanings both in everyday language and 
scholarly writing. Donald Smithburg cites "responsibility" as an 
example of political scientists' deplorable lack of precision in 
the use of terms.^ Richaird McKeon, in his paper "The Development 
56 
and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility","^ states that 
philosophical discussion of the term responsibility began in the 
latter half of the 19th century and that, far from clarifying the 
concept, this discussion became a dispute in the analysis of the 
imputation of actions to agents, and of the accountability of acts 
and agents in applying penalties or punishments. The problems of 
^^ "Political Theory and Public Administration", Journal of 
Politics, Vol.13, February 1951, P.59. 
56 Revue Internationale de Philosophie, No.39, Vol.XI, 1957, 
pp.3-32 
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free will and necessity, blame and punishment, became the context 
of the philosophical debate which still continues. I think this 
context is important because American Public Administration writers 
57 have introduced existentialism into the field and responsibility 
is a fundamental concept in this approach. A man can be irrespon-
sible but he cannot be non-responsible. The notion of responsibility 
as it is used here assumes that the individual cannot avoid the 
liability of existential choice. Talk about a "responsible 
organization" or "ministerial responsibility" is metaphorical and 
refers to organizational design intended to achieve certain ends. 
Only the individual human being is responsible in an existential 
sense - to himself - for himself. 
This postulate cannot be proven scientifically, but 
must be accepted a priori, if at all. Whether a man can choose or 
decide what he is or does is problematical and is at the centre of 
the determinist-voluntarist argument. My experience of being able 
to choose which of two alternative behaviours I will undertake may 
be an illusion. What I propose to do is merely to assert with 
J.D. Mabbott -
"If we are asked for a criterion of responsibility, we have to 
do as the lawyers do. Here is our conception of freedom. It 
is 'defeasable' - that is, we can accept certain evidence as 
evidence that it is absent but there can be no evidence that 
57 For example, see Harmon, Michael M. "Normative Theory and Public 
Administration : Some Suggestions for a Redefinition of 
Administrative Responsibility", in Marini, Frank (ed.). Toward 
a New Public Administration. The Minnowbrook Perspective, 
Scranton : Chandler Publishing Company, 1971, pp.l72-l85. 
Also see Richter, Anders. "The Existential Executive", Public 
Administration Review, July/August, 1970, pp.415-422. 
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it is present in a given case. For this reason too the defence 
of freewill must always be ... an attempt to refute determin-
istic arguments rather than a positive argument itself... 
There cannot be a criterion of free action, for a criterion 
would inevitably be deterministic."J-Q 
Postulating a will in no way prescribes the content of 
that will. The implication for the practicing public servant is 
that personal responsibility for his actions cannot be evaded. He 
is obliged to act and the content of his obligation is a value 
choice. 
At the higher levels, public service is a practical art 
and is not only instrumental but innovative. Whereas at the lower 
levels, the factors in the situation are more or less given, the 
senior official's task is an artistic and creative one. New values 
have to be imagined and new structures created. At this level, 
breadth of experience, knowledge, vision and a sense of personal 
security are necessary to allow the practitioner to transcend the 
parochial values of his office and challenge the system to keep it 
dynamic. If public servants are to be responsible as well as 
accountable,structures should be designed to encourage individuality. 
To be responsible in the sense suggested, the official 
has to sort out what is factual in a situation and what is a value 
choice. He cannot choose "between" facts and values because any 
action involves both a preference and an intention. The "either -
or" approach is simply wrong. The separation of factual statements 
and evaluational statements on the one hand, and the separation of 
58 Mabbott, J.D. in Lewis, H.D. (ed.). Contemporary British Phil-
osophy , London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956, p.302. 
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the methods of science and the methods of other disciplines on the 
other should not be confused. 
The technology which the physical and behavioural 
sciences provide for public servants is a tool, an instrument, for 
achieving some political goal. It is not science per se which 
concerns the practitioner but the possibility of using technology 
in an attempt to achieve this goal. Science is therefore an 
instrumental value and the facts of science (including management 
science) can be ignored quite as easily as other facts by those who 
make political decisions. The practitioner should ask "What is the 
state of scientific knowledge regarding the problem before me?" If 
his problem is (for example) one of "administrative management", he 
should direct his questions to the technology of the field. Whether 
he chooses to adopt the recommended technology is a value choice. 
However, the practitioner should be able to disc«»rn the logical 
bases for establishing value premises in his choice as distinct 
from the factual factors.^° He cannot use the instrumental notion 
of efficiency to insulate himself from the clash of conflicting 
values. He is responsible for his actions and is liable to be 
called to account. His accountability qua public servant is 
political and is therefore part of the general problem of political 
responsibility. 
59 See Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behaviour, and "The 
Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administra-
tiori'.in Pool, Ithiel de Sola (ed.). Contemporary Political 
Science, toward empirical theory. New York : McGraw Hill 
60 See''Dahl?Sobert^ l^ .'''"The Science of Public Administration", 
Public Administration Review. Vol.VII, 1947, No.l, pp.1-11. 
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Obviously, the individual does not exist in isolation 
but draws the content of his evaluations from an environment of 
norms and rules which structure his society, organization or group. 
Unconscious forces and physiological factors shape his cognitive 
processes. But these are necessary conditions of being human, of 
what happens to a man. They are not sufficient conditions to 
explain what he chooses to do. The intra-subjective experience of 
choosing alternative behaviours is the primary dimension of 
responsibility in an existential sense. The significance of this 
perspective for a theory of public service is that whilst a public 
servant cannot evade responsibility, he cannot be made to be 
responsible - this is an individual decision - an ethical choice. 
Because the official is, in the end, accountable to the polity, 
those who manage public organizations should structure the 
situation of choice in order that the ethical dimension in his work 
is clarified. The bureaucratic positivism inherent in the notion 
that a public servant's obligation is only instrumental is neither 
logically nor factually valid. Scientific management and the 
technologies of the behavioural sciences seem methodologically 
required to reject considerations of organizational morality. The 
existential imperatives of bureaucracy can be escaped only at the 
cost of turning public servants into "cheerful robots" who are 
engineered by those with the capability to do so. The individual 
must be able to balance the demands of bureaucratic office with a 
sense of obligation to the polity if he is to be committed to his 
role as a public servant. 
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In my experience in the Queensland Public Service the 
question of ethics has not been a significant factor in training. 
In fact, if one expresses the need for inducting recruits into the 
ethics of public service the usual reply is that the community 
itself will provide such values. By community judgments, public 
servants are characterized as "fat cats", loafers, takers rather 
than givers. What the community seems to require is that public 
servants be more moral, more enthusiastic, more diligent, more 
concerned with the public interest, in other words, more "respons-
ible" than other sections of society. Such standards cannot be 
internalized because public servants lack a specific ethic. 
"Facts" and technique are seen to be all important and the mistake 
made that they have meaning apart from a value giving context. If 
the facts do not accord with expressed values (the myths), cynicism, 
apathy or despair follows. The problem seems to be one of bringing 
political-administrative accountability and personal responsibility 
together in the notion of "responsibility in government". This has 
been attempted by Herbert Spiro who distinguishes three connota-
tions in which people usually speak of responsibility - responsib-
ility; as accountability, responsibility as cause, responsibility 
as obligation. Taken together these define the concept. 
61 Spiro, op.cit. 
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Fig. 1, 
Individual Responsibility. 
Responsibility as 
Accountability 
.. to be answerable. 
.. having to render an account. 
.. being called to account. 
Explicit 
When the person has good fore-
knowledge of the extent to which 
he will be answerable or called 
to account for his actions and 
is called to account accordingly. 
Responsibility as Cause 
..to cause an effect. 
.. to act so that someone is 
"called to account". 
Explicit 
Implicit 
When the person is called to 
account for the cohsequences 
of actions of other htiman 
beings without participation 
and foreknowledge - such 
actions go to his account and 
he may either benefit or 
suffer accordingly. 
When four elements are present 
(1) Choice of alternative 
behaviour. 
(2) Knowledge of likely 
consequences. 
(3) Resources (human material) 
available. 
(4) Purpose - commitment. 
Implicit 
When one or more of the above 
elements are missing. 
Responsibility as Obligation. 
The individual value judgment which 
balances accountability and cause for 
the indil^idual. 
Spire's thesis is concerned with the "situation of 
responsibility" for the individual citizen in a constitutional 
democracy. 
"From the viewpoint of constitutional democracy, however, we 
would have to advocate a fair balance between these two faces 
of responsibility, between accountability and causal respon-
sibility. We would not want to hold a person accountable for 
an event to which he made no causal contribution. We would not 
want his accountability to outweigh the extent of his 
contribution. We would want to enable him to become causally 
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responsible for all decisions, for which he will be explicitly 
or implicitly accountable. And we would want to increase his 
explicit at the cost of his implicit accountability. We would 
want him to be in a sound situation of responsibility, in 
which causal responsibility stands in fair balance with 
accountability."gp 
He argues that a statement of the content of the individual's 
obligation -
"Maintain, improve, or create situations of responsibility."g^ 
There is no space here to state Spire's analysis - the 
reader can refer to that author if he wishes. However, the 
imperative of responsibility as expressed by Spiro is accepted 
by me as a value which informs the discussion of public service 
responsibility in our system and provides the basis for an ethic 
of public service. The content of obligation for Spiro is the 
balance between causal responsibility and accountability. For 
example, a citizen would be in a bad situation of responsibility 
if he had no explicit causal responsibility and great implicit 
accountability. Given the vsuLue judgment that as democrats we 
should "Maintain, improve, or create situations of responsibility", 
then every man should become causally responsible for his fate 
insofar as it is possible in order to attempt to balance his 
accountability. Constitutional democracy is successful to the 
extent that the situation of responsibility of the individual 
citizen is achieved. Theoretically, having shared the causal 
responsibility for an effect, he is called to account for its 
consequences. His obligation as a citizen is to bring these into 
62 Ibid, p.18. 63 Ibid, p.20. 
206 
balance as far as possible. This is a value judgment and is 
asserted as the basic postulate of democracy. 
The public servant's obligation is to put himself in a 
situation of responsibility ^ua citizen, but additionally in a 
situation of responsibility ^ua public servant. Not only does he 
have to balance his personal causal responsibility and account-
ability in the polity generally, but he also has to balance his 
delegated causal responsibility as a public servant, the account-
ability of the consumers of his actions and his own accountability 
within the organization. The moral dilemma (= crisis of obligation) 
arises when his responsibility as a citizen is not congruent with 
his responsibility as a public servant. Of course this dilemma will 
never arise for those public servants who see themselves accountable 
only to prudential criteria (promotion, money, status). In times 
of settled social and political values such prudential criteria may 
be predictable, and functional for the system. But in a time of 
turbulence, when established values are being questioned, a 
conflict of obligation is likely to threaten the system. This will 
become increasingly important as the proportion of public employees 
to those in the private sector increases. How the public servant 
resolves the potential dilemma is the content of his obligation. 
He may follow his own self interest and choose prudentially in the 
light of circumstances, he may choose wholehearted support to his 
hierarchical situation, he may choose to take the part of his client 
group and, if he is lucky, all three of these options may coincide. 
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But whatever he does, it is essentially an ethical dilemma and the 
public servant should be encouraged to understand the situation of 
responsibility in which he is placed. 
Why is this so? Because increasingly he will be placed 
at the centre of debates on problematical social questions which 
he cannot ignore. The increasing conflict and turbulence in society 
will threaten the system maintaining administrative function 
usually associated with the public service. Radical claims and 
counter claims will demand consideration now. And as Wolin pointed 
out -
"Times of crisis are notoriously uncongenial to the mellower 
wisdom of Aristotle, to a fondness for gradual becoming amd 
modest tinkering, to the respect tendered to customary 
practice and common opinion. "/-^  
This analysis applies to both the political and adminis-
trative functions of the bureaucrat because at each level he is 
related to other officials in both these ways. Public service 
responsibility includes both functions. The public servant 
(particularly at a senior level), cannot escape the specific 
responsibility which accrues to him because of his office and the 
delegated power attached thereto. According to the strict hier-
archical theory of organization this should cause no difficulty. 
The office is accountable and his accountability is balanced 
proportionately to his causal responsibility. Thus he is in a 
good situation of responsibility. Clearly, the formal content of 
64 Wolin, op.cit., p.243. 
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his obligation can be defined by his delegation but the way in 
which he directs his efforts will largely depend on the balance 
he strikes between accountability and causal responsibility in the 
fuller sense described above. And in any case, the strict hier-
archical approach is under attack on all sides, more so in the 
American system than in Australia, because of the separation and 
fragmentation of political power in that system. But we cannot 
ignore what appears to be an inevitable threat to traditional 
hierarchical organizational forms. Two examples will illustrate. 
Firstly, public organizations are being staffed more and more with 
"professionals". These vocational groups associate together on the 
basis of some body of knowledge which they "profess" and which they 
say gives them a claim to expert knowledge in the particular policy 
area concerned. On the one hand this allows predictability as to 
their behaviour, which assists in design and system maintenance. 
But it also encourages officers to identify with their professional 
group and not with the hierarchical leadership. There is a 
conflict of accountability and the officerfe obligation becomes 
problematical. Secondly, there is an increasing demand for 
decentralization, participation, individual autonomy, spontaneity, 
creativity and democracy emerging from the more extreme writing on 
management. These normative writings question the values of 
rationality, lawfulness, superior-subordinate relationships, 
efficiency, and other traditional modes. The values expressed 
cannot be argued against per se. What is important in public 
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service is relating those values to the polity. The new organ-
izational technologies are the product of those concerned with the 
business firm, the corporation and the factory and the values 
sought are defined by the objectives of those organizations. The 
"science" that such technologies profess must be separated from 
the value context in which they are employed. Hierarchy in its 
legal rational form is concerned primarily with ensuring account-
ability and, in public service, offices are accountable to the 
polity through the constitutive system. 
The objectives of the firm and the requirements of the 
employees therein can be brought into balance reasonably well by 
the benefit of profit to both parties. Generally speaking, firms 
will not "hiunanize" their organizations unless the effect shows up 
in the balance sheet and an employee's obligation is reasonably 
clear. But in public service there is, in many cases, no real way 
that the employee can identify with the objectives of the organ-
ization which, in the macro sense, is the polity itself. This is 
because organizational objectives are formed through the political 
processes and the values involved may be problematical. Or alter-
natively, where policy goals are vague, experts within departments 
may exercise the policy formation role itself according to 
"professional" values not necessarily those of the polity. Thus 
the public servant may tend not to seek the manifest political 
goals of his sub-system but merely the benefits of office (status, 
salary, power, professional growth, etc.). This possibility is 
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compounded when the legitimating value of hierarchy and authority 
are eroded. 
This is in no way meant to be a defence of "bureau-
pathplogy". The view here is that the hierarchical structuring of 
offices (the bureaucracy) in the governmental system is neither 
inherently good or bad, efficient or inefficient. What is asserted 
is that a public service office has delegated causal responsibility 
and is legitimated by its subordination to the constitutive system. 
Offices must be made accountable in such a way that that system is 
accountable to the electorate. The functional relationship of the 
bureaucracy to the other components in the system is the primary 
subject matter for the study of Public Administration. The tech-
nologies of the business schools apply only to administrative 
capability, that is, one aspect of the administrative function, and 
by definition this must be subordinated to political values. The 
public servant's obligation, his ethical choice, his situation of 
responsibility in relation to the political authority of the 
constitutive system is fundamental. He may seek a good situation 
of responsibility in relation to his hierarchic position or, 
alternatively, to some other structure which in turn should have 
a similar relationship to the constitutive system. If neither of 
these relationships exists, the bureaucrat is in a position where 
his stewardship is out of balance with his accountability. 
Figure 2 sets out the possible sources of the bureaucrat's 
accountability. 
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^ig» 2. 
Responsibility as Accountability. 
^^^ Official (b) Associational (c) Societal 
Hierarchy Profession Clients 
J;^ * Union Unrepresented 
Official Church Groups 
Prescriptions Ethnic Group Organized 
The Constitution Political Parties Pressure Groups 
^tc. Etc. Etc. 
Obviously there are all sorts of combinations and it is 
for the individual to exEunine his own accountability. 
The power to cause an effect (causal responsibility) 
available to the individual is assumed in the discretion allowed 
to his office. A possible combination would be as follows. 
^jg' 3. 
Responsibility as Cause. 
(a) Commitment (b) Resources of Office (c) Knowledge 
Rationality Authority attached Expertize 
Objectives reason- to office Skills 
ably clear and Men, Material, Money Abilities 
obtainable. Law 
How the individual public servant balances his causal 
responsibility and his accountability would be the sum of these 
variables in the context of other individuals faced with the same 
problem. From a design viewpoint, the ideal-type situation would 
exist when all elements are present and do not conflict. The 
important problem is how to ensure that causal responsibility 
delegated to the bureaucrat within the hierarchical structure is 
balanced by his accountability, because delegation is another way 
of stating a political relationship. The power which a bureaucrat 
possesses through delegation is defined by the norms authoritatively 
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prescribed. Authority is a structure. The function for the 
system follows from the bureaucrat's obligation which will be a value 
choice made by him. Which structure (official, associational or 
societal) should demand his accountability can ground different 
theories of Public Administration. 
Public Administration in Queensland is mainly concerned 
with bureaucratic capability - with efficiency, skills, management 
of people in pursuit of organizational goals, the negative aspects 
of accountability, and the development of efficient, effective in-
struments to implement policy. What is missing is a discussion of 
political obligation, the ethical dimension, which is the source 
of legitimacy for individuals in the system. All public organ-
izations are presumed to exist for public purposes, that is, for 
purposes legitimated by the people. Efficiency is a neutral tool 
and the training of experts, specialists and so on to achieve this 
instrumental goal is relatively easy. From the viewpoint of a 
theory of public service, whilst the concepts "politics" and 
"administration" define functional relationships between structures, 
and "responsibility" defines a bureaucrat's possibilities for choice, 
and if the democratic imperative of maintaining, improving or 
creating situations of responsibility for the citizen and the public 
servant is accepted, the individual public servant must still pull 
all these elements together in some form in his own understanding. 
No one can prescribe how this is to be done. Those who construct 
and run public organizations can at least mitigate the existential 
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dilemma through wise leadership and by making the alternatives 
explicit. Rights and obligations must be in balance. Causal 
responsibility and accountability must be explicitly related at 
all levels of the bureaucracy. The relationship of the public 
servant to the polity and to the individual citizen's account-
ability for bureaucratic behaviour should be stressed. This is a 
normative recommendation. The alternative appears to be cynicism 
in which the control of public organizations is seen as a prize in 
a power game without any ethical base. If this view is held 
strongly enough, by enough politicians and public servants, it 
will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be ironic if 
concerned students and practitioners of Public Administration 
were responsible for this happening simply by ignoring the problem. 
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APPENDIX B.-220 
QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT BOARDS 
AND COMMITTEES (JUNE I975T' 
Abattoir Boards (8) 
Aboriginal and Islander Councils 
Advisory and Co-ordinating Committee on Soil Conservation 
Agricultural Bank Board 
Agricultural Chemicals Distribution Control Board 
Agricultural Requirements Board 
Air Pollution Council of Queensland 
Appeal Costs Board 
Apprenticeship Executive 
Art Gallery Trustees 
Artificial Insemination Advisory Committee 
Auctioneers and Agents Committee 
Banana Industry Protection Board 
Beach Protection Advisory Board 
Beach Protection Authority 
Board of Adult Education 
Board of Advanced Education 
Board of Architects of Queensland 
Board of Examiners (Department of Mines) 
Board of Examinersfof Engineers, Engine Drivers and Motor Mechanics 
Board of Examiners for Engineers and Overseers of Works to Local 
Authorities 
Board of Optometrical Registration 
Board of Professional Engineers 
Board of Secondary School Studies 
Board of Teacher Education 
Booval Mines Rescue Station Committee 
Brigalow Sub-Committee of Land Development Committee 
Brisbane Markets Trust 
Brisbane Transportation Study Committees 
Brisbane Water Supply Planning Committee 
Builders Registration Board of Queensland 
Building Construction Industry Safety Council 
Burdekin Basin Appraisal Committee 
Burdekin River Authority 
Cairns Local Advisory Committee (Giant Sensitive Plant) 
Cane Pest and Disease Control Boards 
Central Queensland Mines Rescue Station Committee 
Central Sugar Cane Prices Board 
Chiropodists Board of Queensland 
Collinsville Mines Rescue Station Committee 
Committee of Review (Brigalow Development Scheme) 
Committee of Review (General Selective Openings) 
Source : Department of the Public Service Board, Queensland. 
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Commodity Marketing Boards and Growers' Organizations -
Council of Agriculture 
The Queensland Cane Growers' Council and Mills Suppliers' 
Committees (3I) 
District Executives (8) 
Queensland Dairymen's State Council 
Dairy Products Stabilisation Board 
Atherton Tableland Maize Marketing Board 
Barley Marketing Board 
Brisbane Milk Board 
Broom Millet Marketing Board 
Butter Marketing Board 
Cheese Marketing Board 
Central Queensland Egg Marketing Board 
Committee of Direction of Fruit Marketing 
Cannery Board 
Cotton Marketing Board 
Egg Marketing Board 
Egg Marketing Board Suppliers' Organisation 
Fish Board 
Ginger Marketing Board 
C.Q. Green Sorghum Marketing Board 
Navy Bean Marketing Board 
Peanut Marketing Board 
Rice Marketing Board 
State Wheat Board 
Tobacco Leaf Marketing Board 
Sugar Board 
Quota Committees and Quota Appeal Tribunals 
Consumer Affairs Council 
Co-operative Advisory Committee 
Co-ordinating Board (Lands Department) 
Corporate Affairs Advisory Committee 
Dental Board 
Detention Review Tribunal (Department of Health) 
Drainage Boards (3) 
Dumaresq - Barwon Border Rivers Commission 
Electrical Approvals Committee 
Electrical Workers and Contractors Board 
Environmental Control Council 
Factories and Shops Health, Welfare and Safety Board 
Filled Milk Advisory Committee (Department of Primary Industries) 
Films Board of Review 
Fire Brigade Boards (8I) 
Food Standards Advisory Committee 
Gladstone Area Co-ordinating Committee 
Government Motor Garages Departmental Committee 
Government Services Centre Departmental Committee 
Grammar School Trustees 
222 
Greyhound Racing Control Board 
Group Apprenticeship Advisory Committees (Various) 
Group Apprenticeship Committees (Various) 
Harbour Boards 
Harrisia Cactus Advisory Board 
Hospitals Boards (58) 
Housing and Building Societies Advisory Committee 
Industrial Affairs Advisory Committee 
Industries Assistance Board 
Innisfail Local Advisory Committee (Giant Sensitive Plant) 
Institutes of Advanced Education Committees 
Island Industries Board 
Joint Committee (Department of Local Government) 
Land Development Committee (Department of the Co-ordinator-
General) 
Land Transport Industry Occupational Safety Council 
Law Reform Commission 
Library Board of Queensland 
Licensing Commission 
Literature Board of Review 
Local Government Auditors Board 
Local Government Clerks Board 
Marginal Dairy Farm Amalgamation Committee 
Marine Board of Queensland 
Meat Industry Safety Council 
Medical Board of Queensland 
Medical Boards (Specialist) for the purposes of the Workers 
Compensation Acts and Mt. Isa Lead Board 
Mental Health Review Tribunal 
Milk and Cream Transport Committee (Department of Primary 
Industries) 
Mineral Industry Advisory Committee (Department of Education) 
Moreton Regional Water Advisory Committee 
National Fitness Council 
National Trust of Queensland 
Nominal Defendant (Queensland) (Treasury Department) 
Noxious Plant Consultant Committee of Co-ordinating Board 
(Lands Department) 
Nurses Board of Queensland 
Parole Board 
Pharmacy Board 
Physiotherapists Board of Queensland 
Picture Theatres and Films Commission 
Plximbers and Drainers Examination and Licensing Board 
Police Superannuation Board 
Poultry Advisory Board 
Public Service Superannuation Board 
Pyramid Selling Schemes Elimination Committee 
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Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigade Organisations 
Queensland Energy Resources Council (Department of Mines) 
Queensland Health Education Council 
Queensland Institute of Medical Research 
Queensland Meat Industry Authority 
Queensland Museujn Trustees 
Queensland Place Names Board 
Queensland Place Names Committee 
Queensland Radium Institute 
Queensland Road Safety Council 
Queensland Surveyors Board 
Queensland Theatre Company 
Queensland Trotting Board 
Rabbit Advisory Committees (k) 
Rabbit Control Authority 
Radiological Advisory Council of Queensland 
Regional Electricity Board 
River Improvement Trusts (15) 
Rural Fires Board 
Rural Reconstruction Board 
Rural Training School Boards 
Solicitors Board 
State Disaster Relief Organisation 
State Fire Services Council 
State Government Insurance Office (Queensland) Board 
State Stores Board 
Stud Advisory Committee (Cattle) (Lands Department) 
Stud Advisory Committee (Sheep) (Lands Department) 
Sugstr Board 
Sugar Experiment Stations Board 
Timber Research and Development Advisory Council of North 
Queensland 
Timber Research and Development Advisory Council of South & Central 
Queensland 
Totalisator Administration Board of Queensland 
Trustees, Newstead House 
Tully Local Advisory Committee (Giant Sensitive Plant) 
Universities Boards and Committees 
Valuers Registration Board of Queensland 
Veterinary Surgeons Board of Queensland 
Water Boards (18) 
Water Quality Council of Queensland 
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